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ABSTRACT 
 
During its violent spread across the Middle East, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham 
(ISIS) amassed both a local and international following in large part due to its usage of emergent 
media distribution. Beginning in 2014, ISIS’s Ministry of Media published an English-language 
magazine, Dabiq, disseminating its issues through online platforms. Dabiq and its successor 
Rumiyah both serve as propagandistic recruitment material for ISIS’s international community as 
well as broadcasting the message of the jihadist movement to ISIS’s enemies. This study 
analyzed ISIS’s publications using a qualitative content analysis in order to identify jihadist 
recruitment strategies through the perspectives of agenda-setting theory, the diffusion of 
innovations, symbolic convergence theory, and speech codes theory. These communication 
theories characterize the roles that civilizational conflict, population demographics, narrative 
themes, and emergent media play in the diffusion of the jihadist movement.  
This study samples the textual content and imagery of issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah, 
using thematic analysis to procedurally code the data by recognizing shared characteristics and 
concepts. The fundamental goal of this study is to gain a greater understanding of the way ISIS, 
its members, and the jihadist movement communicate their intentions, with the hope of 
preventing further recruitment and radicalization. The two following research questions drive 
this study: (1) What themes are present in the ISIS publications of Dabiq and Rumiyah? (2) How 
do the themes of these publications vary over time?
  
 The findings of this study reveal an overarching worldview present in the rhetoric of 
every theme within the magazines. The themes are as follows: jihad, sharia, the ummah, non-
Muslims and apostate Muslims, the caliphate, violent militancy, enmity against the West, divine 
sanction, and final conflict. These themes reflect ISIS’s ultimate goal a wide-scale conflict 
between faithful jihadists and their enemies – the infidels and apostates. This conflict is both 
physical and ideological; ISIS encourages its members to believe that they are sanctioned by 
Allah and will triumph culturally over the West and nonbelievers. ISIS’s focus on the 
subjugation of these nonbelievers through violent militancy further pushes the shared group 
fantasy of total victory over its enemies. The variation in thematic frequency visible within the 
magazines imply trends in ISIS’s shifting priorities over time. However, ISIS’s thematic 
hierarchy still reinforces a black-and-white rhetoric of all-encompassing conflict.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Emergent telecommunications technology provides new opportunities for all 
communicators to convey their messages. Communicators within the jihadist movement are no 
exception. The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) produces a wide array of propagandistic 
materials in multiple languages and disseminates these communications through online 
platforms, reaching a wide international audience inaccessible with traditional print media. 
ISIS’s strong online presence broadcasts its message, bolsters the group’s international visibility, 
and may act as the crucial step towards radicalization of potential recruits. Its English-language 
magazine publications Dabiq and Rumiyah compile ISIS propaganda for readers across the 
globe. Through a qualitative analysis, this study has identified key themes and issues found 
within the content of these magazines and has utilized theories of communication to understand 
their rhetorical and applied significance. 
 
Objective of this Study 
 
The objective of this study is to analyze the theoretical objectives and functions of the 
content presented within ISIS’s magazine publications in order to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of ISIS’s communication strategies. The three following research questions drive 
this study: (1) What themes are present in the ISIS publications of Dabiq and Rumiyah? (2) How 
do the themes of these publications vary over time? These questions are respectively addressed 
through agenda-setting theory, the diffusion of innovations and memetic engineering, and speech 
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codes theory. This study is framed with a content analysis methodology with a focus on thematic 
analysis. 
 
Rationale for Conducting this Study 
  
 Though ISIS’s perceived threat level towards the global community is greatly diminished 
from its militant peak, its pervasive online presence and its adaptation to emerging 
telecommunications technologies were major factors in the group’s international visibility. While 
the group has failed to maintain its territory and establish an uncontested theocratic Islamist 
empire, it has succeeded in spawning multiple terror attacks from individual actors inspired by 
ISIS across the globe. These attacks include the 2016 murders of 86 people and the injury of over 
four hundred more in Nice, France after an ISIS supporter drove a cargo truck through a crowd, 
as well as the Pulse massacre in Orlando, Florida, in which 49 individuals were killed by a 
shooter who claimed allegiance to ISIS (“Attack on Nice”, 2016). Both perpetrators, as well as 
those of multiple other similar attacks, were exposed to ISIS content. The success of small-cell 
terrorist attacks inspired by ISIS’s message may denote significant implications on the future of 
the jihadist movement and of Islamist terrorism.  
 ISIS’s communication strategy influenced the lethal radicalization of terrorists 
worldwide. In order to combat this strategy, the group’s available content must be understood, 
thus shedding light on the group’s overarching approach to communication. This study utilizes a 
qualitative analysis approach, sampling the magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, to address the 
group’s intentions, identify recurrent themes in its content, and understand the significance of 
ISIS’s content in terms of the wider jihadist movement.  
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Preview of the Main Points 
 
 The preliminary literature review identifies multiple themes shared in the jihadist 
movement and evident in the contents of Dabiq and Rumiyah. These themes follow the narrative 
of fundamentalist Islamist belief in a unified theocratic Islamist empire and the hostile conflict 
between the Islamic world and traditionally Judeo-Christian, democratic Western civilizations, 
culminating in a divinely sanctioned Islamic victory. The dependence of ISIS’s content on the 
traditional belief in an apocalyptic victory of Islam falls in line with Samuel Huntington’s 1993 
hypothesis of the Clash of Civilizations, which suggests that conflict in the modern world will 
stem from peoples’ cultural and religious identities. Though the magazines espouse the same 
belief in a struggle against the West (as is found in classical Islamist belief), Dabiq and Rumiyah 
are unique in their presentation of content that blends traditional jihadist narratives with modern-
day communications methods and strategies. These methods include propagandistic persuasion 
attempts, identified through agenda-setting theory, and memetic engineering within the jihadist 
movement. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter begins with a description of three major communication theories that drive 
this thesis project. These theories relate to the communication strategies used in the jihadist 
publications Dabiq and Rumiyah. Each theory addresses how groups use communication to 
influence various audiences. 
 
Agenda-Setting Theory 
   
Developed by McCombs (2004), agenda-setting theory examines how media outlets and 
news organizations create or shape the relevance of topics for the public at large. When 
a particular issue in the news is conspicuously featured and heavily covered in magazines, 
newspapers, websites, or on television, the audience – or a certain percentage thereof –
 will likely consider that issue more salient (i.e., important). As a definition, “agenda-setting” 
refers to the diffusion of an issue through the media and the development of public 
awareness (and public concern as a reaction to the issue). Through this influence, the media 
creates a hierarchy of prevalence in news issues and topics (Rogers, 1993).   
McCombs’s description of agenda-setting includes two basic premises of the media. The 
first premise is that the media and the press do not reflect an accurate picture of reality, but rather 
a filtered version of reality shaped to meet their interests. The second premise is that the media’s 
focus on the issues and subjects they select influences the public to perceive those issues as more 
important or more relevant than other less-prominent subjects. Therefore, the media establishes a 
hierarchy of news salience through its coverage.  
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An important factor in media agenda-setting is the time frame in which a media source 
features a topic. The speed with which the media covers an issue can affect the issue’s 
prominence, the way the issue is portrayed in the media and the issue itself.  
Through their preliminary research on agenda-setting and public perception through 
political campaigns, McCombs and Shaw (1972) observed that the mass media had little 
influence on the direction or intensity of attitudes towards different issues. However, they also 
noted that the mass media set the agenda for political campaign by influencing the salience of 
attitudes towards specific political issues. This statement is echoed in McCombs’s 2004 work 
and in the work of other researchers. Cohen (1963) observed that the press “may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling readers what to think about. The world will look different to different people... depending 
on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors and publishers of the paper they read” (p. 
13).   
In regards to the digitalization of media, McCombs also observed in his 2004 book 
that emerging communications technology creates a wide variety of sources of information from 
which consumers can choose. Information consumers can select issues in advance to which they 
choose to be exposed to. This variety of information sources (available digitally) prevents 
consonance throughout media, presenting a challenge to agenda-setting, as different outlets set 
different agendas of their choosing dependent on the issues they perceive as most important.   
 
Framing Theory 
  
 Related to agenda-setting, framing theory also discusses how the media affects public 
salience of a topic, but also asserts that the characterization of an issue in the media influences 
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the public’s perspective of the topic. First developed by Goffman (1974), the term “frame” refers 
to the framework with which one interprets the world, while the term “framing” describes how a 
communication source constructs and characterizes information communicated. Goffman 
suggested that individual people struggle constantly to interpret information, and through 
applying interpretive schemas, or frameworks, individuals can better understand meaning. 
Framing theory states that media outlets act as gatekeepers, controlling and communicating the 
content that the audience consumes (Scheufele, 1999). This affects the way that the audience 
interprets and understands the content. 
Entman (1993) stated that the principles of framing theory involve selection and salience. 
Framing, Entman defines, refers to the way media outlets select information from a perceived 
reality, then make that selected information more salient in order to promote a certain 
perspective. Frames usually ultimately define problems, from the perspective of the media outlet, 
though they often analyze and evaluate the problem defined and prescribe solutions for the 
problem. Through highlighting parts of information, media outlets make the information they 
share more salient, as in agenda-setting theory.  
Fairhurst and Sarr (1996) describe multiple framing techniques with which media outlets 
make the information they highlight affect the audience’s interpretation of a situation. These 
techniques include framing information as metaphors, stories, traditions, slogans, artifacts, 
contrasts, or spins. Metaphor refers to the framing of an idea by comparing it to something else. 
Dependent on an audience member’s established perspective on what the idea is being compared 
to, the comparison may affect the audience member’s interpretation of the idea itself (Fairhurst 
& Sarr, 1996). To frame a topic like a story, such a saga, myth, or legend, means to convey the 
topic with the drama of a memorable narrative. Referencing tradition or ritual in framing is a 
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technique where media outlets tie culturally significant ideas to their content, changing the way 
the audience understands the meaning of the content.  
Slogans, jargons, and catchphrases are all framing techniques that increase the 
memorability of a topic. The slogan may also include a descriptor of the topic that frames it with 
a certain perspective. Artifacts, like traditions, hold cultural value. Framing content through 
artifacts makes use of the symbolic significance of established concepts, applying it to the 
content of a media outlet (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). To contrast is framing through comparison, in 
which the media outlet describes a topic by what the outlet perceives the topic is not. Lastly, spin 
is a framing technique that subtly conveys value judgment on an issue, creating an inherent bias.  
While agenda-setting addresses what the public think is most important, framing 
describes how the public views issues made salient by the media. As communication gatekeepers, 
media outlets consciously and unconsciously stress specific facts, perspectives, and opinions 
when describing issues, altering the way an audience interprets the subject at hand. The 
information the media presents on a topic to the public changes the data with which the public 
uses to pass judgment on the issue.  
 
Persuasion  
  
The media’s ability to influence public agenda on issue salience also ties into the broad 
study of persuasion. Persuasion is an umbrella term referring to the power of influence over 
a person’s beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations, or behaviors (Gass & Seiter, 2010). 
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), as developed by Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986), the degree of persuasion a person is susceptible is affected by multiple variables of the 
source, message, recipient, and context of a persuasion attempt. These variables can serve as 
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persuasive arguments or peripheral cues and can also affect relatively objective or 
biased consideration of arguments. The ELM describes how different individuals process stimuli 
and how likely an individual is to mentally elaborate or reflect on an argument through these 
variables.   
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) state that there are two “routes” to persuasion: central and 
peripheral. The central route to persuasion consists of thoughtful consideration of the arguments 
within the content of the message. When a receiver processes a message centrally, he or she is 
actively engaging in the process of persuasion rather than passively letting persuasion occur. 
Thee prerequisites required for central processing is that the receiver has both the motivation and 
the ability to thoughtfully reflect upon a message. If the listener has no stake in the content of the 
message, he or she will likely lack the motivation to process the message centrally. Likewise, if 
the listener is distracted from the message or cannot understand the message, he or she will also 
lack the ability to process the message centrally. The peripheral route to persuasion is the 
superficial decision whether to agree with a message based on heuristic cues other than the 
strength of the message’s arguments. These heuristics may include variables from the perceived 
authority of the persuader to the social proof of the reactions of other listeners. The placement of 
an issue on the public agenda news hierarchy may depend on how the news media utilizes the 
two routes of persuasion to influence public perception of a topic’s importance.   
Cialdini (2001) describes these heuristics in depth, calling them “click, whirr” processes 
that serve as mental shortcuts for individuals to make decisions. Heuristics allow message 
receivers to form decisions based off of generalizations when the message contains more 
information than the receiver is willing to process. Persuaders can also exploit these heuristics to 
strengthen the persuasive ability of their messages.  
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The heuristics Cialdini (2006) describes are reciprocity, commitment and consistency, 
social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. Reciprocity is a societal norm found across cultures 
in which a person feels obliged to reciprocate gifts or favors to the giver. Commitment and 
consistency describe the social tendency of people to wish to appear consistent, particularly in 
fulfilling commitments, and to value consistency in others. This tendency may also extend to 
justifying and escalating commitments. Social proof is conceptually similar to groupthink and 
refers to the act of looking to the choices of one’s peers when making decisions. Liking refers to 
the tendency for individuals to be more susceptible to persuasion if the individual likes the 
persuader and can be influenced by multiple factors such as similarity and common goals. The 
heuristic of perceived authority is another major factor of persuasion and may include the 
perceived expertise of the persuader. Lastly, scarcity describes the tendency of people to want 
things or concepts more the less available the item in question seems to be. These heuristics 
may be employed by media sources to support the propagation of the agenda set through their 
issue coverage.  
The media’s ability to persuade the public of a topic’s salience can also be addressed 
through inoculation theory. Inoculation theory, as described by McGuire (1961), refers to how 
attitudes and belief may change due to persuasion attempts and how such change is preventable. 
McGuire’s theory compares inoculation against persuasion to medical inoculation, in which 
antibody production is triggered by the exposure of a body to a weakened virus, building the 
body’s resistance and strengthening it against stronger viruses. In terms of persuasion, attitudinal 
inoculation exposes an individual to weakened arguments of a persuasive message in order 
to trigger a process of counterargument, eventually creating resistance to stronger arguments of 
that message. Reinforcing preexisting attitudes and beliefs prevents persuasion in the future and 
the understanding of possible counterarguments to existing beliefs initiates defenses for 
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future attacks (McGuire, 1964). McGuire also notes that these counterarguments should be 
strong enough to initiate an active defensive response but not so strong as to persuade the 
receiver. Though media outlets may utilize methods of persuasion in order to set the public 
agenda, they may also use attitudinal inoculation to prevent the propagation 
of counterarguments.   
Lastly, another method of persuasion with which the media can utilize to influence public 
agenda is narrative transportation. Narrative transportation, as developed by Green and Brock 
(2000), proposes that when individuals are fully and personally invested in a story or narrative, 
their attitudes and intentions change to reflect that story. In order for transportation to occur and 
for there to be observable attitudinal change in the message receiver, the receiver must interpret a 
story, experience empathy for the narrative and apply it to his or her personal experience (Van 
Laer et al., 2014). Unlike analytic persuasion such as the ELM, narrative persuasion does not 
require careful reflection and consideration of a persuasive message and may often apply to 
media that does not overtly seem persuasive. However, both narrative persuasion and the ELM 
require the full mental engagement of the message receiver.   
 
Propaganda  
  
Propaganda is communication which endeavors to create a response in an audience that 
promotes the desired intent of the communicator (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014). According to 
psychologists Pratkanis and Aronson (2001), propaganda is defined as “mass ‘suggestion’ or 
influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual” (p. 11). It 
is a major aspect of the study of history, journalism, political science, and other disciplines, 
particularly in regards to how the ideology of a propagandist is received by an audience, 
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disseminates throughout a population and impacts public opinion. Propaganda is commonly 
perceived as negative; Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) also stated that propaganda is the abuse of 
persuasion and that propaganda withholds vital information, invokes heuristic devices and 
employs ethically questionable methods. The usage of propaganda emphasizes an intent and 
purpose for communication and implies a conscious attempt to achieve a balance of influence 
and power that falls in the propagandist’s favor (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014).  
According to Roloff and Miller (1980), there are three different responses to persuasion 
attempts through propaganda: response shaping, response reinforcing, and response changing. In 
response shaping, propaganda communication may encourage positive inclinations towards the 
ideas the communication is espousing. Response reinforcing is the strengthening of positive 
opinions towards the propaganda’s ideology and is particularly used to encourage the 
actualization of a positive attitude. Lastly, Roloff and Miller (1980) identify response changing 
as the most difficult outcome of persuasive propaganda to achieve, as it requires an attitudinal 
change from one opinion to another. Though propaganda is used in large part to alter public 
opinion, the ultimate goal of propaganda is to manipulate behavior and behavioral patterns in its 
audience, such as joining an organization, fighting for a cause and exposing others to an ideology 
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014).   
 
Diffusion of Innovations (DoI) Theory  
  
Developed by Rogers (1962), the theory of diffusion of innovations describes the way 
new ideas and technology disseminate throughout a population. Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) 
state that diffusion is a time-consuming process by which an innovation is communicated among 
members of a social system. The term “innovation” broadly refers to ideas, practices, or objects 
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that adopters perceive as new. Rogers studies four main elements that affect how innovations 
spread: the innovation itself, the communication channel in which the innovation is 
disseminated, the time frame of dissemination and the social system, particularly human capital, 
and opinion leadership. Successful, widely adopted innovations are capable of sustaining 
themselves. The moment in the time frame of diffusion in which an innovation becomes self-
sustaining is referred to as critical mass. When an innovation reaches critical mass, it is capable 
of causing future innovation beyond itself.   
There are five categories of adopters, or members of a population who come to accept the 
innovation: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rogers, 
1962). Innovators are individuals willing to take risks and who possess the financial liquidity and 
high social status to do so. They are members of strong social networks and have access to close 
contact with research sources. Innovators also have the greatest amount of interaction with other 
innovators. As their tolerance for risk and financial safety net is greater than that of other 
adopters, they are capable of adopting innovations that may ultimately fail. 
Early adopters have the highest amount of public influence amongst the adopters and 
often have a higher social status, financial liquidity, education and social prominence than late 
adopters. They generally have the greatest degree of opinion leadership within a 
society. However, unlike innovators, they are more selective and judicious in adopting ideas to 
help them main their prominence in communication. To preserve face, they take risks 
discreetly. The early majority adopt an innovation after a degree of time significantly longer than 
the innovators and early adopters and often have above average social status. They are more 
often in contact with early adopters, but they seldom hold positions of public influence and great 
opinion leadership.  
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The late majority approaches innovations with high degrees of skepticism and adopts 
innovations after the average participant, once the majority of the society has already adopted the 
innovation. They generally have below-average social status, opinion leadership and influence as 
well as lesser financial liquidity. Laggards are the last to adopt an innovation and often show 
little to no public influence or opinion leadership. Laggards typically have an aversion to change-
agents and tend to focus on traditions.   
Opinion leadership, described by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1961), refers to leadership by an 
active user of media, who interprets the meaning of media messages or content for lower-end 
media users. As not all individuals exert an equal amount of influence over others, opinion 
leaders, who can exert higher degrees of influence, are influential in spreading both positive and 
negative information about an innovation. They are often held in high esteem by those 
who accept their opinions. Katz and Lazarsfeld also note that opinion leaders express one or 
more of three factors: an expression of their values, professional competence and an extensive 
social network.   
  
Memetic Engineering  
  
The theory of memes and memetic engineering, developed by Dawkins (1976), further 
addresses how ideas disseminate and lead to the innovation of further ideas. Memetic 
engineering refers to the process of developing so-called memes through meme-splicing and 
memetic synthesis, eventually leading to the alteration of the attitudes, beliefs or behaviors of 
others in a society. Dawkins’s original concept of the meme describes any cultural entity which 
one may consider a replicator of a certain idea. The idea itself may undergo refinement, change, 
combination or other alteration over tie between iterations. Memes are also otherwise described 
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as self-replicating ideas or thought contagion. Because memes are replicating units of behavior, 
they are not isolated and are connected to other iterations and alterations, forming intricate 
complexes known as memeplexes.  
Dawkins intended the word “meme” to be the behavioral equivalent of a gene and 
described memes as units of cultural inheritance. Dawkins also asserts that embers of a 
population more culturally inclined towards following trends are more susceptible to inheriting 
and adopting memes. As Dawkins (1976) continues, “individuals who are predisposed... towards 
imitation are on a fast track that have may taken others a long time to build up” (p. 65). Memes 
may also be manipulated to develop chosen behaviors within an organization and to achieve 
desired outcomes (Pech & Slade, 2004). In this way, the concept of the meme can be 
weaponized, as a meme is the dissemination of a self-replicating idea.   
Pech and Slade (2004) further suggest that memetic engineering can be utilized as a 
process for embedding desirable cultural traits into the collective minds of members of an 
organization. Meme mapping is a process that identifies levels of memetic fidelity, susceptibility 
of potential hosts and resonance within each meme with the aim of constructing a diagnostic tool 
in order to facilitate attitudinal and behavioral change. Within an organization, Pech and Slade 
state that using a meme mapping framework can allow organization leaders to identify memes 
inherent in the social structure of organization members. Identifying these memes can allow 
organization leaders to manipulate them into developing a desired organizational culture and 
outcomes that suit the organization's greater mission.  
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Symbolic Convergence Theory 
 
 As the diffusion of innovations describes how ideas are propagated throughout a 
population, symbolic convergence theory (SCT), proposed in Bormann’s 1972 work, addresses 
how common ideological themes and fantasies are shared through a collective, strengthening or 
creating group bonds. Groups create meaning by interpreting shared experiences into symbols, 
and these symbols in turn reinforce the group’s ideas. This occurs through commonplace 
conversation, stories, and rituals which group members partake in (Deetz, 2001). Fantasies, as 
defined in reference to symbolic convergence, means “creative and imaginative interpretation of 
events that fulfills a psychological or rhetorical need” (Griffin, 2006, p. 38). SCT essentially 
addresses how and why group identities are constructed and how the resultant shared 
consciousness assigns meaning within the group. 
The term “symbolic convergence” refers to how groups of people create a common 
consciousness, ultimately developing common beliefs in the forms of symbols and fantasies. 
According to Vaughan (2009), SCT consists of two premises: communication creates the reality 
people experience, and that through communication, individuals can share their reality 
throughout their group. This results in the convergence of meaning.  
Bormann, Cragan, and Shields outlined three principles that allow groups to create shared 
rhetorical vision in their 1996 work: novelty, explanatory power, and imitation. According to the 
principle of novelty, the authors assert that established shared rhetorical visions within a group 
may fail to attract future members without an element of novelty to the shared group fantasy. 
This necessitates new additions to the shared group fantasy over time. The principle of 
explanatory power is the ability of symbolic fantasies to provide satisfying explanations of 
certain experiences. For an example, when a group is presented with a traumatic event, symbolic 
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convergence may allow a group to rationalize the event and see how the event affects the group 
from a holistic perspective, rather than an experiential perspective. Lastly, the principle of 
imitation states that people may apply familiar symbols and fantasies to past events and 
experiences, creating a dramatized product (Bormann, Cragan, and Shields, 1996).  
Sanctioning agents are figures of authority that legitimize a rhetorical vision and its 
symbols (Bormann, 1992). These figures may be individuals with esteem within a group. 
Conversely, sanctioning agents may also be higher powers, such as God, a religion, or an 
ideology. They may also be generally accepted doctrines or codes of law.  
The result of the shared rhetorical visions established by symbolic convergence is mutual 
understanding throughout a group of group ideology, particularly in reference to further group 
experience. Bormann (1972) asserted that groups attribute meaning to signs and fantasies in 
order to understand shared experiences. This is achieved through the tools of symbolic 
convergence Bormann lists: fantasy themes, symbolic cues, fantasy types, and sagas.  
 
Fantasy Themes 
 
Fantasy themes dramatize events that may have already occurred, are currently occurring, 
or will occur in the future, and they include individual words, phrases, or statements (Jackson, 
2000). These themes may contribute to a group’s overall rhetorical movement. Jackson (2000) 
states that fantasy themes refer to three different aspects of a narrative: setting, character, and 
action. Setting themes refer to the location of the fantasy, while character themes describe the 
characteristics and motivations of actors within the fantasy. Lastly, action themes, also referred 
to as plotlines, address the narrative plot of a fantasy. 
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The analysis of fantasy themes shared by a group is a form of rhetorical criticism that 
allows for the evaluation of the values of the group consciousness (Bormann, 1985). Within a 
group consciousness, one can identify heroes and villains within the actors of a shared fantasy 
theme. The heroes of a rhetorical vision are figures lauded for their actions throughout a group 
and supported by the group as a champion of the group’s members, while the villains oppose the 
group and are reviled by it.  
 
Symbolic Cues 
 
Symbolic cues, which include words, phrases, nonverbal gestures, and slogans, evoke 
fantasy themes and may serve as tools for building group cohesion (Cragan & Shields, 1992). 
These cues act as heuristics which remind members of the group of the group’s shared ideology, 
emotions, and past experiences. Cues trigger responses for the listener, regardless of whether the 
listener is party to the meaning of a cue. Jokes may act as symbolic cues, to which the response 
would be laughter or smiling, reminding members of the group of shared group humor. A 
listener unaware of the symbolic value of a cue may respond to the cue with confusion.  
A symbolic cue adopted by ISIS is a single raised index finger, commonly understood as 
the symbol for the number one, but also used as a cue of the jihadist movement. According to 
Zelinsky (2014), the gesture refers to the Islamic principle of the tawhid, referring to the oneness 
of Allah and the unity of the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community. Within ISIS, the 
gesture refers to the unilateral destruction of pluralism and western civilization, to be abrogated 
by a unified Islamic empire. The raised index finger is not only a cue of ISIS as a group, but also 
a cue of ISIS’s ideology of world domination.  
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Fantasy Types 
 
 Bormann’s 1985 work describes fantasy types as recurring fantasy themes applicable to 
common concerns and situations the group face. Because fantasy types are relevant to shared 
issues within the group, they provide references for the group with which to understand and 
assign meaning to similar situations and experiences. Bormann, Cragan, and Shields (1996) state 
that fantasy types are the driving forces of rhetorical visions, and their recurrent application to 
new experiences and events showcase the principle of imitation of symbolic convergence. By 
imitating a recurring fantasy theme and applying it to a shared experience, a group creates a new 
symbol in the dramatized version of the experience.  
 A common fantasy type is the prevalent type, fetching good out of evil, which is often 
used to explain the outcomes of adversity, particularly in the face of calamity (Bormann, 1977). 
By applying this type, people attempt to rationalize grave issues and find beneficial experiences 
within difficult situations.  
 
Sagas 
 
Another tool of symbolic convergence theory is the saga, described by Cragan and 
Shields (1992) as the retelling of significant events relevant to the group and its figures. The 
detailed accounts of the life of a person, community, organization, or state, sagas describe 
achievements, representing the symbolic consciousness of an entire group (Bormann, 1985). 
Sagas construct emotional narratives that strengthen the rhetorical vision of a group, and are 
repeated, appended, and changed in order to reflect the group’s principles. A saga reflects a 
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shared group consciousness within a rhetorical community, particularly rhetorical communities 
that physically exist, such as organizations (Cragan & Shields, 1992).  
 Through these aspects of symbolic convergence, a group’s rhetorical vision is developed. 
Rhetorical visions refer to the structure of communication within a group, from which the 
group’s shared identity coalesces, affecting the perspectives on reality of the group members 
(Bormann, 1985). 
 
Speech Codes Theory 
 
 Developed by Philipsen (1992), the process of speech codes theory allows observers to 
analyze different forms of communication through identifying and coding socially-constructed 
symbols, meanings, premises and rules. The theory builds off from Bernstein’s concept of coding 
principle in his 1971 work as well as Hymes’s 1962 discussion on analyzing communication 
systematically. Philipsen and Hart (2015) treat communication as a human activity deeply rooted 
in culture. Speech codes theory demonstrates how communication characterizes, interprets and 
rationalize information in reference to a societal culture. The theory thus provides an established 
framework for integrating culture with communication (Ward, 2010). The distinctive 
communicative record of conversations throughout a community is interpreted through speech 
codes theory as implicating a specific and observable code (Philipsen, 1992). Philipsen also 
argues in his 1992 work that speech codes theory is applicable to the study of all discursive 
forms and the analysis of self, society and strategic action within a population.  
 A tool used in speech codes research is the SPEAKING model by Hymes (1974). The 
letters in the word “speaking” stand for different aspects relevant to speech codes: situation, 
participants, ends, acts, key, instrumentalities, norms, and genre. Hymes (1974) refers to a 
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situation as the scene or setting of communication. This can also refer to the context in which a 
written communication is transmitted. Analyzing the participants in a communication scenario 
requires an understanding of the social positions and relationships between communicators and 
members of an audience. Hymes (1974) identifies ends as the goals and outcomes of 
communication and defines acts as the form a message is communicated in and the content of a 
message. Identifying the key in a speech codes analysis is recognizing the tone or manner of 
communication and understanding instrumentalities is distinguishing the channels or modalities 
of the message. Norms are the framework for producing and processing the message. Lastly, 
Hymes (1974) identifies communication genre as the type of interaction the communication 
takes place in. 
 In summarizing speech codes theory, Philipsen (1992) outlines several key statements. 
Philipsen argues that each distinctive culture and community has its own speech codes that are 
foreign to outsiders. These include normative symbols, meanings, premises and rules about 
communicative conduct. Philipsen (1992) also notes that multiple speech codes exist in any 
given speech community; individuals may engage in multiple codes concurrently. Speech codes 
also have a distinctive psychology, sociology, and rhetoric. Analyzing these aspects, Philipsen 
argues, unveils insight into the structure of the community or culture a communication takes 
place in. Lastly, Philipsen (1992) asserts that the speech community assess and analyzes its own 
codes and meanings, which are inextricably woven into the speech itself.  
  
Islam 
 
 The religion of Islam descended from Abrahamic tradition and shares a monotheistic 
belief in one all-powerful deity with Judaism and Christianity. Followers of Islam believe that 
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Allah revealed sacred truth to the prophet Muhammad and called the prophet to take leadership 
of men. According to Islamic tradition, this sacred truth was scripturally recorded in the Quran. 
The Quran and the Hadith, the traditions or sayings of Muhammad, describe Muhammad’s 
journeys in the cities of Mecca and Medina (Sinai & Ringgren, 2017). The major teachings of 
Islam include obligatory acts of worship, following traditional Islamic law and believing strictly 
in a single deity (Esposito, 2014). Muslims consider the Quran the unadulterated, definitive, final 
revelation of Allah (Bennett, 2010).  
A study by the Pew Research Center states that Islam has about 1.8 billion adherents, or 
about 24 percent of the world population (Lipka & Hackett, 2017). Islam is the world’s second 
largest religion, only dwarfed by Christianity. In the same report, the Pew Research Center notes 
that Islam is the world’s fastest growing religion in large part due to the higher rate of fertility of 
Muslim women than non-Muslim women. The median age of the Muslim population, 24, is 
notably younger than that of the non-Muslim population, 32 (Lipka & Hackett, 2017).  
Significant majorities of the population of Muslim countries in the Middle East, North Africa, 
sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia favor the establishment of sharia, traditional 
Islamic law, as the official law of their country (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2013). 
This includes 71 percent of Nigerian Muslims, 72 percent of Indonesian Muslims, 74 percent of 
Egyptian Muslims and 89 percent of Muslims in Palestinian territories (Pew Forum on Religion 
& Public Life, 2013).  
 
The Quran 
  
The Quran, Arabic for “Recitation” and alternatively spelled Qur’an or Koran, is the 
sacred scripture of Islam. Islamic tradition states that the angel Gabriel revealed the divine 
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knowledge of the Quran to the prophet Muhammad in separate passages in the cities of Mecca 
and Medina from the years 610 AD until Muhammad’s death in 632 AD. In conventional Islamic 
belief, the Quran is the literal transcript of Allah’s word; Quranic scripture itself refers to the 
Quran as “the well-preserved tablet” (Sinai & Ringgren, 2017). The Quran is the foundation of 
Islamic law alongside extra-Quranic verses and quotes attributed to Muhammad. Utterances 
accredited to Muhammad and accounts of Muhammad’s life not recorded within the Quran are 
referred to as the Hadith. As Islamic belief assert that the revelation of the Quran was often 
revealed in singular verses or isolated verse groups, Islamic history contains many reports and 
sources about the context of the occasion in which different verses or surahs, or chapters, were 
reportedly revealed.  
Pre-modern Muslim scholars discuss the revelation of the Quran as inseparably 
associated with events within Muhammad’s life, as reported by Islamic literature and history 
outside the Quran. Western scholars, however, generally approach narratives of Islamic history 
other than the Quran with skepticism and caution due to a lack of historical source credibility and 
the distance in time between their recording and the factual lifetime of Muhammad (Sinai & 
Ringgren, 2017). Notable within the Quran, however, are the literary and doctrinal changes and 
developments between Muhammad’s Meccan and Medinan period, particular in its statements 
concerning the treatment of members of other faiths.  
 
Salafism 
 
Multiple sects of Islam interpret the Quran in different ways. Of prominent importance to 
jihadist terrorism is the Salafi reformist movement, which grew within the late nineteenth 
century in response to the impact of European economic growth and heightened military power 
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on Muslim nations and peoples (Campanini, 2011). Salafi thinkers identify Western, Judeo-
Christian nations and cultures as political, economic, and cultural subjugators of Islamic peoples 
and countries. Salafi commentaries on the Quran focus on a revival of traditionalist, literalist 
interpretations of the Quran; rather than modernizing Islam, Campanini (2011) states that Salafi 
thinkers stress the “Islamization of modernity” (p. 9).  
Salafism asserts that Islam is capable of subsuming and assimilating modernity into its 
own values and beliefs, as laid out by a traditionalist interpretation of the Quran. The original 
founding principles of Salafism are thus summarized: Islam should return to and revive the 
Quran and the teachings of Muhammad, believers should renew Islamic traditions, science and 
modern knowledge should assimilate into Islam and the history of Islam and Arab peoples 
should take the place of European colonial history (Campanini, 2011). Salafists reject the idea of 
religious innovation and adaptation and support the widespread implementation of sharia law 
(Amman, 2015).  
 
The Principle of Abrogation 
 
 Scholars of the Quran identify conspicuous differences of doctrine and literary format 
between Quranic passages reportedly revealed in the city of Mecca to those revealed in the city 
of Medina. At the beginning of Muhammad’s religious ministry, he founded Islam in the city of 
Mecca. During his time in Mecca, Muhammad’s actions, teachings, and beliefs were primarily 
peaceful, inspired in part by the teachings of Jesus in the Bible. Hence, the verses in the Quran 
which espouse nonviolence, peace, and tolerance came from Muhammad’s teachings in Mecca. 
In 622 AD, at the age of 52, Muhammad fled Mecca to go to Medina, where he became a 
political and military leader. Islamic conquests and wars originated from his time in Medina. 
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Therefore, most violent verses in the Quran originated from Muhammad’s teachings in Medina 
(Burton, 1990). The surahs dated to Muhammad’s Medinan period exhibit a much greater focus 
on detailed legal regulations and on militant action on the part of believers in the service of Allah 
than surahs dated to Muhammad’s Meccan period (Sinai & Ringgren, 2017). Medinan surahs 
also identify the target of this militant action as unbelievers in Islam and those who associate 
with unbelievers.  
This shift between Quranic Meccan verses and Medinan verses is identifiable in multiple 
passages throughout the Quran. The Meccan verse 8:61 asserts, “If your enemy inclines toward 
peace, then you too should seek peace and put your trust in Allah,” whereas the Medinan verse 
47:35 firmly states, “Do not weaken and call for peace.” Though the Quranic verse 2:256, “Let 
there be no compulsion in religion,” was allegedly revealed in Medina, it was offered by 
Muhammad in his first year in Medina, in which he required the support of the Jews of the city 
(Bukay, 2007). The Meccan verse 109:6 also promotes tolerance of other beliefs; “To you your 
religion, and to me my religion.” The Medinan verse 2:191, however, asserts of Jews and 
Christians, “Slay them wherever you find People of the Book.” Another Medinan verse, 9:29, 
further commands, “Fight those who believe not in Allah… the People of the Book, until they 
pay the jizya (a “tax” for non-Muslims) with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.”  
 The contradictions within the Quran are explained within the Quran itself through the 
Principle of Abrogation. Particularly in Quranic verses 2:106 and 16:101, it is written that later 
verses cancel out (i.e. abrogate) chronologically earlier verses. The Principle of Abrogation 
states that for any controversial topic (e.g., murder, ethics, the treatment of unbelievers) about 
which a Meccan verse contradicts a Medinan verse, the later Medinan verse abrogates the earlier 
Meccan verse. Medinan verses and teachings thus have precedence over Meccan verses 
(Matusitz, 2015). Sharia law, the legal system defined by Islam, implemented the principle of 
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abrogation of older verses within the Quran or the hadiths as an established practice at least by 
the ninth century (Hallaq, 2009).  
 The Quran is not organized by chronology, like the Bible’s Old and New Testaments. 
Rather, the Quran is organized by the size of its surahs, within which the order of verses is not 
consistently chronological (Bukay, 2007). For example, Bukay notes that in the second surah, 
Islamic tradition and history states that Allah revealed verses 193, 216 and 217 upon his arrival 
in Medina, but verses 190, 191 and 192 were only revealed six years later. A major aspect of the 
study of the Quran within Muslim theological scholarship is the determination of which verses 
abrogate and which others are abrogated, particularly through referencing the accounts of the 
Hadith. The common understanding amongst Islamic scholars is that Muhammad accepted that 
Allah would invalidate previous revelations (Bukay, 2007).  
 The amount of verses in the Quran and the hadiths recognized by Islamic scholars as 
abrogated by newer verses is disputed (McAuliffe, Walfish, & Goering, 2010). However, Kadri’s 
2012 study estimates that 71 of the Quran’s 114 surahs contain abrogated verses.  
 
The Principle of Ijtihad 
 
 Within Islam, ijtihad is the legal practice of independent thought and reasoning upon a 
question that involves Islamic law (Esposito, 2014). Antonymic to the term taqlid, which refers 
to strictly following and emulating legal precedent within Islam, ijtihad allows for personal 
judgment in matters of law. Masterful understanding of Islamic theology, jurisprudence and the 
Arabic language is required to perform ijtihad according to Sunni convention. Traditionally, 
ijtihad is only performed by qualified Islamic scholars and is not used when Islamic doctrine 
contains unequivocal ruling. Venkatraman (2007) described ijtihad as necessary to interpret the 
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Quran, particularly for different social, political and economic situations in different time 
periods. This allows individuals to identify which Islamic teachings they wish to emphasize and 
comply with.  
 Because ijtihad allows Muslims to interpret, shape, and selectively enforce Islam to their 
own beliefs and agendas for the sake of following Allah’s will, terrorists primarily emphasize the 
Quran’s teachings on violence. Venkatraman (2007) noted that terrorists use ijtihad to highlight 
Quranic verses that sanction force and violence against nonbelievers, particularly through 
emphasizing the use of violence to propagate Islam. Ijtihad is a major principle of Salafism; most 
Salafists believe ijtihad allows modern Islam to return to the principles of Islamic forefathers and 
that taqlid led to Islam’s decline (Ungureaneu, 2011). Gesnik (2003) notes that the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a Pan-Islamic radical political organization, was founded with the principle of 
ijtihad. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood believe that ijtihad encourages Muslims to better 
understand the Quran and to form personal conclusions about the teachings of Islam. Osama Bin 
Laden also supported ijtihad and accused the Saudi Arabian government for prohibiting 
independent thought on Islam (Gesnik, 2003). 
 
Jihad and Islamic Terrorism 
 
 Religiously-motivated acts of jihadist terror remain a major issue and theme in global 
crises and international relations. Jihad is literally translated from Arabic as “striving” or 
“struggling” and it may refer both to internal struggle against perceived sin, the struggle to better 
society or a struggle of violence (Esposito, 2014). According to classical Islamic law, jihad is a 
militant struggle against nonbelievers (Peters & Cook, 2014). This militant struggle remains 
observable in modern-day Islamic terrorist groups calling for the creation of a Pan-Islamic 
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caliphate as well as in extremist perspectives of Islam and in the radicalization of individuals 
across the globe. Support of sharia law is a factor in Islamic militancy. The Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life (2013) reported that 86 percent of supporters of sharia in Egypt, 82 
percent of supporters in Jordan support executing those who abandon the Islamic faith. Likewise, 
79 percent of supporters of sharia law in Afghanistan, 76 percent of supporters in Pakistan and 
66 percent of supporters of sharia in Palestinian territories also support executing apostates who 
deny sharia or leave Islam. A 2005 Populus and Times poll of Muslim youth in Great Britain 
between the ages of 18 to 24 found that 12 percent of those surveyed believe suicide bombings 
against civilians are legitimate.  
 Jihadist terrorist action was not a major concern on the public agenda in the West until 
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, argues 
Mullins (2012). However, international Islamist networks began developing after the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, at which point Middle Eastern veterans of the Soviet 
invasion dispersed internationally (AIVD, 2006). The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was 
the first major Islamist terror attack against the West; among the terrorists, the majority of whom 
were Middle Eastern nationals, there was one naturalized American citizen (Blumenthal, Hanley, 
Mitchell, Treastor, & Tabor, 1993).  
From then on, the jihadist terror groups Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, already well-
established in the Middle East, intensified their focus on recruitment for attacks on Western 
nations (Mullins, 2012). The 9/11 attacks shone a spotlight on Islamist terrorism and further 
popularized the jihadist cause (Pargeter, 2008). Though there have been no jihadist attacks on the 
scale of 9/11 since the attacks, jihadist terror attacks remain a common news headline. Most 
recently, eight were killed and 13 injured in New York City on October 31, 2017 when Sayfullo 
Saipov, an ISIS supporter, drove a vehicle into Halloween celebrators, shouting “Allahu akbar” 
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(Mueller, Rashbaum, Baker, & Goldman, 2017). Mueller et al. (2017) noted that Saipov 
followed instructions for a vehicle attack found in the ISIS magazine Rumiyah and described 
Saipov as “a voracious consumer and meticulous student of ISIS propaganda” (p. A1). 
 
Clash of Civilizations 
 
 The Clash of Civilizations is a hypothesis created by Samuel Huntington (1993) that 
argues that the major motivation for conflict in the modern era is cultural and religious identity. 
Huntington groups cultural identities in broad areas referred to as “major civilizations” through 
their major religions and cultural history. These civilizations include the West, Latin America, 
Orthodox, Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu, Japanese, Sub-Saharan African and the Muslim 
civilization. Due to complex cultural histories, Huntington describes some countries as “lone” 
members of their own civilizations and others as “cleft” countries, home to large populations 
which identify to different civilizations. Of particular interest to this thesis is Western civilization 
and Muslim civilization. Western civilization, according to Huntington, includes the US, Canada, 
Western and Central Europe, Australia, much of Oceania and parts of Latin America. The 
Muslim civilization refers to the greater Middle East. 
 Huntington argues in his 1993 work that in a post-Cold War world, governments and 
groups will find themselves decreasingly capable to catalyze support on the basis of ideology. 
Therefore, these groups appeal to common religion, culture, and civilizational identity in order to 
mobilize support. Huntington predicts that conflict arising from disputes in civilizational power 
occurs on two levels. Locally, at the micro-level, neighboring groups on opposite sides of 
civilizational dividing lines compete over territory and territorial influence. Globally, at the 
macro-level, states from different civilizations compete over comparative military power, 
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economic power, control of international institutions and influence over third parties. This 
civilizational rivalry also competitively promotes the political, cultural and religious values of 
the opposing civilizations (Huntington, 1993). Huntington characterizes the rivalry or 
competition between civilizations through the extent of violence present in the states’ 
interactions, particularly noting the militant tendency of the Muslim civilization’s interactions 
with other states, citing Muslim conflicts with Orthodox Serbs, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and 
Catholics worldwide.  
Huntington (1993) particularly notes the conflict between the Muslim civilization and 
“the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values” 
(p. 29). A major point in Huntington’s work is that the West’s next global conflict is most likely 
to be with the Islamist civilization. Akbar (2003) affirms this sentiment: “The West’s next 
confrontation is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of Islamic 
nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin” (p. 
272). Civilizational conflict between the West and the Islamic world is further echoed by 
Islamist and jihadist groups. The radical Pan-Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir (2002) released a 
response to Huntington’s 1993 hypothesis, titled The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilization, 
calling unequivocally for war against the Christian and capitalist West. The response echoes 
Huntington’s observation that leaders in the Islamic world meet the attempted propagation of 
Western values with enmity, identifying the dominance of Western education, media and 
influence as cultural attacks (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2002). The work concludes by saying that “the 
clash of civilizations is an inevitable matter” and it calls for the Muslim population to rise against 
the West; “Do not be deceived, O Muslims, by the callers to the dialogue who place their heads 
in the sand and condone humiliation and defeat. Make the preparations required for the conflict, 
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since the Capitalist Western civilization has knocked you down militarily, politically and 
economically. However, they will never defeat you intellectually” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2002, p. 62). 
 
Jihadist Motivations 
 
 The word “jihad,” Arabic for “struggle,” refers to two forms of jihad, the greater jihad 
and the lesser jihad (Silke, 2008). The greater jihad is an individual, internal, nonviolent effort to 
live a good life as defined under the Islamic code. The lesser jihad is the militant, external, 
violent struggle on the behalf of Islam as a whole. In the modern age of Islam, the catalyst of 
engaging in the violence of the lesser jihad is radicalization. Radicalization generally refers to a 
process whereby ordinary practices of tolerance and dialogue with an opposing group break 
down in favor of conflict, particularly through acts of violent extremism (Schmid, 2013). The 
process of radicalization may include coercion and acts of political violence other than explicit 
terrorism. Applied to Islamist terrorism, Mullins (2012) describes radicalization as the process of 
adopting and internalizing militant Islamist ideology.  
The process of Islamist radicalization also includes a shift towards religious fanaticism 
and towards an extremist interpretation of Islamic doctrine. Sageman’s (2004) survey on jihadist 
terrorist backgrounds notes that 99 percent of Islamist extremists describe themselves as very 
religious prior to entering a jihadist organization and committing acts of terrorism. Though 
committing violence is not an inevitability of radicalization, radicalized jihadist individuals 
generally believe that Islam is under attack from Western civilization, that the Islamic world is 
divided into true Muslims and infidels and, lastly, that jihad is violence necessary to defend 
Muslims from oppressors (Mullins, 2012).   
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 According to Silke (2008), scientific assessment of the psychological and sociological 
reasons ordinary individuals become jihadist terrorists remains limited in size and evidence, but 
past research identifies no psychological abnormality in the majority of radicalized jihadists: 
“Despite the indiscriminate and extreme violence of many terrorist attacks, the vast majority of 
research on terrorists has concluded that the perpetrators are not psychologically abnormal” (p. 
104). Sageman’s (2008) survey on the background of Islamist terrorists support the lack of 
evidence of psychological abnormalities in jihadist terrorists. Rather, according to Sageman 
(2004), a major constant in jihadist motivations is a sense of societal isolation, particularly 
among jihadist terrorists in the West. Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) study noted that Muslims in 
Europe are on average less wealthy than the general population, have higher rates of 
unemployment and imprisonment and are politically under-represented.  
Schmid (2013) states that radicalization creates ideological abnormalities through “an 
ideological socialization away from mainstream… towards more radical or extremist positions 
involving a dichotomous world view” (p. A1). The process of radicalization capitalizes upon 
social detriments Muslims may experience and furthers the sense of social isolation Sageman 
described. The ideological socialization of radicalization also fosters a jihadist identity. As Silke 
(2008) explains, “within the context of jihadi terrorism, the perception of a strong shared identity 
and link with the wider Muslim world – the umma – has serious consequences” (p. 114). In an 
analysis of individual terrorist motivations, Clifton (2017) observed that “the struggle is de-
territorialized, it is ideological: western democracy against Muslim theocracy and true believers 
against infidels” (p. 467). Taarnby (2005) characterizes issues of personal and group identity as 
major factors in radicalization, particularly in terms of Muslims who harbor “deep resentment” 
against the West. Mullins (2012) notes that throughout past research into jihadist motivations, 
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the common theme throughout different studies is the “dissatisfaction and disillusionment with 
life in the West” (p. 119). 
 
 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) 
 
 Designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations and many other countries 
worldwide, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) is a Salafi jihadist militant group known 
for war crimes, destruction of cultural heritage sites, human rights offenses, and ethnic 
cleansings (Irshaid, 2015). ISIS declared itself a caliphate in June 2014, functioning as a 
theocratic state unbound by the Westphalian principle of sovereignty with the explicit goal of 
expanding and subjugating other lands (Caldwell & Williams, Jr., 2016). The brutality of its 
methods, which include systematic violations to human life and the ethnic cleansing of the 
Yazidi minority in Iraq, caused Al-Qaeda to denounce the organization (Shany et al., 2014). The 
growth of ISIS and its proclamation of a caliphate coincided with a sharp increase in the amount 
of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq: the UN Security Council (2015) reported that 
between 20,000 and 30,000 foreign fighters travelled to Syria and Iraq between 2011 and 2014. 
In the thirty-year span between 1980 and 2010, this number was only between 10,000 and 20,000 
foreign fighters (United Nations Security Council, 2015). According the Soufan Group (2015), 
the number of foreign fighters travelling to join ISIS doubled between June 2014 and December 
2015. 
Its acronym, originally translated to the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, often causes 
confusion during translation; the word Sham may be variously interpreted, its translations 
including “the Levant” and “Syria” (Irshaid, 2015). Some Western sources use the Arabic 
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abbreviation Daesh in reference to ISIS as a way to challenge the group’s legitimacy and its 
roots in Islam, as the term is similar to an Arabic verb meaning “to trample” (Irshaid, 2015). In 
2014, ISIS declared itself an international caliphate and shortened its name to “Islamic State,” 
dropping its regional labels to reflect its expansionist intentions (Irshaid, 2015). However, this 
paper will only refer to this group as ISIS, in order to denote its original name and to avoid the 
confusion of its other translations. 
 ISIS came into international focus after its victories in the summer of 2014 against the 
government of Iraq, Kurdish forces, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, and rival regional 
jihadist groups (Hashim, 2014). The organization originated from the little-known militant group 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), which differed significantly from 
other Iraqi militant groups through its reliance on suicide bombers and its indiscriminate 
targeting (Hashim, 2014). Founded by a Jordanian jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in 2004, JTJ 
exhibited an understanding of group identity, recruitment, networking and the Internet; Hashim 
(2014) notes that Zarqawi, 
was very adept at using the Internet to promote his message, recruit personnel and 
terrorize his enemies… Through creating a worldwide network, Zarqawi’s volunteers 
posted messages from their leader and videos of violent acts, like beheadings, on multiple 
servers. This avoided delays in downloading and made it difficult for the material to be 
removed from the World Wide Web (p. A1). 
Milton (2016) observes that from ISIS’s early stages, it is evident that “the organization 
understood the necessity of using its media branch to cultivate some level of popular support… 
while the military side of the war essential, the ability to justify its actions to the people of Iraq 
was crucial” (p. 3). This theme of recruitment, propaganda, and communication through digital 
resources continues throughout ISIS’s evolution from JTJ to the group that it is today.  
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 After a short-lived merger with Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi’s death, years of unexceptional 
leadership and a decline, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of ISIS in 2010, fundamentally 
restructuring the organization while continuing Zarqawi’s legacy of a focus on online 
recruitment and social media (Hashim, 2014). In June 2014, when ISIS proclaimed itself a 
caliphate, it named Baghdadi its caliph (Caldwell & Williams, Jr., 2016). Baghdadi spearheaded 
the online release of ISIS recruitment materials and propaganda. ISIS infamously released three 
online videos in 2014 documenting the beheadings of American journalists James Foley and 
Steven Sotloff and British citizen David Haines (Shany et al., 2014). In every video, each victim 
was forced to denounce U.S. or British military action against ISIS and warn against future 
action at the peril of other captives. These graphic videos drew international attention towards 
ISIS and its online presence.   
 
Online Social Media 
 
 The information operations and online presence of ISIS are controlled by the 
organization’s Ministry of Media, through which Gambhir (2016) states that ISIS “activated and 
garnered support from a dispersed online community that believes Muslims should immediately 
unite under the governing authority of ISIS’s rightful caliph rather than remain dispersed 
throughout the world” (p. 9). ISIS’s Ministry of Media controls multiple radio services, 35 
regional media bureaus throughout the Middle East and Africa and a production branch for 
English translations and non-Arabic language magazines, Al Hayat Media Center (Milton, 2016). 
In large part, the goal of ISIS’s media presence is to maximize radicalization in order to gain 
potential recruits; much of its content is therefore externally-focused, created to foster 
radicalization and to recruit individuals both regionally and abroad (Gambhir, 2016).  
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A report by the Quilliam Foundation describes ISIS’s media branch as a “behemoth, 
which produces on average 38 individual batches of propaganda each day – videos, photo essays, 
articles and audio programs” (Winter, 2015, p. 3). Milton’s (2016) analysis of ISIS online media 
releases observes that at its peak in August 2015, ISIS released more than 700 pieces of visual 
media in a month; the release of visual media and governance statements since then declined. 
Milton also notes that official ISIS content released on its main webpages are amalgamations of 
content released from the multiple media bureaus across ISIS territory.  
The online content released by ISIS plays an instrumental role in the propagation of its 
message, particularly in the recruitment of foreign fighters. In an analysis of American militants 
drawn to the Syrian conflict and involved with ISIS or other Syrian-related militants, Bergen 
(2015) observes that the only profile that draws these militants together is their activity in online 
jihadist circles. The Soufan Group (2015) states that ISIS’s social media outreach is particularly 
effective in spreading the group’s message and fostering radicalization, laying the foundation for 
recruitment. Gambhir (2016) also notes that the media information operations of ISIS are 
particularly responsible for ISIS’s success in worldwide notoriety and international recruitment.  
 Propaganda dissemination through the Internet and social media provides many benefits 
to extremist groups. Unlike open online forums, easily susceptible to law enforcement, Klausen 
et al. (2012) states that it is simpler to outnumber illegal, violent content with social media posts 
protected through a platform’s policy and through. Functions to re-share posts and content allow 
that content to memetically disseminate and social media attracts a much wider breadth of 
potential recruits than invitation-only private websites (Klausen et al., 2012). Though some 
social media platforms, such as Facebook, impose stringent user limitations in order to expel 
jihadist propaganda groups, other platforms, such as Twitter, remain popular for jihadist groups 
and ISIS supporters (Winter, 2015). No single account on a major social media platform such as 
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Twitter is currently responsible for the release of propaganda; however, the organization uses 
designated hashtags to identify supporters (Winter, 2015). For example, in June 2014, ISIS 
supporters began distributing graphic or disturbing images praising ISIS on Twitter, featuring the 
hashtag “#AllEyesOnISIS.” The number of tweets using the hashtag numbers at over 30,000 
tweets (Katz, 2014). Aside from its distribution of materials on social media platforms, ISIS 
produces multiple monthly magazines translated to several languages. 
 
Dabiq 
 
 Produced by the Al Hayat Media Center of ISIS’s Ministry of Media, Dabiq was an 
English-language digital magazine series that focused on the propagation of jihadist ideas, 
radicalization and recruitment (Wignell et al., 2017). The magazine’s title refers to a small town 
in Syria where a well-known hadith states that the Muslim world and “Rome,” usually 
interpreted to signify the West, will battle during Armageddon (Gambhir, 2014). The first 
installment of Dabiq was released digitally on July 5, 2014, a month after the fall of Mosul, 
focusing on organizational reports, battlefield updates, and extremist ideology (Gambhir, 2014). 
Due to the magazine’s online distribution and English language, Gambhir notes that the 
magazine was likely not only intended for possible ISIS supporters in the West, but was also 
created to communicate ISIS ideology to ISIS’s Western enemies. Publications of Dabiq’s issues 
were aborted in 2016. 
 The magazine uses multiple approaches to ISIS ideology in order to convey its 
worldview. Past research identifies the heavy emphasis in Dabiq on in-group religious identity, 
crisis reinforcement, regional consolidation and emotional, zealous language. A study by Ingram 
(2016) concluded that Dabiq primarily used the methods of stressing in-group identity, the 
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concept of the Other, crisis constructs and solution constructions in order to reinforce a cultural 
dichotomy between Islam and the West. In a content analysis, Ingram identified values-
reinforcing, dichotomy-reinforcing and crisis reinforcing messaging used throughout the 
magazine’s publication. Ingram (2016) states that Dabiq constantly refers to Western civilization 
with hostile language, drawing upon cultural and religious differences between the Islamic 
civilization and the Western civilization to further polarize its readers. It refers to Western 
involvement in the Middle East and the spread of Western civilization as a “crisis” and describes 
Sunni Islam and ISIS as the “solution” (Ingram, 2016).  
 
Inspire 
 
 Dabiq was not the first widely-known jihadist magazine disseminated worldwide. It 
follows the precedent of Inspire, an English-language magazine reportedly published by Al 
Qaeda to convey its propagandistic messages over the internet. First published in January 2010, 
its origin as Al Qaeda’s official publication was unconfirmed, though US officials stated it 
appears to be authentic (Ambinder, 2010). There have been sixteen published issues of Inspire, 
the most recent of which was released in November 2016 (Daftari, 2016). The magazine 
included several structural elements similar to the format of Dabiq, including transcribed 
speeches form Al Qaeda leaders, descriptions of successful acts of terror associated with Al 
Qaeda, and instructions on how to build devices of terrorism. The first issue of Inspire featured 
an article on how to “make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom” (Ambinder, 2010).  
Multiple attempted bombers in the United States in the years of Inspire’s publication 
admitted to having read the instructions within Inspire to begin their bomb construction. Naser 
Jason Abdo and Jose Pimentel were respectively arrested in Texas and New York in 2011, both 
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for attempted bombing, and both were found with copies of Inspire’s instructions on bomb 
assembly (“Inspire magazine: A staple of domestic terror”, 2013). In 2012, brothers Raees and 
Sheheryar Qazi and Adel Daoud were arrested for separate attempted bombings, all admitting 
their instruction came from Inspire (“Inspire magazine: A staple of domestic terror”, 2013). 
 
Apocalyptic Language 
 
Ingram (2016) also notes that, while reinforcing a cultural and religious dichotomy, 
Dabiq uses apocalyptic language: “The mutually reinforcing narratives within and across 
Dabiq’s issues plunge its readers into a bipolar world, characterized by cosmic war and on the 
verge of End times, that demands Sunnis choose between the forces of good or evil” (p. 474). To 
reinforce the legitimacy of its eye-catching imagery, Dabiq cites Islamic doctrine directly and 
heavily. Ingram (2016) describes, 
Central to Dabiq’s stylistics is its extensive use of direct quotations from suras, hadiths 
and prominent Islamist figures. This strategy is used so extensively that the author’s 
words often play a secondary role in Dabiq articles. For example, an article titled ‘The 
Islamic State before al-Malhamah’… literally reads as a series of quotations from 
speeches and hadiths. The style has the effect of portraying Dabiq’s narrative as 
inherently legitimate because its wording is taken directly from revered sources (p. 472). 
To foster radicalization and encourage action even further, as Ingram states, Dabiq draws upon 
its apocalyptic messaging to trigger “awakening” in its readers. As Ingram (2016) continues, 
First, eschatological triggers are used to remind Dabiq’s readership of Armageddon and [ISIS’s] 
role… Second, Dabiq draws upon jurisprudential triggers, for instance, to frame jihad as an 
individual obligation for all Muslims… Third, Dabiq uses triggers designed specifically for 
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Western audiences such as existential anxieties associated with the banality of Western life (p. 
472). 
Lastly, Ingram’s 2016 study concludes that though Dabiq does not give operational 
commands to its readers, “its message unequivocally demands that every Muslim engages in 
violence against Islam’s enemies” (p. 473). Through extensive use of Islamic text and 
dichotomous messaging, the magazine encourages radicalization and violence against the West. 
 A content analysis by Vergani and Bliuc (2015) using a computerized text analysis 
program, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), investigated the evolution of language and 
identified several key themes in the first year of Dabiq’s publication. The study observed that 
affiliation with ISIS is a primary psychological motive exhibited within the magazine, and that 
Dabiq relies heavily upon the strategic use of emotions to encourage mobilization amongst its 
readers. Lastly, the analysis showed that internet jargon is increasingly more present within 
Dabiq.  
 Vergani and Bliuc (2015) identified three core drives and needs within action-oriented 
literature such as Dabiq: achievement, affiliation, and power. Previous literature defined these 
three factors as motives particularly associated with aggression and terrorist rhetoric (Smith, 
2008). The LIWC analysis observed that the motive of achievement peaked in Dabiq’s first issue 
and decreased in subsequent issues, while the motive of power fluctuated. Vergani and Bliuc 
(2015) argued that their analysis showed that affiliation, the concern with maintaining group 
cohesion and identity, was the most prominent motive featured in Dabiq. Without robust loyalty 
and cohesion to ISIS, further calls for mobilization in the name of ISIS are less effective.  
 
 
 
40 
Emotional Language 
 
Emotional language, Vergani and Bliuc (2015) state, is effective in influencing collective 
action and mobilization. Their analysis showed that highly emotional language is present 
throughout the issues of Dabiq, particularly in reference to the subject of death and religion. 
Klausen’s (2015) research indicates that ISIS is more comfortable than other terrorist groups 
with portraying extremely graphic violence. A tendency towards depicting graphic violence is 
also present within the messaging of Dabiq, and Vergani and Bliuc (2015) assert that reminders 
of death are an important part of ISIS communication. Concerning religion, Vergani and Bliuc 
also state that their research reinforces Ganor’s (2015) study, which observed that religious 
intransigence is of great importance in ISIS recruitment and mobilization.  
Celso’s 2014 study characterizes the world view ISIS presents in Dabiq as “apocalyptic, 
sectarian and fanatical” based off of Zarqawi’s Salafist strategy, which divides the world 
between Muslims and the West (p. 1). According to Celso (2014), Dabiq presents ISIS’s 
ideology through the Salafist themes of mass upheaval, takfiri and sectarianism, supported by 
Islamic doctrine. The theme of mass upheaval after an Islamic victory is present throughout 
Dabiq, particularly in reference to Quranic verses and hadiths that describe a sectarian battle 
between Islam and the West. Takfir refers to the practice of excommunicating fellow Muslims, 
originally used to eject impious leaders, but currently used by jihadists to legitimize killing 
opposing Muslim groups (Celso, 2014). Dabiq identifies several groups as targets for takfir, 
including Shiite and Alawite Muslims. According to Celso (2014), Dabiq’s articles also venerate 
Zarqawi and connect his actions and strategies to Quranic verses and hadiths, presenting him as a 
divinely sanctioned leader and a legitimate religious authority.  
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Other Propagandistic Themes 
 
Beyond its heavy usage of an apocalyptic narrative, the content of Dabiq uses language 
that strengthens its appeal to its audience of possible recruits. Vergani and Bliuc (2015) identify 
a heightened presence of internet jargon within the publication. This audience-tailored, 
propagandistic usage of language showcases ISIS’s adaptability to the internet environment, 
particularly towards the goal of connecting with young people. This falls in line with Zarqawi’s 
legacy of a propagandistic media focus within ISIS (Hashim, 2014). 
The subject of religion remained a prominent subject throughout all of the Dabiq issues 
included in the aforementioned study. Vergani and Bliuc (2015) note the unique focus Dabiq 
exhibits on women and female recruits. Over two hundred Western women left their countries to 
join ISIS, more than in any other jihadist group, states Peresin and Cervone (2015). Vergani and 
Bliuc (2015) attribute this to the unusual emphasis ISIS propaganda materials, including Dabiq, 
place on women. Dabiq also communicates ISIS’s explanation of why it is superior to other 
jihadist groups and its religious justification, for the purpose of convincing potential recruits of 
ISIS’s strength and its ultimate victory.  
Gambhir (2014) asserts that Dabiq is not merely propaganda, but is rather “an outward-
looking articulation of ISIS’s caliphate vision… [and] indicates how ISIS will shape its global 
strategy” (p. 10). The division and evolution of the themes and topics within Dabiq’s articles 
provide insight into ISIS’s priorities. Dabiq exhibits a heavy emphasis on mandatory hijrah, 
emigration, to areas controlled by ISIS, particularly calling for the emigration of educated 
Muslims (Gambhir, 2014). This demand echoes Baghdadi’s strategy of commanding for the 
emigration of doctors, engineers, academics and specialists to ISIS-controlled territory. In the 
second issue of Dabiq, Gambhir (2014) notes that an article calling for emigration claimed that 
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hijrah is a literal requirement for all Muslims and encouraged the relocation of entire families to 
areas under ISIS control. Gambhir states that this indicates ISIS’s plan to repopulate its territory 
with its followers in order to establish and secure control. The article also states that those who 
cannot perform hijrah should encourage others to emigrate and publicize their allegiances to 
ISIS in order to normalize loyalty to the group (Gambhir, 2014).   
In summary, previous research on Dabiq identifies several key themes present within 
ISIS ideology and provides insight into ISIS’s recruitment strategies and its overall global goals. 
These themes include the apocalyptic anticipation of a sectarian battle against the West, a heavy 
emphasis on in-group affiliation and loyalty, the excommunication of ISIS’s rivals and the 
consolidation of ISIS’s power through emigration to ISIS territory. The thematic changes present 
between Dabiq releases indicate shifts in ISIS outlook and strategy. Virtually all analyses on 
Dabiq content also observe the heavy usage of Islamic doctrine to justify Dabiq’s radical themes. 
 
Rumiyah 
 
 Rumiyah is the current English-language publication produced by Al Hayat Media 
Center. The first issue was released on September 6, 2016. No further issues of Dabiq have 
appeared since the first issue of Rumiyah, indicating its replacement of Dabiq as ISIS’s primary 
non-Arabic propaganda magazine (Wignell, Tan, O’Halloran, & Lange, 2017). In regards to the 
name change from the doctrinally significant town of Dabiq to the Arabic word for Rome, 
Shanahan (2016) remarks:  
With its hold on territory becoming more precarious by the day, ISIS has possibly 
decided that naming your social media magazine after a town that will likely soon fall out 
of your control would not be a good look ‘going forward.’ Renaming your publication 
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after the center of Christendom is a way to show what you aspire to, rather than what you 
have lost (p. A1). 
Wignell et al. (2017) note that ISIS lost the doctrinally significant town of Dabiq roughly a 
month after the first issue of Rumiyah, suggesting that ISIS both predicted the loss of Dabiq and 
prepared accommodations for its loss. The change of name from Dabiq to Rumiyah implies 
ISIS’s shift of focus from the territory of the caliphate to the ideological goals of continued 
jihadist action, its ultimate goal victory over Rome, a symbol of Christianity and the West. 
 Ingram (2016b) states that Rumiyah’s content primarily consists of translations of articles 
ISIS released in its Arabic-language magazine, Al Naba, along with some articles written 
specifically for Western audiences similar to that of Dabiq. According to Ingram, the translation 
of content from Al Naba suggest that Rumiyah is part of ISIS’s current strategy to more 
efficiently convey news form the Middle East to an international audience. Ingram suggests that 
if Rumiyah’s primary content expands beyond translations of Arabic articles into a Western-
oriented magazine similar to Dabiq, it indicates a shift in ISIS’s ideological strategy towards 
greater dissemination of propaganda in response to its territorial losses. Further use of Rumiyah 
as a simple English translation of Al Naba implies an economized, minimized approach towards 
propaganda within ISIS, Ingram (2016b) asserts. An analysis by Wignell et al. (2017) shows 
numerous differences between theme, content, style, and approach between the subject materials 
of Dabiq and Dabiq, indicating the fluidity and flexibility of important issues within ISIS. As 
they further explain, 
Changes in focus across issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah appear to closely align with 
changes in ISIS’s circumstances. For instance, the focus was on migration, recruitment 
and state-building when ISIS was rapidly expanding the territory under its control. ISIS 
presented itself as an expanding, victorious and administratively competent organization, 
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successfully carving out an ever-growing ‘promised land’ for their believers. As their 
territory reached its maximum and no further gains were looking likely, they switched 
focus to highlight affiliated organizations, particularly in Africa, to present a case that 
their caliphate was expanding globally. When their home territory started to shrink again 
they switched focus to [attack] their enemies, far and near (p. 16).  
As the impending apocalyptic messaging present in Dabiq is not present in Rumiyah, ISIS 
appears to imply a longer time frame for victory over the West.  
In terms of content, articles in Dabiq that placed more emphasis on political enemies and 
denouncing the ideology of the West are seemingly replaced in Rumiyah by procedural articles, 
encouraging and instructing direct attacks, such as knife selection and using a vehicle to attack 
crowds (Wignell et al., 2017). Rather than elaborating on the ideological narratives of articles 
present in Dabiq, Rumiyah appears to serve a more functional, instructional role in ISIS 
propaganda. Rumiyah is also considerably shorter than Dabiq. This may suggest that whereas 
Dabiq was intended to showcase ISIS’s ideology and recruit individuals into the apocalyptic 
narrative it espoused, Rumiyah serves as a functional transmission of instruction, describing to 
ISIS’s believers worldwide how to sustain its fight against the West despite ISIS’s apparent 
defeats. With the apocalypse nowhere in sight, Rumiyah instructs believers how to maintain 
ISIS’s presence worldwide. However, though the apocalyptic messaging present in Dabiq cannot 
be found in Rumiyah, both magazines emphasize continued attacks on the West.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 This section will describe the methodology that the study will employ. The three 
following research questions drive this study:  
 
Research Question 1: How does ISIS affect its readers through Dabiq and Rumiyah?  
Research Question 2: What is the significance of the themes found within the magazines within  
the greater jihadist community?  
Research Question 3: What does the rhetoric of the communication of Dabiq and Rumiyah  
reveal about ISIS and the jihadist movement? 
 
Content Analysis 
 
 Content analysis is defined as a systematic, replicable procedure for organizing many 
words of text into fewer categories of content, based off of precise rules of coding (Berelson, 
1952; Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1990). By systematically categorizing communication data, 
one can make replicable and valid inferences on the communication (Krippendorff, 198). 
Different parts of the text undergoing analysis are labelled with the category that the part of the 
text was coded as belonging to. Rosengren (1981) adds to this definition by describing content 
analysis as a family of similar analytical procedures which range from interpretive and intuitive 
to systematic and strict. Due to this flexibility, researchers approach content analysis as an easily 
adaptable method for analyzing textual data (Cavanagh, 1997). The primary identifier of content 
analysis is the categorization of messages through shared characteristics. According to Holsti 
47 
(1969), content analysis may include “any technique for making inferences by objectively and 
systematically identifying characteristics of messages” (p. 9).  
Originally, content analysis objectively examined the manifest content of 
communication, content that is explicitly stated to the receiver (Berselson, 1952). However, over 
time, content analysis evolved to interpret the latent content of communication as well. Latent 
content may include implicit, allusive, or semiotic communication. Researchers can also apply 
content analysis to non-textual types of communication, such as drawings or actions (Stigler, 
Gonzales, Kawanaka, Knoll, & Serrano, 1999). The flexibility of content analysis allows for its 
application throughout different channels of communication.  
 Conducting quantitative content analysis requires procedurally valid methodology to 
produce replicable results. McKeone (1995) states that a quantitative content analysis of a 
written or verbal communication requires the observation of formal properties, including word 
frequencies, space measurements, time counts, or social media metrics. Quantitative content 
analysis also typically focuses on manifest content rather than latent meaning and requires a 
description of methodology to describe the research’s reliability and validity (McKeone, 1995). 
Lastly, due to modern word processing technology, quantitative content analysis is often 
computerized.  
 Krippendorff’s 1980 work describes six questions that must be considered in all content 
analyses: which data are analyzed, how they are defined, what is the population the content is 
drawn from, what is the context of the analyzed data, what are the boundaries of the analysis and 
what is the target of inference. In addition to these questions, Krippendorff (2004) developed an 
outline of the principles and components of a content analysis. According to Krippendorff, 
content analysis begins with the design of the analysis, based off of existing theoretical 
frameworks and previous literature relevant to the research question of the analysis. The next 
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step of content analysis, unitizing, organizes the object of analysis into discrete units, “wholes 
that analysts distinguish and treat as independent elements” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 97). These 
units of analysis may include sentences, phrases, key words, or images.  
The uses of content analysis are categorized by Holsti (1969) into three basic purposes: 
(1) To make inferences about the antecedents of communication, (2) to describe and make 
inferences about the characteristics of communication, and (3) to make inferences about the 
consequences of communication. Content analysis can provide insight into the reasons behind 
communication, including inferences into antecedents such as cultural aspects, traits of 
individuals, and the political intelligence behind a message (Holsti, 1969). In regards to the 
characteristics of communication, content analysis is often used to analyze a message’s 
techniques of persuasion, interpret its style, describe trends in communication content and relate 
the characteristics of a message to the characteristics of its source (Holsti, 1969). Lastly, content 
analysis can support further inferences about the consequences of communication. Holsti (1969) 
states that communication consequences particularly concern the response of the message’s 
receiver. For example, a possible consequence of jihadist communication to a receiver is the 
mobilization of the receiver to violent action.   
 
Thematic Analysis 
 
 This study focuses on identifying and examining themes that arise during content 
analysis. Thematic analysis refers to a form of qualitative research that distinguishes patterns 
within data and develops those patterns into categorical themes, which are then used as 
categories for analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). According to Guest (2012), the 
process of thematic analysis identifies both implicit and explicit ideas offered by the data through 
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coding moments of significance within the data. Through analysis of the themes presented within 
the data, a researcher can identify the frequency of theme occurrence, the relational co-
occurrence of different themes, insights the themes give about the source of the data, and the 
overall narrative the themes convey (Guest, 2012).   
 The thematic analysis of the content of this study conforms to Krippendorff’s (1980) 
structural descriptions of content analysis. The data analyzed is the textual and visual content of 
ISIS’s Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines as a whole, defined by the articles and images that appear 
in every issue of each magazine. The content is drawn from the population of ISIS’s greater 
media publications in the context of propagandistic jihadist material. The boundaries of the 
analysis are the extent to which each part of the data falls under one of the thematic categories, 
the target of inference being the motivations and communication strategies of the jihadist 
movement. Within this study, the units of analysis Krippendorff (2004) identifies will include 
important key words, phrases, and imagery referencing different themes.  
 Theme definition is achieved through the process of thematic coding, which consists of 
identifying parts of data, such as images or lines of text, exhibiting a common theme (Gibbs, 
2007). One method of coding is identifying the occurrences of certain words, phrases, or images 
used in the data which describe a particular concept, including feelings, actions, and beliefs. 
Depending on the concept’s importance, an analyst may define that concept as a theme. For 
example, an analysis of an article found within the magazine Dabiq may identify multiple 
references to a creating theocratic empire, practicing religious imperialism, and subjugating or 
converting nonbelievers within the empire. These references share the common theme of the 
concept of a caliphate. Through this method of defining themes, drawing from an extensive 
literature review, this study identifies multiple themes present in jihadist communication and in 
the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah.  
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 The primary goal of thematic analysis is to identify and categorize units that correspond 
to key themes in order to make further inferences about the communication characteristics, its 
senders, receivers, and possible consequences (Holsti, 1969). Within this study, understanding 
the communication usage of identified themes particularly lead to inferences on what Dabiq and 
Rumiyah reveal about the message, communication strategies, and future outcomes of the jihadist 
movement.   
 
Identified Themes 
 
According to the principles of the methodology of thematic analysis, this study identifies 
and analyzes multiple key themes in the ISIS magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah based on the 
reoccurrence of ideas featured within the magazines’ articles. 
 
Jihad 
 
 Jihad, the conflict between Islamists and nonbelievers, broadly characterizes both the 
literature assessed in this thesis and the general movement ISIS and similar groups are part of 
(Peters & Cook, 2014). However, within the scope of the thematic analysis of this study, the 
theme of jihad will specifically apply to references to a struggle against the non-Muslim world.  
 
Sharia 
 
The legal system defined by Islam, the theme of sharia influences all levels of the 
Islamist movement, from its definition of jihad as a violent struggle to its definition of a 
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caliphate (Hallaq, 2009). Sharia is favored by Salafists and Pan-Islamist groups and is linked 
with militancy (Amman, 2015). All references to Islamic law and its requirements fall under the 
theme of sharia. References to sharia often tie into the theme of the caliphate and an Islamic 
governing body, which would institute sharia. This theme is indicative of the jihadist 
movement’s influence in all aspects of life, addressed by the laws of sharia.  
 
Militancy 
 
 While the theme jihad may not explicitly call for violence, entreaties within ISIS’s 
magazines for its readers to take up arms, assemble militarily, and wage violence against 
nonbelievers will fall under the theme of militant mobilization. Militancy is also closely linked 
with sharia law, supporters of which are more likely to consent to violent action (Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life, 2013). Within the texts, graphic descriptions of militant violence, 
particularly entreaties for readers to carry out such acts, are identified as references towards 
militancy. The Arabic term ribāṭ, meaning military fortification, is referenced often in Dabiq and 
Rumiyah, but is not considered a reference towards militancy in this study, as its usage 
specifically refers to maintaining fortifications on the borders of ISIS territory. References 
towards ribāṭ will therefore fall under the theme of the caliphate. 
 
Caliphate 
 
 References within the data to a theocratic Pan-Islamic empire ruled by Islamic law fall 
underneath the theme of the caliphate, particularly data that endorses the invasion and 
subjugation of other lands in the name of Islam. This rejection of the Westphalian principle of 
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sovereignty is found in ISIS’s caliphate declaration (Caldwell & Williams, Jr., 2016). This theme 
is also tied to the theme of sharia law, as a caliphate is governed by classical Islamist law. The 
act of performing ribāṭ, referenced multiple times in Dabiq and Rumiyah, means manning a 
defense fortification to maintain the borders of the caliphate. Because this theme references 
physical territory, it also connects to the theme of hijrah, emigrating to Islamic territory. 
 
Hijrah 
 
 The sharia concept of hijrah, or emigration to traditionally Islamic-occupied lands, is 
referred to within Dabiq as a mandatory requirement for practicing Muslims (Gambhir, 2014). 
Emigration is of particular interest for a caliphate, which would require a sizeable population of 
loyal citizens to remain a self-sustaining, powerful militant force. Calls for Muslims to emigrate 
to ISIS’s self-declared caliphate share the theme of hijrah.  
 
Enmity against the West 
 
 Jihadist texts particularly single out primarily Judeo-Christian Western nations as the 
major enemy of Islam and the primary target of a militant caliphate, decrying perceived Western 
concepts such as democracy and the separation of church and state. References to this theme 
support Huntington’s (1993) theory of the Clash of Civilizations. This theme also influences a 
further theme of the treatment of non-Muslims and is connected to the idea of a ruling caliphate. 
It also shares the concept of battle against the West with the notion in Islamic texts that the final 
battle will be between Islam and Christendom (Shanahan, 2016). Language that also refers to 
perceived Western subjugation of Islamic peoples also falls under this theme. 
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Treatment of Non-Muslims and Apostate Muslims 
 
 A characteristic of Islamic texts, the concept of the caliphate, and sharia law is a 
consensus in the belief in subjugating or converting nonbelievers: as the Quranic verse 2:191 
states of Christians and Jews, “Slay them wherever you find People of the Book.” In modern 
jihadist groups, this violence also carries to apostates who leave Islam or who deny jihad (Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2013). References towards the treatment of perceived 
enemies of jihad fall under this theme.  
 
Ummah 
 
 The theme of ummah, the concept of an international, united Islamic community, is a 
major aspect of jihadist ideology, as it ties into the theme of militancy through organized groups, 
as well as the theme of the caliphate (Silke, 2008). Data that refers to an organized Islamic 
community exhibits the theme of ummah. References to this theme likely tie in to the jihadist 
effort to unite Muslims under the Sunni Salafist teachings supported by ISIS. This theme ties into 
ISIS’s movement to build its worldwide caliphate.  
  
Divine Sanction 
 
 Another major theme evident in Dabiq and Rumiyah is the affirmation that the actions of 
ISIS and the jihadist movement are sanctioned by Allah, assuring ISIS members that the violence 
the movement espouses will achieve an Islamic caliphate. This theme is related to the overall 
concept of jihad, a holy struggle, as well as the themes of a caliphate born of a final, apocalyptic 
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conflict. As the vast majority of ISIS recruits report high religiosity, affirmations of divine 
sanction are likely motivational to the group’s members (Sageman, 2004).  
 
Final Conflict 
 
 Lastly, the theme of a final conflict, an apocalyptic clash of civilizations, is central to the 
very names of the magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, indicating that the overarching goal of jihadist 
groups is the ultimate defeat of nonbelievers and the West by an Islamic caliphate (Shanahan, 
2016). The theme of a final conflict is present both in references to the final battle named in 
Islamic texts as well as in apocalyptic language, common in ISIS publications (Ingram, 2016). 
 
Applying Themes 
  
 Currently, there are fifteen published issues of Dabiq and thirteen published issues of 
Rumiyah. To obtain appropriate samples of both magazines as to identify possible thematic 
changes over time in their content, one magazine issue was systematically selected from every 
year of publication from 2014 to 2017, the third and ninth issue of each magazine. The third and 
ninth issues of each magazine were arbitrarily selected to account for consistency in the 
systematic sampling. This totals to four issues: the third and ninth issues of Dabiq, published 
respectively in September 2014 and May 2015, and the third and ninth issues of Rumiyah, 
published respectively in November 2016 and May 2017. From each magazine, data was 
collected from a sample of the first four articles, inclusive of a foreword if present. 
Text from each sampled magazine will account for the amount of occurrences of the 
individual themes. The table below visually represents the process of thematic analysis for Dabiq 
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and Rumiyah; sentences and phrases that reference the themes are identified and categorized. If 
two or more themes may apply to a single sentence or phrase, the sentence or phrase is counted 
under both themes.  
 
Data Key phrases Themes 
Dabiq (Issue 1): “A new era has arrived of might and 
dignity for the Muslims” 
Amirul-Mu’minin said: “Soon, by Allah’s permission, a 
day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a 
master, having honor, being revered, with his head raised 
high and his dignity preserved. Anyone who dares to 
offend him will be disciplined, and any hand that reaches 
out to harm him will be cut off. So let the world know that 
we are living today in a new era. Whoever was heedless 
must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now 
awaken. Whoever was shocked and amazed must 
comprehend. The Muslims today have a loud, thundering 
statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement 
to make that will cause the world to hear and understand 
the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the 
idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and 
uncover its deviant nature.”  
Shayk Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani said: “The time has 
come for those generations that were drowning in oceans 
of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and 
being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long 
slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for 
them to rise. The time has come for the Ummah of 
Muhammad... to wake up from its sleep, remove the 
garments of dishonor, and shake off the dust of humiliation 
and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has 
gone, and the dawn of honor has emerged anew. The sun 
of jihad has risen. The glad tidings of good are shining. 
Triumph looms on the horizon. The signs of victory of 
appeared.” 
“by Allah’s permission” 
 
“sun of jihad” 
“Triumph looms on the 
horizon” 
Victorious ISIS militants 
portrayed in images 
 
“will walk everywhere as a 
master” 
“Anyone who dares to offend 
him will be disciplined, and any 
hand that reaches out to harm 
him will be cut off.” 
 
“living today in a new era” 
“must now be alert… must now 
awaken” 
“Muslims today have a loud, 
thundering statement” 
 
“Ummah of Muhammad” 
 
“understand the meaning of 
terrorism” 
“trample the idol of 
nationalism, destroy the idol of 
democracy” 
[democracy’s] “deviant nature”  
“disgrace… humiliation” 
“ruled by the vilest of all 
people” 
 
Divine sanction 
 
Final Conflict, 
Caliphate 
 
 
 
 
Caliphate, 
Treatment of 
Non-Muslims 
 
 
 
 
Militancy, 
Ummah  
 
 
 
 
Ummah 
 
Enmity Against 
the West 
Table 1: Thematic Application Process 
  
Through identifying the frequencies with which different themes appear in issues of 
Dabiq and Rumiyah, this study addresses the degree of importance ISIS and the jihadist 
movement places on these themes. This provides observers a better understanding of the jihadist 
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movement and its goals. Furthermore, this study also addresses the connections these themes 
have to the communication theories of agenda-setting theory, the diffusion of innovations, and 
speech codes theory. These communications theories will provide insight on the strategies with 
which the jihadist movement uses the identified themes to communicate with their audiences and 
mobilize potential recruits.  
Despite ISIS’s physical decline in the Middle East, its presence remains on the world 
stage due to its network of associates, its continuing online publications, and militants who 
commit ISIS-inspired acts of terror. Whether ISIS remains the world’s primary Islamic terrorism 
threat, its media and publications reflect the motivations of the jihadist movement at large. This 
study seeks to understand how ISIS uses those motivations to wage their media war.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This study sampled data from the third and ninth issues of both magazines, processing the 
texts of the articles and categorizing individual phrases into the described themes. The collected 
data is visually represented in the following tables and figures. Each magazine is referred to as 
the year of its publication, in order to showcase variation in thematic frequency over time.  
 
Frequency of Themes from 2014-2017 
 
THEME 2014  2015 2016 2017 Total 
Jihad 25 20 11 5 61 
Sharia 6 1 6 3 16 
Militancy 4 4 36 28 72 
Caliphate 14 42 13 3 72 
Hijrah 49 6 4 0 59 
Enmity against the West 19 50 38 7 114 
Non-Muslims and Apostates 38 57 50 78 223 
Ummah 5 3 3 4 15 
Divine Sanction 19 12 72 48 151 
Final Conflict 14 1 4 1 20 
Table 2: Frequency of Themes from 2014-2017 
  
This table shows the number of occurrences of each theme across each sampled 
magazine. The number of instances of any one theme in one magazine ranged between zero to 78 
instances, total references of a theme from 2014 to 2017 ranging from fifteen to 223 occurrences. 
and the most common theme, by far, was a reference to non-Muslims and apostate Muslims. As 
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ISIS’s primary operations are associated with their opposition to non-Muslims and other 
Muslims they deem heretical, it follows logically that their most ubiquitous theme is the 
treatment of non-Muslims and apostates.  
The second most common theme was divine sanction, a reference to the religious 
righteousness of the jihadist movement and affirmation that ISIS’s actions are the will of Allah. 
The theme of divine sanction reoccurred 151 times throughout the magazines. Keen to inspire 
assurance in its constituency that its actions are supported by Allah, ISIS utilized affirmations of 
divine sanction with a high frequency throughout the publications of Dabiq and Rumiyah. 
Through analysis, one may also observe a connection between the theme of divine sanction and 
the theme of sharia, though sharia was referenced far fewer times than affirmations of divine 
sanction were made. Sharia was referred to throughout all issues of the magazines as “Allah’s 
rule,” the phrase “Allah’s rule” appearing five times from 2014 to 2017. By referring to sharia as 
the divinely sanctioned rules of Allah, ISIS lent further legitimacy to their cause.  
The least common theme was the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community, with only 
fifteen appearances from 2014 to 2017. Though the ummah is an integral part of Islamic 
doctrine, references to a global spiritual community were made far less often than references to a 
physical Islamic empire, the caliphate. The theme of caliphate was referenced 72 times 
throughout the sampled magazines. Because the themes of caliphate and the ummah are similar 
in their relevance to the Islamic community – the caliphate being a physical community and the 
ummah being a spiritual community – the prevalence of references to the literal caliphate rather 
than a spiritual ummah suggests greater focus on the political, territorial motivations of the 
jihadist movement rather than the religious motivations. 
 The theme of sharia, doctrinal Islamic law, was the second least common theme 
throughout the samples of Dabiq and Rumiyah, with only sixteen instances. Its absence may 
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indicate familiarity on the part of the intended reader with the principles of sharia. This suggests 
that the intended readership of Dabiq and Rumiyah primarily consists of individuals already 
involved enough in Islam to understand sharia without added explanation. In addition, the 
mentions of sharia present in the magazines tended not to focus on the actual rulings of sharia, 
but rather on the defense of sharia from western influence and the implementation of sharia in a 
caliphate. The third issue of Rumiyah, published in 2016, asserts that western nations attempt to 
“prevent the muwahhidin from establishing the religion and implementing the Shari’ah.” As 
Dabiq and Rumiyah focused less on the principles of sharia and more on its defense and 
implementation, the theme of sharia was less present throughout the magazines. 
 The third least common theme, final conflict, only appeared twenty times throughout the 
sampled magazines. Despite the fact that an ultimate clash of civilizations ending in the victory 
of the caliphate is the definitive goal of the jihadist movement, and that the names of the 
magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah, specifically allude to a final conflict, the theme itself is largely 
unimportant in the content. References to a final conflict in the magazines tend to act as 
affirmations of the more common theme of divine sanction. When alluding to a final conflict 
between the Islamic world and nonbelievers, Dabiq and Rumiyah write of an Islamic victory as a 
certainty, the will of Allah. The third issue of Dabiq, published in 2014, frames an ultimate 
Islamic victory on the battlefield as fact, including a short description of a final conflict in an 
article titled “Islamic State Reports.” Though the rest of the article is composed of military 
reports of ISIS’s advances in territory at the time, the article describes “the events of al-
Malhamah al-Kubrā,” literally “the grand battle,” as fact. The article asserts that Allah will grant 
the Islamic caliphate victory during the grand battle. Juxtaposing the description of a 
hypothetical, divinely sanctioned final battle with military reports grounded in reality, ISIS 
appears to attempt to further legitimize their military acts through alluding to a final conflict. 
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 The total occurrences of each theme convey prevalence on average throughout the 
publications of both magazines from 2014 to 2017. However, to understand the variation in 
frequency over time of each theme, the themes are represented visually in the following figures. 
 
Frequency of Themes by Year of Publication 
 
Figure 1: Frequency of Themes by Year of Publication 
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Figure 1 charts the frequencies of each theme from every year of publication of the 
sampled magazines, relative to one another. Through this presentation of the data, one can 
visually compare the frequencies and ranges of multiple themes and how the thematic variation 
of the magazines changed over time, as ISIS’s success peaked and fell. One can observe the most 
common and least common themes previously discussed, particularly how references to the 
treatment of non-Muslims and apostate Muslims remain one of the most common themes 
throughout all four years of publication. However, the second most common theme, divine 
sanction, is visibly less common than the themes of jihad, caliphate, and enmity against the west 
during the first two years of magazine publication. In 2016, the number of references to divine 
sanction spiked higher than all other themes, even overtaking the theme of non-Muslims and 
apostate Muslims for that year. Between 2015 and 2016, from the ending of Dabiq to the 
beginning of Rumiyah, it appears that the needs of ISIS’s community changed in a way that 
called for a drastic increase in religious affirmations of the jihadist movement.  
Another noticeable shift in relative frequency between 2015 and 2016 was the increase in 
references to the theme of violent militancy. From 2014 to 2015, militancy ranked among the 
least common of all the themes present within Dabiq. Upon Rumiyah’s publication in 2016, 
however, the usage of violent, militant language jumped noticeably, becoming the fourth most 
common theme. In 2017, references to militancy remained high relative to the other themes, and 
militancy was the third most common theme in the sampled magazine, by a large margin. The 
increased usage of violent language present in Rumiyah that was not present in Dabiq suggests 
further changes in ISIS’s agenda as it declined territorially. By 2016, violent militancy overtook 
the theme of caliphate, which was the third most common theme in 2015, implying that ISIS 
turned its focus from building its empire to seeking to damage its enemies.  
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The steep drop in the relative presence of the theme hijrah may also suggest larger 
implications throughout ISIS as a terrorist organization. In 2014, hijrah began as the most 
common theme in the sampled magazine. However, by 2015, its commonality dropped from 49 
instances to six instances, the steepest drop in frequency of all the themes in every magazine. For 
the rest of the magazines’ publications, hijrah was hardly referenced at all, and was completely 
unmentioned in the issue of Rumiyah published in 2017. Hijrah went from the most common 
theme in 2014 to the least common theme in 2017. Its drop in frequency may indicate ISIS’s 
changing strategy from 2014 to 2015 in terms of recruitment. As hijrah is the doctrinal mandate 
found in sharia calling Muslims to emigrate to traditionally Islamic lands, ISIS utilized the 
concept of hijrah to recruit radicalized Muslims to its local territory in the Levant (Gambhir, 
2014). In 2014, as ISIS neared its territorial peak, it called upon the worldwide ummah to 
emigrate to its territories and take up residence. ISIS believed it was building a new caliphate, 
and this empire required citizens. However, ISIS suffered several territorial loses in 2015, after 
U.S. and Arab forces launched air strikes on ISIS operations in Syria in 2014 (Barnard & 
Shoumali, 2015). These local defeats threatened the establishment of a functional caliphate state, 
and may have led to the decrease in calls for hijrah in the magazines from 2015 to 2017.  
Similarly, references to the theme of caliphate peaked in 2015, after ISIS reached its 
territorial pinnacle, then dropped by 29 points in 2016 and remained relatively uncommon in 
2017. Following the drop in calls for hijrah, this increase in references to a caliphate may 
suggest ISIS’s focus to defend what was left of the caliphate’s territory in lieu of building the 
caliphate as a functional state through hijrah.  
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Individual Theme Frequency by Year of Publication 
 
 The following figures chart the individual frequencies of each theme analyzed in the 
samples of Dabiq and Rumiyah over the years of the magazines’ publications. While Figure 1 
was useful in analysis of thematic frequencies of multiple themes to one another, Figures 2 to 11 
provide a visual representation of single themes, allowing for understanding of the importance of 
individual themes over time. 
 
Jihad and Sharia 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of Jihad by Publication Year 
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 The frequency of the theme of jihad, as observable in Figure 2, declined steadily from 25 
instances in 2014 to five instances in 2017. This downward slope began with higher frequencies 
during ISIS’s most successful years, in 2014 and 2015, but took its steepest drop between 2015 
and 2016, as ISIS suffered its greatest strategic losses. As the theme of jihad is representative of 
the greater jihadist movement, the reduced frequency of references to jihad may suggest a 
decrease in support of the Lesser Jihad, the struggle against nonbelievers.  
 
Figure 3:  Frequency of Sharia by Publication Year 
 
 References to sharia, charted in Figure 3, remained relatively stable from 2014 to 2017, 
lying within a range of five points, from one instance to six instances. This limited range of 
instances showcases the consistency with which sharia was mentioned throughout Dabiq and 
Rumiyah. 
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Militancy and Caliphate 
 
 
Figure 4:  Frequency of Militancy by Publication Year 
 
Militancy, charted in Figure 4, had very few instances in the first two years of magazine 
publication. In 2016, the usage of violent, militant language increased by 32 points, peaking at 
36 instances in that year and remaining relatively high in 2017. With a wide range of four 
references to 36 references, it appears that violent militancy only became an important theme in 
Dabiq and Rumiyah during ISIS’s territorial decline. This may be due to an increased movement 
within ISIS strategy to focus less on its local empire-building and more on calling its 
international community to cause violent acts of terror. Many references to violent militancy in 
2016 and 2017 come from articles describing the need to perform terrorism regardless of where 
one is located. In the ninth issue of Rumiyah, published in 2017, the phrase “kill the mushrikin 
wherever you find them” is repeated multiple times, referring to nonbelievers, in an article 
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discussing the treatment of Christians. Furthermore, the third issue of Rumiyah, published in 
2016, included a highly detailed, militant article instructing jihadists worldwide to use rental 
trucks to run over crowds of people. Both these articles suggest a greater emphasis on militancy 
and violence in the jihadist movement as the territorial caliphate ISIS was intent on building 
declined. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Frequency of Caliphate by Publication Year 
 
The rise in the saturation of militant language in Dabiq and Rumiyah coincides with a fall 
in emphasis on the caliphate. The theme of caliphate peaked to a high of 42 instances in 2015, 
then fell steeply the next year by twenty-nine points to only thirteen references, finishing at a low 
of only three instances in 2017. As an emphasis on violence and militancy rose, the importance 
of the physical caliphate fell. The loss of their territory in the Middle East may have influenced 
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ISIS leadership to focus less on the caliphate in their rhetoric, as not to draw attention to the local 
defeats the organization was suffering. 
 
Hijrah and Enmity against the West 
 
 
Figure 6:  Frequency of Hijrah by Publication Year 
 
 The theme of hijrah was highly prevalent in the third issue of Dabiq, published in 2014, 
but from 2015 to 2017, the number of references to hijrah dropped precipitously. In fact, the 
ninth issue of Rumiyah, published in 2017, included no references to hijrah whatsoever. In 2014, 
there were 49 instances of the theme of hijrah, but this number dropped by 43 points by the next 
year to only six occurrences. The wide range of the amount of references to hijrah over the years 
of the magazines’ publications suggest a change in ISIS rhetoric regarding calling individuals to 
emigrate to traditionally Islamic lands. An article titled “A Call to Hijrah” featured within the 
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third issue of Dabiq, published in 2014, summoned Muslims worldwide to ISIS’s self-
proclaimed caliphate, particularly calling the skilled and educated to help serve ISIS’s interests. 
The article suggested that “every Muslim who lives amongst the mushrikīn” is avoiding his or 
her sacred duty. Though ISIS rhetoric continued to include references to the caliphate well into 
2015, calls to emigrate to that caliphate seem to diminish after 2014. By 2017, as ISIS suffers 
heavy territorial losses, encouragement of hijrah appears to have expired.  
 
 
Figure 7:  Frequency of Enmity against the West by Publication Year 
 
 Though the theme of enmity against the west is the third most common theme in Dabiq 
and Rumiyah, its relevance peaked in the 2015 issue of Dabiq, at fifty occurrences. It remained a 
common theme in the third issue of Rumiyah, published in 2016, but its frequency dropped to a 
low of only seven instances in 2017. With a range of 43 points, language that described a hatred 
of western nations and ideology appeared to be of less importance in the ninth issue of Rumiyah, 
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published in 2017. Notably, the ninth issue of Rumiyah had a very high occurrence of references 
towards non-Muslims and apostate Muslims. The lack of references to a hatred of the West may 
be due to the fact that the ninth issue of Rumiyah may have been written to focus more on non-
Muslims and apostate Muslims, and the few occurrences of enmity against the West in 2017 may 
not reflect any larger trend in ISIS rhetoric.  
  
Non-Muslims and Apostate Muslims and the Ummah 
 
 
Figure 8:  Frequency of Non-Muslims and Apostate Muslims by Publication Year 
 
 References to ISIS’s religious enemies, namely non-Muslims and Muslims they consider 
apostates, remained a common theme throughout the publications of Dabiq and Rumiyah. 
However, their frequency increased greatly from 2014 at a low of 38 occurrences to a high of 78 
occurrences in 2017. This overall increase in frequency, with a range of 40 points, may suggest a 
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trend in the rhetoric of ISIS’s editors of the magazines encouraging material that justified 
negative sentiment towards ISIS’s targets. The majority of references to non-Muslims and 
apostate Muslims throughout the publications of Dabiq and Rumiyah discuss their treatment 
under ISIS protocol. An article in the third issue of Rumiyah, published in 2016, commanded, 
“Turn the disbelievers’ night into day, bring destruction to their homes, make their blood flow 
like rivers” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 5). Similar statements in reference to non-Muslims and 
apostate Muslims are present throughout the magazines. As ISIS’s member population grew 
from 2014 to 2017, the rhetoric of its propaganda may have accommodated for the growing 
number of ISIS fighters by increasing the repetition of commands to fight against disbelievers.  
 
 
Figure 9:  Frequency of the Ummah by Publication Year 
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The theme of the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community, was the least common theme in 
Dabiq and Rumiyah, and the variation in the frequency of references to it remain fairly low. The 
number of occurrences of the theme of ummah peaked in 2014 at five instances, with a low of 
three instances in the magazines sampled from 2015 and 2016. As the range of the frequencies of 
occurrences was only two points, there was little variation in the repetition of references to the 
ummah. 
 
Divine Sanction and Final Conflict 
 
 
Figure 10:  Frequency of Divine Sanction by Publication Year 
 
 Divine sanction, the second most common theme throughout Dabiq and Rumiyah, had a 
wide variation in its number of occurrences from 2014 to 2016. In 2014 and 2015, claims that the 
work of ISIS and the jihadist movement was sanctioned by Allah were relatively infrequent, with 
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a low of twelve instances in 2015. However, the amount jumped 60 points to a high of 72 
occurrences a year later, remaining fairly common at 48 instances in 2017. In the first two years 
of the publications of ISIS magazines, it appears that, though affirmations of divine sanction 
were present, their importance increased exponentially between 2015 and 2016. This coincides 
with the beginning of ISIS’s territorial decline in the Middle East. A possible explanation for the 
huge increase in the frequency of the theme of divine sanction is that the editors of Dabiq and 
Rumiyah may have observed a need within the jihadist community for affirmations that ISIS’s 
operations were the will of Allah as ISIS suffered territorial defeats. Leaders within ISIS may 
have called for more reassurances that Allah was on ISIS’s side to boost community morale. 
Throughout ISIS’s decline in 2016 and 2017, references to divine sanction remained frequent. 
 
 
Figure 11:  Frequency of Final Conflict by Publication Year 
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 The theme of a final conflict, an ultimate clash of civilizations resulting in an Islamic 
victory, had a minor presence in the first magazines sampled, the third issue of Dabiq, published 
in 2014. Its presence peaked at fourteen references in 2014, dropping to only a few occurrences 
in the next three years, with lows of one instance in both 2015 and 2017. Though the number of 
references to a final conflict over the course of the magazines’ publications was relatively low, 
the drop of thirteen points from 2014 to 2015 may suggest a change of perception in ISIS 
rhetoric. As ISIS reached its peak of success in 2014, organization leaders may have perceived 
that a prophesized final victory over disbelievers was within conceivable reach, after further 
expansion of the self-proclaimed caliphate. However, as ISIS’s presence declined in the Middle 
East, this final conflict became hypothetical once more, rather than a prophesized inevitability.  
 
Symbolic Convergence in Dabiq and Rumiyah 
 
 Throughout the samples of Dabiq and Rumiyah, ISIS’s overall rhetoric and the 
worldview it espouses are evident, accomplished by the usage of numerous rhetorical devices 
and symbols throughout the texts. The principles of symbolic convergence theory (SCT) are 
reflected in ISIS’s attempts to shape reality through the communication within its publications, 
as SCT is the synthesis of a thematic narrative through communication, particularly within 
groups. The group can affect the reality individuals experience; likewise, individuals can affect 
the shared reality of the group (Vaughan, 2009). These shared worldviews are described within 
SCT as shared group fantasies. 
The reality that Dabiq and Rumiyah puts forth is one of a violent battle against hated 
enemies, so-called disbelievers, which affects every aspect of the lives of the members of the 
group. According to the magazines, ISIS’s battle is supported by Allah, and the descriptive 
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language used within its texts evoke an epic, dichotomous narrative of civilizational conflict. The 
third issue of Rumiyah describes ISIS’s conflict as a “fiery battle, all-encompassing war, and 
major jihad which the Islamic State is engaged in today” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 4). 
Readers of the publications are exposed to a shared militant worldview that clearly indicates 
organizational goals and ideology. “Show them your strength, burn them with the fire of your 
wrath, and take revenge for your religion,” commands the text (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 6). 
As both magazines are official ISIS publications, developed by the Al Hayat media center 
and edited by group leaders, ISIS members and affiliates consider the magazines reputable and 
authoritative. This authority, as described by SCT, is granted by a sanctioning agent (Bormann, 
1992). ISIS acts as the sanctioning agent of the ideology proposed in the magazines. Because 
Dabiq and Rumiyah were created to communicate ISIS’s group vision, they reflect the rhetoric of 
authorities within ISIS.  
 
Fantasy Themes 
 
The magazines exhibit multiple instances of the symbols of fantasy themes, which 
include words, phrases, or statements that describe different elements of a narrative. These may 
be elements related to a narrative’s setting, its actions or plotlines, and its characters. Within 
Dabiq and Rumiyah, the usage of fantasy themes is primarily associated with describing 
characters and plotlines. As a group with a dichotomous worldview, one that describes saintly 
believers and evil disbelievers, ISIS casts many heroes and villains as symbols throughout the 
publications. These characters may be groups of people, historical and religious figures, or real 
people relevant to modern-day occurrences.  
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The primary heroes described in the magazines within ISIS are its own leadership and the 
Islamic figures the group members aspire to become akin to. Both magazines mention and quote 
at length known ISIS leaders and Salafist thinkers, such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Following a 
mention of al-Baghdadi’s name, the third issue of Dabiq adds, “may Allah support him and keep 
him firm” (“Dabiq Issue 3”, 2014, p. 5). By giving al-Baghdadi such a degree of reverence, to 
the extent of calling upon Allah to protect him, the magazines cast al-Baghdadi as a heroic 
champion of Allah. The magazine also identifies the heroes of Islamic doctrine as symbolic 
heroes, but goes even further by comparing ISIS’s own members to traditional Islamic heroes. 
The third issue of Rumiyah encourages readers to take up arms against nonbelievers, saying, “O 
men of the Arabian Peninsula, O grandsons of the Sahabah, attack them, following one attack 
with another” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 6). The term Sahabah refers to the companions of 
the prophet Muhammad, followers who interacted personally with him during his lifetime 
(“Companions of the Prophet”, 2006). The Sahabah is held in high esteem throughout the 
Muslim world, and by asserting that ISIS members are the descendants and heirs of the 
companions of Muhammad, heroes within Islam, the magazines cast ISIS members as heroes as 
well.  
Dabiq and Rumiyah also characterize the enemies of ISIS as complete, irredeemable 
villains. Related to the theme of non-Muslims and apostate Muslims, as developed within the 
thematic analysis, disbelievers are not only painted in an unflattering light in the magazines, but 
in an unforgiving light. The text of the third issue of Rumiyah states that “Jews, Christians, 
atheists, Rafidah, apostates, and all the nations of disbelief” are “the enemies of Allah” who have 
“dedicated their media, wealth, armies, and vehicles to wage war against the Muslims” 
(“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 5). By stating that the many disbelievers who fall under these 
identities are the enemies of Allah, ISIS not only vilifies non-Muslims and apostate Muslims, it 
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demonizes them. The magazines also describe villainous deeds done by disbelievers, who 
“extinguish the light of Allah, in enmity towards His religion and methodology on the earth” 
(“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 4). The third issue of Rumiyah states that the armies of the 
disbelievers “raid your lands under the pretext of waging war against the Islamic State, then they 
don’t depart until they’ve… killed your men and taken your women and children prisoner” 
(“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 5).  
Less generally, Dabiq and Rumiyah also characterize smaller groups of people as villains, 
particularly the religious and ethnic minorities within the Middle East that ISIS targeted in the 
past. This includes groups such as Christians, Yazidis, and Jews. The ninth issue of Dabiq states, 
“The Jews are humiliated in all the lands” (“Dabiq Issue 9”, 2015, p. 17). Lastly, individual 
people deemed enemies of ISIS are also vilified in both magazines. The third issue of Rumiyah 
in particular identifies the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as a villain. He is 
referred to within the magazine as “the wicked Erdogan,” ruling over “the secular, apostate state 
of Turkey,” which ISIS deems “despicable and cowardly” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 2). The 
magazine also calls Turkey “vile.” The usage of descriptors like “wicked,” “despicable,” “vile,” 
and “cowardly” paints an unequivocal portrait of President Erdogan as a villain.  
Fantasy themes also address the action or plotline of a narrative. In the case of Dabiq and 
Rumiyah, the plotlines referred to within the magazines include minor terrorist incidents, major 
attacks, and overarching actionable themes important in the jihadist movement. The two action 
themes primarily present in the magazines are the themes of hijrah and militancy. Hijrah as a 
plotline merely describes the emigration of a Muslim to traditionally Islamic lands or a caliphate, 
but it is an important plotline mentioned multiple times in Dabiq. As it is an action which plays 
into the larger shared group fantasy of a modern-day caliphate, it reflects ISIS’s larger narrative. 
The third issue of Dabiq strongly encourages hijrah: “The best people on earth will be those who 
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keep to the land of Ibrahim’s hijrah,” the magazine states, further emphasizing that “those who 
left their tribes” are “the best of Allah’s slaves” (“Dabiq Issue 3”, 2014, p. 10-11).  
The action fantasy theme of militancy acts as a plotline both at the individual level and at 
an organizational level. Individual terrorist plots are reflected in the articles of Dabiq and 
Rumiyah which detail battlefield updates and discuss attacks carried out by ISIS affiliates. At an 
organizational level, ISIS’s militant action is a plotline that was intended to conclude with the 
establishment of a true caliphate. Repeated descriptors of ISIS’s militant action contributes to 
normalizing a shared group vision of constant warfare with the enemy and integrating violence 
into the group consciousness. Words and phrases like “harvesting,” “smashing,” “crushing,” 
“blood bath,” “carnage,” “destruction,” and “reaping casualties” are often used and repeated in 
the magazines in reference to ISIS’s victims, further describing the action fantasy theme of 
militancy (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 10-12).  
The three principles of shared rhetorical vision, as defined by SCT, are fully observable 
within Dabiq and Rumiyah. The principle of novelty states that the shared group fantasy must 
evolve over time in order to suit the group members.  
 
Symbolic Cues 
  
 Heuristics for shared group emotion, symbolic cues include words, phrases, nonverbal 
gestures, and slogans that evoke fantasy themes. The textual symbolic cues used within Dabiq 
and Rumiyah remind readers of concepts shared within ISIS and widely in the greater Muslim 
world. Mentions of the themes of jihad, hijrah, caliphate, and ummah allow readers to 
understand the larger ideologies associated with the words, building group cohesion through 
shared understanding. The symbolic cue of the word “jihad” already evokes both the internal 
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Islamic struggle to do good and the external conflict against nonbelievers. For members of ISIS, 
the phrase “performing jihad” generally refers to committing acts of terrorism. 
 The symbolic cue of the word “caliphate” evokes the shared understanding of an Islamic 
empire, and its application to ISIS, a self-styled caliphate, indicates ISIS’s ultimate goal. The 
related term of ribāṭ, referring to military border fortifications, cues a reader to the concept of the 
caliphate, which ribāṭ would protect the frontiers of. The term ribāṭ also refers to the action of 
manning a border fortification. ISIS members would understand the shared group knowledge that 
the call to “perform ribāṭ,” a phrase repeated eight times in the ninth issue of Dabiq, is a request 
for troops guarding ISIS’s territorial borders. 
Ummah, referring to the wider Muslim community, is a symbolic cue of the fantasy of a 
unified Islamic world: unified under creed and interest and undivided by sectarianism. The ninth 
issue of Dabiq states that ISIS’s goals were to “achieve the Ummah’s interest” and “defeat the 
enemies of the Ummah” (“Dabiq Issue 9”, 2015, p. 7). The shared group fantasy of the ummah 
evokes unity both within the Muslim community and within ISIS, as symbolic cues build group 
cohesion. 
 
Fantasy Types 
 
 Within Dabiq and Rumiyah, themes reoccur frequently, and are applied to situations and 
concerns ISIS faces as a whole. These recurrent fantasy themes are referred to in SCT as fantasy 
types. Fantasy types act as references for a group on how to assign meaning to happenings, and 
their reapplication drives shared rhetorical visions within a group, allowing the group to achieve 
internal consistency. Multiple themes addressed in the thematic analysis portion of this work act 
as fantasy types. The theme of divine sanction is a recurrent theme applied frequently in ISIS’s 
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rhetoric, as the idea that Allah is on their side affirms the members’ cause and encourages them 
to continue to wage war. The second most common theme analyzed, divine sanction occurs 
many times over the magazines’ publication. Phrases like “the enemies of Allah,” “the cause of 
Allah,” and “Allah is with us” are repeated throughout Dabiq and Rumiyah. The third issue of 
Rumiyah states that ISIS is “supporting the religion of Allah and making His word supreme,” 
while also saying that “killing [disbelievers] is the greatest of rewards, by Allah’s permission” 
(“Rumiyah Issue 3,” 2016, p. 9). Each reference to the fantasy type of divine sanction was 
applied to different scenarios addressed by ISIS. Reapplication of a theme to different situations 
is a key characteristic of the fantasy type.  
 Dabiq and Rumiyah contribute to a shared fantasy within ISIS and the jihadist movement 
that they wage an all-encompassing war of an epic scale. This is related to the theme of a final 
conflict. Like the theme of militancy when applied to a large scale, the idea of apocalyptic 
warfare is repeated throughout the magazines and is applied to multiple different situations. 
Referring to ISIS’s enemies in the ninth issue of Dabiq, the magazine states ominously of 
disbelievers, “We have cast among them animosity and hatred until the Day of Resurrection” 
(“Dabiq Issue 9”, 2015, p. 17). Within the text, the previous quote simply refers to the chaos 
caused by a minor ISIS attack, but the usage of apocalyptic language implies that the minor 
attack was a step on the path to a final conflict. Similarly, ISIS’s rhetoric in reference to 
historical western influence suggests that the current wars and a final conflict are the results of 
western encroachment in Islamic lands. In the third issue of Rumiyah, the magazine asserted that 
one of ISIS’s final goals in an ultimate battle would be to dismantle the borders of the Middle 
East drawn after World War II. The texts state that Islamic forces would fight Western nations 
“until its borders met the fate of other Sykes-Picot borders that the mujahidin had removed with 
their own hands” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 2). 
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 Lastly, the concept of just killing of disbelievers resurfaces throughout the sampled 
magazines. Tied closely to the theme of non-Muslims and apostate Muslims, the idea of just 
killing is a fantasy type applied to many different groups of nonbelievers throughout Dabiq and 
Rumiyah. Referring to Christians in the Middle East, the ninth issue of Rumiyah had multiple 
instances of the phrase “kill the mushrikin wherever you find them,” further stating that “the 
blood of mushrikin is that it is permissible to shed” (“Rumiyah Issue 9”, 2017, p. 5). The phrase 
“permissible to shed” is repeated several times. The magazine goes further to state that the 
killing of any armed disbeliever, regardless of age, gender, or physical condition, is justified and 
praised by Allah. The sentiment is repeated in reference to Jews in the ninth issue of Dabiq, 
which said, “the accursed Jews are always in humiliation and overpowered” (“Dabiq Issue 9”, 
2015, p. 18).  
 
Sagas 
 
 The SCT concept of sagas is of special importance to ISIS, as the retelling of significant 
events relevant to the group and its figures is a major aspect of the Salafi jihadist movement. 
Because Salafism refers to a reversion to the old ways of Islam and its figures, such as 
Muhammad and his Sahabah, sagas play a huge role in building shared group understanding in 
the jihadist movement. Sagas construct emotional narratives that bolster the group’s rhetorical 
vision, and the most important saga of Islam, Muhammad’s life as presented in the Quran and the 
Hadith, is highly present throughout Dabiq and Rumiyah. ISIS connects its own narrative to the 
saga of Muhammad and his successors’ conquests, saying that it fights a “Modern crusade 
against the usurped Muslim lands” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 2).  
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 The overall saga of Islam and its final conclusion are of major importance to Dabiq and 
Rumiyah, and a reminder of the saga is repeated on the cover of every issue of the magazine. The 
town of Dabiq and the city of Rome are references to the final, apocalyptic battle prophesized in 
Islamic doctrine in which the caliphate triumphs over the West. The third issue of Dabiq 
addresses this, noting that “the name of our magazine was taken from the area named Dābiq in 
the northern countryside of Halab, due to the significant role it will play during the events of al-
Malhamah al-Kubrā (The Grand Battle) against the crusaders” (“Dabiq Issue 3”, 2014, p. 15). By 
repeating a reference to the saga of Islam and its apocalyptic conclusion, the magazines 
strengthen the group’s shared fantasy of a victorious caliphate, simply through the titles alone.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
 This study expands the study of communication in terrorism through analyzing jihadist 
publications from multiple facets of theory, utilizing thematic analysis to identify possible 
rhetorical trends over time in a terrorist organization. The thematic variation in the sampled 
magazines from 2014 to 2017 showed clear, significant movement in ideological concepts 
important to ISIS’s identity as a leader in the jihadist movement. The three most frequent themes 
– (1) non-Muslims and apostate Muslims, (2) divine sanction, and (3) enmity against the West – 
each play a different role in forming ISIS’s communication culture. However, all the themes 
present within Dabiq and Rumiyah suggest an ultimate worldview promoted by ISIS: an 
ongoing, dichotomous battle between righteous jihadists and their enemies (comprising of both 
the infidels and the apostates). The theme of non-Muslims and apostate Muslims showcases the 
uncompromising stance ISIS takes against every person who does not subscribe to jihadist Islam. 
By forming a coherent picture of “the enemy,” ISIS shows its audience the target of its acts of 
terror through frequent references to them across the magazine issues. References to divine 
sanction act as reaffirmations for ISIS members that ISIS is on Allah’s side. Thus, victory for 
ISIS will be inevitable, despite the territorial defeats it suffers. Lastly, the theme of enmity 
against the West promotes the concept of a Clash of Civilizations, a concept supported by 
Salafist interpretations of Islamic doctrine.  
 
Agenda-Setting Theory 
 
 The theory of agenda-setting identifies the establishment of public salience of different 
issues; this is how media outlets choose to reflect a version of reality. Within Dabiq and 
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Rumiyah, ISIS chooses specific issues, some more than others, as visible in the frequency of 
themes from the magazine samples from 2014 to 2017. The order of thematic occurrence in each 
sample reflected McCombs’s (2004) hierarchy of news salience, with the most frequently 
reappearing themes as the most important for the magazines’ audiences. This is due to the fact 
that a media outlet’s – i.e., ISIS’s Al Hayat Media Center – selection of which issues to select 
leads the public to perceive those subjects as more significant and relevant. The changes over 
time in thematic frequency suggest (1) changes in priority within ISIS, reflected in the decisions 
that Al Hayat Media Center made when editing Dabiq and Rumiyah and (2) changes in perceived 
salience of topics for the readers of the magazines.  
 Overall, as the theme of non-Muslims and apostate Muslims was the most common 
theme throughout all four years of magazine samples, ISIS’s attitude towards so-called 
disbelievers was of significant importance to the readers of Dabiq and Rumiyah, reflecting the 
rhetoric of the terrorist organization at large. As ISIS’s perspective of disbelievers is arguably 
one of the group’s most important motivators, as its members carry out acts of terror against non-
Muslims and apostate Muslims, it follows logically that the theme remained at the top of the 
hierarchy of thematic significance. Without analyzing the perceived importance of the themes 
analyzed (in this study) from the perspective of actual ISIS members or sympathizers, we could 
not identify the real-world salience of the themes as felt by the primary audience of Dabiq and 
Rumiyah. However, through agenda-setting theory, it is likely that the most common themes of 
non-Muslims and apostate Muslims, divine sanction, and enmity against the West have the 
greatest salience for the readers of Dabiq and Rumiyah and ISIS members. Conversely, one may 
assume that the least common themes of the ummah, sharia, and the final battle have the least 
relevance for ISIS members and other readers of the magazines. 
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 Through agenda-setting theory, the variation over time of thematic frequency also 
suggests variation in thematic salience from 2014 to 2017. The theme of violence and militancy, 
which displayed a steep increase in frequency from 2015 to 2016, likely became more important 
to readers of Dabiq and Rumiyah over the same time span. References to divine sanction also 
exhibited a similar jump in frequency between 2015 and 2016. Perhaps presented as reassurance 
for the territorial defeats ISIS suffered during the time, affirmations of ISIS’s divine sanction 
may have become more important for the group’s members during that time. The theme of 
hijrah, meanwhile, decreased greatly in frequency between 2014 and 2015, until it was not 
mentioned at all in the sample of the issue published in 2017. Following agenda-setting, hijrah 
was likely a priority for ISIS members in 2014, then faded to irrelevance in the subsequent years. 
 Though the primary audience of Dabiq and Rumiyah was ISIS members and affiliates, 
one cannot disregard the fact that the magazines were also published for ISIS’s enemies, 
allowing other parties to see ISIS’s vision. Because agenda-setting theory states that media 
outlets do not necessarily affect the direction or intensity of attitudes towards issues, exposure to 
ISIS’s agenda would not change the feelings of anti-terrorism reader towards the jihadist 
movement. However, the hierarchy of issue relevance displayed within Dabiq and Rumiyah may 
influence how we can perceive the importance of the themes within the magazines, just as 
jihadist readers of the magazines do.  
  
Framing Theory 
 
 While the application of agenda-setting theory to Dabiq and Rumiyah implies that the 
magazines reflect issue salience for the magazines’ readers, framing theory suggests that the way 
the magazines characterize their themes shape the audiences’ perceptions of the topics. As the 
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magazines mirror wider ISIS rhetoric, the way ISIS frames the various themes may also reflect 
the attitudes of ISIS members to the themes. For example, both Dabiq and Rumiyah display 
harshly negative language in reference to non-Muslims and apostate Muslims, often describing 
them with words like “enemies,” “criminal,” “traitors,” and “hatred.” In third issue of Dabiq, the 
magazines states, in reference to disbelievers, “Their lands will cast them out, Allah will hate 
them, and the fire will gather them together with the apes and swine… there will remain the 
worst of the people, having intercourse as donkeys do” (“Dabiq Issue 3”, 2014, p. 15). This 
intensely negative, vivid language frames disbelievers as subhuman. According to Fairhurst and 
Sarr’s (1996) framing techniques, this instance is an example of framing metaphor, in which 
non-Muslims and apostate Muslims are compared to apes, swine, and donkeys.  
 Another example of framing techniques used throughout Dabiq and Rumiyah is framing 
through stories and tradition – specifically, the sagas and traditions of Islamic doctrine. One can 
expect frequent invocations of the Quran, the life of Muhammad, Islamic tradition, and caliphate 
history throughout the magazines. In addition, the magazines often combine framing through 
stories and tradition with framing through metaphor, by comparing ISIS, a self-proclaimed 
caliphate, with the historical caliphates: ISIS conducts a “modern crusade against the usurped 
Muslim lands” (“Rumiyah Issue 3”, 2016, p. 2). This quotation not only uses the well-known 
concept of crusades, holy wars, but also denotes that ISIS is fighting to reclaim “usurped Muslim 
lands,” referencing Islamic history and implying that lands rightfully controlled by Muslims 
were forcibly taken away from them by disbelievers.  
 In nearly every issue of Dabiq and Rumiyah, a section is devoted to “battlefield updates,” 
reports from ISIS’s physical troops in the Middle East detailing current terrorist operations. The 
sections were usually titled “Islamic State Reports.” The presentation of these updates, under the 
guise of factual reports, implies that ISIS is more territorially successful than it actually was, as 
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the reports never detailed the territorial defeats the group suffered. Because of the subtle value 
judgment conveyed in these sections, an inherent bias was likely conveyed to the readers of the 
magazines who took these reports as actual fact – an example of the framing technique, spin. 
Though Dabiq and Rumiyah likely influence the perception of issue significance for its readers, 
its usage of framing techniques characterizes the issues, shaping the readers’ interpretation to 
follow ISIS’s worldview.  
 
Persuasion 
 
 The study of persuasion identifies multiple heuristics that communicators use to influence 
the audience peripherally, without assuming that audience members will centrally process the 
content of the communication. Much heuristics detailed in Cialdini’s 2006 work is unique to 
interactive communication and does not apply to publications like Dabiq and Rumiyah. However, 
the persuasion heuristics of commitment, consistency, and authority is used throughout the 
magazines, particularly in reference to ISIS’s faith-based motivations. As ISIS rhetoric is rooted 
in the Salafi jihadist movement, which stresses a highly traditionalist interpretation of Islam, the 
magazines take advantage of the religiosity of its members by calling on “true Muslims” to 
partake in ISIS’s operations. Righteous, pious Muslims, the magazines argue, should take up 
arms against disbelievers. As the ninth issue of Dabiq points out, “the true men will step forward, 
and the [Western nations] will have no peace and no security” (“Dabiq Issue 9,” 2015, p. 17). 
This type of narrative plays into the social tendency of commitment and consistency, which is 
the tendency for people to appear consistent in their commitments with others. In this case, the 
commitment exploited by the magazines is between a devoted Muslim and Allah.  
87 
 Narrative transportation, another method of persuasion, is also observable throughout 
Dabiq and Rumiyah. ISIS uses vivid language to describe an ongoing, all-encompassing battle 
between two civilizations. The framing of ISIS operations and terrorist activities, as part of a 
great continuous war for the sake of Islam, creates a symbolic saga. The third issue of Rumiyah 
calls ISIS’s operations “fiery battle, all-encompassing war, and major jihad” (“Rumiyah Issue 3,” 
2016, p. 4). This apocalyptic framing invites ISIS members and admirers to become invested in 
this greater narrative and to take part in it personally through militant mobilization. Green and 
Brock (2000) assert that people become fully invested in a narrative when applying the narrative 
to their personal experience, thereby changing their attitudes to reflect the story. Similar to the 
technique of saga framing, narrative transportation persuades people to adopt a worldview 
through identification with a story. Individuals who identify with the jihadist drama showcased 
in Dabiq and Rumiyah may go on to identify with jihadist intentions.  
 
Propaganda 
 
 According to Jowett and O’Donnell (2014), propaganda specifically implies intentional 
communication that consciously attempts to exert influence over the communication recipient. 
As Dabiq and Rumiyah are ISIS’s official English-language publications and actively call for its 
readers to take up arms and fight for ISIS’s cause, the magazines are active attempts on ISIS’s 
part to exert influence over its readership. The magazines especially exhibit two of the three 
different responses to persuasion attempts through propaganda – as defined by Roloff and Miller 
(1980): response shaping and response reinforcing. Particularly through its theme of divine 
sanction, Dabiq and Rumiyah encourage positive inclinations towards ISIS’s ideology by 
asserting that Allah supports ISIS and wants Muslims to join the jihadist movement. Promoting 
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positive inclinations towards the ideas the communication is espousing the primary characteristic 
of response shaping. The magazines also capitalize on enmity that their readers may hold against 
western nations and ideology, reinforcing positive emotions towards ISIS by encouraging further 
hatred of the West.  
Following response shaping, response reinforcing refers to strengthening the positive 
inclinations developed through response shaping, with the ultimate goal of actualizing a positive 
attitude towards the ideologies offered by the communication. The magazines consistently 
describe ISIS and its operations positively, if not superlatively. For example, in an article in the 
ninth issue of Rumiyah addressing women in the Islamic State, the text states, “Every woman to 
whom Allah has granted the blessing of giving birth in the Islamic State should take advantage of 
this tremendous grace” (“Rumiyah Issue 9”, 2017). Such positive description of the Islamic State 
is a clear attempt to reinforce positive emotions towards the organization.  
 
Diffusion of Innovations 
  
 The theory of diffusion of innovations addresses the dissemination of new ideas or 
technology among members of a social system who, essentially, act as a conduit. In the case of 
Dabiq and Rumiyah, the magazines are a communication channel in which the innovations of 
jihadist ideology are communicated from ISIS leaders to the worldwide public. Because ISIS and 
the jihadist movement have inspired isolated terrorist cells overseas, through the power of digital 
outreach, one can argue that the jihadist movement has already reached critical mass. Critical 
mass is the point at which an innovation becomes self-sustaining, capable of causing further 
innovation. Because ISIS has inspired “lone wolf” terrorist attacks like the Pulse shooting in 
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Orlando, it is currently self-sustaining, despite the fact that it is not widely adopted and that it has 
lost large amounts of its physical territory.  
 By publishing articles in Dabiq and Rumiyah, ISIS takes the role of an opinion leader. 
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1961) define opinion leadership as the interpretation of content by active 
media users for lower-end media users. As an opinion leader in the jihadist movement, ISIS 
interprets Islamic doctrine and the beliefs of Islamic scholars throughout history and broadcasts 
its interpretation through its media publications. The group utilizes the widest social network in 
history, the internet, to disseminate its ideology.  
 In its ideological dissemination, ISIS also takes part in memetic engineering within the 
minds of its members, affiliates, and admirers. Memetic engineering, the process by which ideas 
are repeated and disseminated, referred to as “memes,” may be used to foster advantageous traits 
in members of an organization. This process, called meme mapping by Pech and Slade (2004), is 
used by ISIS to further foster positive attitudes towards the organization. Again, using the 
example of the theme of divine sanction, ISIS leadership may have increased the saturation of 
references to divine sanction from 2014 to 2017 to foster positive attitudes towards ISIS within 
its membersISIS may use the theme of divine sanction to meme map and foster religious 
affirmation for the group ideology within its members. 
 
Symbolic Convergence Theory 
 
 As described in Chapter 4, fantasy themes, symbolic cues, fantasy types, and sagas are 
prevalent throughout Dabiq and Rumiyah. As the magazines are ISIS’s channel of broadcasting 
its inner rhetoric, it follows that ISIS communication outside its published magazines also 
reflects SCT. The shared group fantasies identified in the SCT analysis of the magazines are 
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likely present across the entire ISIS ummah. Throughout the analysis, a recurring symbol was 
present: a dichotomous, black-and-white conflict between enemies – the infidels and apostate 
Muslims – and ISIS, the self-styled caliphate. Central to ISIS’s ideology is a perceived 
irreconcilable difference between “true” Muslims, sanctioned by Allah, and nonbelievers. All of 
the themes present in the thematic analysis are shaped by the shared group fantasy of a Clash of 
Civilizations. The goal of jihad is to form a caliphate from the ummah, by conquering through 
militancy and through successful hijrah, ruled by sharia. Non-Muslims and apostate Muslims 
would be subjugated in this caliphate. This goal is divinely sanctioned, but is opposed by the 
West, and will culminate in a final conflict between the two civilizations.  
 Because the caliphate promulgated by ISIS explicitly states its supreme goal must be 
established by defeating disbelievers, particularly the West, the ultimate shared group fantasy 
exhibited by ISIS is that of the Clash of Civilizations. Huntington (1993) proposed the Clash of 
Civilizations as the result of clashes in cultural values between Islam and “the rest,” but ISIS and 
the jihadist movement elevate the Clash of Civilizations into a goal, in which the Islamic 
civilization triumphs completely over nonbelievers and the West. As exhibited in the analysis 
based on SCT, the Clash of Civilizations is ISIS’s greatest fantasy theme.  
 
Speech Codes Theory 
 
 This study utilized speech codes to identify and analyze the themes within Dabiq and 
Rumiyah. Speech codes theory is the process by which observers can analyze communication 
through identifying symbols, meanings, premises, and rules. The theory provides a framework 
with which to understand all forms of communication, including ISIS’s communication methods. 
Combined with the theories of agenda-setting, framing, diffusion of innovations, and symbolic 
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convergence, the symbols and meanings within ISIS’s publications were identified and 
interpreted over time through frequency and context.  
According to the SPEAKING model put forth by Hymes (1974), the situation of 
communication for Dabiq and Rumiyah was the digital magazine medium. The participants were 
ISIS and its publication wing and the various audiences of the magazines, from ISIS members 
and its admirers to academics. In the eyes of ISIS, the magazines carry authority, as they are the 
organization’s official published materials. The comprehensive ends of the magazines are 
unknown, as the magazines may cause various outcomes dependent on a reader’s interpretation 
of the material. The key of Dabiq and Rumiyah, as defined by speech codes theory, refers to 
recognizing the manner of the communication and its underlying instrumentalities. This was 
achieved through the literature review background of the magazines. The communication genre 
of the magazines refers to the way the audience consumes Dabiq and Rumiyah, as relatively one-
sided communication with little capability to send feedback without being an inner member of 
ISIS’s speech community.  
Through the distinctive rhetoric and ideology presented within Dabiq and Rumiyah, 
speech codes theory asserts that analysis sheds light on group culture. Using agenda-setting, 
framing, diffusion of innovations, and symbolic convergence, this study identifies ISIS’s 
principle concern: a dichotomous worldview culminating in a civilizational conflict.  
 
Further Research 
 
 This study focused on three research questions: (1) How might ISIS affect its readers 
through Dabiq and Rumiyah? (2) What is the significance of the themes found within the 
magazines within the greater jihadist community? (3) What does the rhetoric of the 
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communication of Dabiq and Rumiyah suggest about ISIS and the jihadist movement? Through a 
thematic analysis and speech coding of sampled material from 2014 to 2017 and the application 
of multiple theories of communication, the study addressed the influence that the jihadist 
magazines may exert over the readership using agenda-setting theory, framing theory, 
persuasion, and propaganda. Through the diffusion of innovations, the study identified how ideas 
and influence spread from ISIS to its audience through outlets like its English-language 
magazines. The study also identified significant themes that reinforced ISIS’s shared group 
fantasies. Lastly, through addressing the implications of the content of Dabiq and Rumiyah on a 
wider organizational scale, this study discussed what the rhetoric found in the magazines may 
suggest about ISIS as a whole.  
This study was able to identify possible rhetorical trends, aspects of group identity, 
frames of communication, and fantasy themes that may be present within ISIS and the jihadist 
movement at large. However, whether these details exist beyond the theoretical is unknown due 
to limited information available on rhetorical decisions within ISIS, its group culture, and the 
attitudes of its members. Without reliable access to insider information on ISIS and the jihadist 
movement, this study was only capable of addressing ISIS’s outward rhetoric. Future research 
should cross-reference the theoretical findings of this study with provable data garnered from 
more direct observations of the terrorist organization. This would allow for the conjecture 
posited in this study to be compared alongside reported rhetorical trends in the organization.  
Further research could also identify connections between ISIS’s thematic rhetoric within 
its publications and its real-world military actions by comparing the date of publication of 
articles with particular thematic focuses to the dates of known ISIS military action. By 
comparing past ISIS action with its past publications, researchers may be able to identify how the 
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themes present within the group’s publications reflect the group’s physical actions and the 
greater jihadist movement.  
Another area of further research should entail a more comprehensive analysis of Dabiq 
and Rumiyah. Due to research constraints, this study consistently sampled large portions of four 
issues of the magazines: the third and ninth issues of Dabiq, published in 2014 and 2015, and the 
third and ninth issues of Rumiyah, published in 2016 and 2017. By sampling content from all 
four years of the magazines’ publication, this study was able to identify trends in thematic 
variation in the magazines over time. However, applying the methods of analysis of this study 
through a more comprehensive examination would provide more detailed results. By analyzing 
all published issues of the magazines, one could more accurately see the trends in thematic 
variation between the publications.  
Finally, more research on ISIS publications outside the magazines of Dabiq and Rumiyah 
would allow for greater understanding of ISIS’s rhetoric across platforms and its usage of 
different aspects of media to convey its worldview. A comparison of the thematic frequencies 
across platforms – for example, by comparing the thematic variation found within Dabiq and 
Rumiyah with the topical themes present in ISIS videos – would also create a more 
comprehensive picture of ISIS’s rhetorical intentions. Through ISIS’s magazine platforms, the 
group presents an apocalyptic worldview and a dichotomous, irreconcilable conflict between 
jihadists and disbelievers. Further research could address whether this thematic conflict is 
reflected in ISIS’s other media platforms and in ISIS’s real-world group rhetoric. Nonetheless, 
despite its territorial losses, the group took a leadership role in the jihadist movement, and its 
future influence will be observable in continued research.  
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TABLES 
 
Dabiq Issue 3: Shawwal 1435 
 
Theme Data Frequency 
Jihad 1. “there is no real jihād in Iraq except with the presence of the 
muhājirīn” 
2. “pleasure of jihād” 
3. “We cannot adopt the mindset that jihād is acceptable 
without da’wah, or that the hudūd cannot be established 
during defensive jihād, or that we are living in an era similar 
to the Prophet’s time in Makkah and must therefore focus on 
da’wah because there is no jihād “ 
4. “It is for this reason that the Islamic State has long 
maintained an initiative that sees it waging its jihād 
alongside a da’wah campaign that actively tends to the needs 
of its people” 
5. “It fights to defend the Muslims, liberate their lands, and 
bring an end to the tawāghīt, while simultaneously seeking 
to guide and nurture those under its authority and ensure that 
new pledges of allegiance in both their religious and social 
needs are met” 
6. “incite the people to jihād” 
7. “every Muslim professional who delayed his jihād… 
claiming he would contribute to Islam later with his 
expertise, should now make his number one priority to 
repent and answer the call to hijrah” 
8. “abandoning hijrah – the path to jihād – is a dangerous 
matter” 
9. “one is thereby deserting jihad” 
10. “pray daily for an escape from the lands of qu’ūd 
(abandonment of jihād) to the lands of jihād” 
11. “searching for a path to jihād” 
12. “This is the Sunnah of Allah concerning the qā’idīn (those 
who sit back and abandon jihād).” 
13. “This love [of jihād], for those who don’t know it, embitters 
the life of the qā’id (one who sits back and abandons jihād) 
and destroys his delights” 
14. “If the love of jihād enters a man’s heart, then it will not 
abandon him, even if he wishes so” 
15. “He will find himself surrounded by everything that reminds 
him of jihād” 
16. “this love will either kill you with sorrow if you decide to sit 
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and abandon jihād, or it will kill you, making you a martyr fī 
sabīlillāh if you decide to answer the call” 
17. “the verses of jihād” 
18. “when you compare the situation of the Sahābah after hijrah 
and jihād” 
19. “Jihād not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, 
it also grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual” 
20. “This life of jihād is not possible until you pack and move to 
the Khilāfah” 
21. “living amongst Muslims who reside amid kuffār and 
abandon jihād” 
22. “of the worst of sins in modern times is that of qu’ūd 
(abandonment of jihād), for jihād now is fard ‘ayn (an 
obligation upon each individual)” 
23. “Then how can one be pleased with the company of the 
jihād abandoners?” 
24. “one who abandons jihād – the deed without which he can 
achieve no maslahah – should be punished by hajr” 
25. “And so, the zunāh (fornicators/ adulterers), lūtiyyah 
(sodomites), abandoners of jihād, ahlul-bida’ (people of 
religious innovations), alcoholics, are all harmful for the 
religion of Islam, and intermingling with them is also 
harmful” 
Sharia 1. “if the tribe does not act as a group in opposing the Sharī’ah, 
it would be obviously wrong to apply this ruling to its 
members” 
2. “submit to the rule of the Sharī’ah with the condition they 
hand over all heavy weaponry” 
3. “All these crimes were carried out in opposition to the 
enforcement of the Sharī’ah” 
4. “All those able-bodied men remaining would be treated in 
accordance with the Sharī’ah” 
5. “the soldiers of the Islamic State found men hateful of the 
Sharī’ah, drowning in fāhishah, alcoholism, and drugs, some 
of them married to more than four wives!” 
6. “the Islamic State actively works to educate its citizens, 
preach to and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence 
to Islamic obligations, judge their disputes, implement the 
shar’ī hudūd, eradicate all traces of shirk and heresy” 
6 
Militancy 1. “Matters will run their course until you become mobilized 
armies: an army in Shām, and an army in Yemen, and an 
army in Iraq” 
2. “This month, the soldiers of the Islamic State launched a 
swift and brutal offensive in the northern Halab countryside” 
3. “And why should we not fight in the cause of Allah when 
we have been driven out from our homes and away from our 
children?” 
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4. “He then took advantage of their plot to blast it in their own 
faces, killing a number of American crusaders and their 
apostate agents” 
Caliphate 1. “Were the muwahhid to search every book authored by the 
historians, he would not find mention of any state similar to 
the Islamic State, particularly as it exists following its 
revival under the wing of Amīrul-Mu’minīn Abū Bakr” 
2. “For has any state ever been established in human history in 
the manner that the Islamic State was revived with its 
expansion into Shām?” 
3. “This phenomenon is something that has never occurred in 
human history, except in the case of the Islamic State!” 
4. “this state, which has gathered the bulk of the muhājirīn in 
Shām and has become the largest collection of muhājirīn in 
the world, is a marvel of history” 
5. “the bulk of at-Tā’ifatul-Mansūrah (the victorious group) 
will be in Shām near the end of times, because the Khilafah 
will be there” 
6. “pledged allegiance to the Khilāfah, promising to die 
defending it” 
7. “call them to unite behind the Khalīfah” 
8. “especially after the establishment of the Khilāfah” 
9. “This Khilāfah is more in need than ever before for experts, 
professionals, and specialists” 
10. “now there is a Khilāfah prepared to accept every Muslim 
and Muslimah into its lands” 
11. “successfully reached the Khilāfah” 
12. “Allah brought them safely to the Khilāfah” 
13. “the Khilāfah is a state whose inhabitants and soldiers are 
human beings” 
14. “remember that the Khilāfah is at war with numerous kāfir 
states and their allies” 
14 
Hijrah 1. “emigration of poor strangers from the East and the West, 
who then gathered in an alien land of war” 
2. “war waged by the nations of the world against their 
religion, their state, and their hijrah” 
3. “soldiers and the commanders to be of different colors, 
languages, and lands: the Najdī, the Jordanian, the Tunisian, 
the Egyptian, the Somali, the Turk, the Albanian, the 
Chechen, the Indonesian, the Russian, the European, the 
American and so on” 
4. “They left their families and their lands to renew the state of 
the muwahhidīn in Shām, and they had never known each 
other until they arrived in Shām” 
5. “gathered the bulk of the muhājirīn in Shām and has become 
the largest collection of muhājirīn in the world” 
6. “the Prophet… said, ‘… glad tidings to the strangers… 
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‘Those who break off from their tribes’” 
7. “the muhājirīn who’ve abandoned their homelands and 
migrated to Allah” 
8. “muhā- jirīn who’ve abandoned their homelands for the sake 
of Allah” 
9. “those who leave their homelands to establish the sunan 
(traditions) of Islam” 
10. “the one who leaves his tribe is a muhājir that parts from his 
family, his wealth, and his homeland, and who believes in 
Allah” 
11. “strangers are those who left their families and their lands, 
emigrating for the sake of Allah and for the sake of 
establishing His religion” 
12. “in the era of ghuthā’ as-sayl (the feeble scum), they are the 
most wondrous of the creation in terms of faith” 
13. “There will be hijrah after hijrah" 
14. “The best people on earth will be those who keep to the land 
of Ibrāhīm’s hijrah.” 
15. “the best of the people on the earth are those who keep to the 
land of Ibrāhīm’s hijrah” 
16. “this hijrah of theirs is equal to the hijrah of the Companions 
of Allah’s Messenger to Madīnah, because hijrah is made to 
wherever the Messenger is and left an impact” 
17. “And the land of Ibrāhīm’s hijrah, has been made for us 
equal to the land of our Prophet’s hijrah, because hijrah to 
Madīnah was discontinued after the conquest of Makkah” 
18. “So those who left their tribes – the best of Allah’s slaves – 
rallied together” 
19. “an unkept promise of hijrah to Allah could result in a 
devastating ending for the slave” 
20. “repent and answer the call to hijrah”  
21. “This Khilāfah is more in need than ever before for experts, 
professionals, and specialists, who can help contribute in 
strengthening its structure and tending to the needs of their 
Muslim brothers” 
22. “Otherwise, his claims will become a greater proof against 
him on Judgment Day” 
23. “Muslim students who use this same pretense now to 
continue abandoning the obligation of the era, then they 
should know that their hijrah from dārul-kufr to dārul-Islām 
and jihād are more obligatory” 
24. “abandoning hijrah – the path to jihād – is a dangerous 
matter” 
25. “one is thereby deserting jihād and willingly accepting his 
tragic condition of being a hypocritical spectator” 
26. “sincere Muslims would weep and pray daily for an escape 
from the lands of qu’ūd (abandonment of jihād) to the lands 
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of jihād, even if to live only as a soldier in constant wait for 
the opportunity to battle” 
27. “They would dream of going to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, and Waziristan” 
28. “the only way for a man claiming a mustard seed of faith in 
his heart to preserve his faith would be to leave the West” 
29. “now there is a Khilāfah prepared to accept every Muslim 
and Muslimah into its lands and do all it can within its 
power to protect them while relying on Allah alone” 
30. “when you compare the situation of the Sahābah after hijrah 
and jihād” 
31. “This life of jihād is not possible until you pack and move to 
the Khilāfah” 
32. “Living amongst the sinful kills the heart, never mind living 
amongst the kuffār!” 
33. “Go to the land of such and such, for in it there are people 
who worship Allah” 
34. “Worship Allah with them and do not return to your land, 
for it is a land of evil” 
35. “I disassociate myself from every Muslim who lives 
amongst the mushrikīn” 
36. “living amongst Muslims who reside amid kuffār and 
abandon jihād” 
37. “Thus, the sinful company affects you whether you desire so 
or not” 
38. “Then how can one be pleased with the company of the 
jihād abandoners?” 
39. “The crux of hijrah is to abandon sin and its people” 
40. “Whoever does not abandon them has thus left an obligation 
and fallen into a prohibition” 
41. “Are you pleased to intermingle with those who Shaykhul-
Islām mentioned after the zunāh and lūtiyyah, and before 
ahlul-bida’ and the alcoholics?” 
42. “Before you make your trip, keep in mind the following 
hadith of the Prophet” 
43. “do not say to yourself, ‘I will never succeed in my hijrah’” 
44. “Most of those who have tried, have successfully reached 
the Khilāfah” 
45. “Amongst them are those who travelled by land, sometimes 
on foot, from country to country, crossing border after 
border, and Allah brought them safely to the Khilāfah” 
46. “fear is unsure and the obligation of hijrah is certain” 
47. “do not let the achievement of hijrah nullify your deeds by 
allowing pride to enter your heart” 
48. “hijrah is a great deed but it is not a license to view yourself 
better than others” 
49. “We ask Allah to facilitate your hijrah” 
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Enmity 
against the 
West  
1. “the USA decided to officially get involved… by conducting 
airstrikes against the Islamic State and its people” 
2. “number of related events that the Obama administration 
and western media tried to ignore when discussing the 
strikes and the consequential execution of James Foley” 
3. “US had already interfered in Iraq… regular air 
reconnaissance missions” 
4. “The US had interfered in Shām by supporting groups allied 
to it and to “Saudi Arabia” against the Islamic State” 
5. “The US had killed women, children, and the elderly, during 
its direct occupation of Iraq prior to its withdrawal” 
6. “There are countless accounts of American soldiers 
executing families and raping women under the sanctity of 
the US military and Blackwater” 
7. “Muslim families were killed under the broad definition of 
‘collateral damage,’ which the US grants itself alone the 
right to apply” 
8. “Therefore, if a mujāhid kills a single man with a knife, it is 
the barbaric killing of the ‘innocent’… if Americans kill 
thousands of Muslim families all over the world by pressing 
missile fire buttons, it is merely ‘collateral damage’” 
9. “The US was informed of James Foley’s status as a prisoner 
held by the Islamic State… demands made prior to the US 
strikes, for the release of Muslim prisoners held by the US in 
exchange for Foley’s release… were arrogantly ignored” 
10. “The US attempted a rescue mission in Wilāyat ar-Raqqah, 
which failed when some of the members of the mission were 
injured and possibly killed, so they carried their fallen away 
with disaster” 
11. “This threat was received with typical American 
indifference” 
12. “Upon receiving the threat and prior to the execution, 
Obama scurried to prevent knowledge of the affair from 
reaching his citizenry” 
13. “Obama completely avoided mention of Steven Sotloff, 
again showing his ‘people’ that the number one interest of 
the American government is the sanctity of Israel and its 
allies, which include the Zionist Peshmerga forces”  
14. “These are more important than the lives of his citizenry” 
15. “bring about the complete collapse of the modern American 
empire” 
16. “prostituted themselves to America and its regional puppets” 
17. “al-Malhamah al-Kubrā (The Grand Battle) against the 
crusaders” 
18. “killing a number of American crusaders and their apostate 
agents” 
19. “numerous kāfir states and their allies” 
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Non-
Muslims and 
Apostate 
Muslims 
1. “These same groups now beg the US for further support and 
aid, which, by Allah’s grace, will end up as ghanīmah for 
the Islamic State” 
2. “war waged by the nations of the world against their 
religion, their state, and their hijrah” 
3. “Even the apostates cannot ignore its threat, let alone the 
cross worshippers and the Jews” 
4. “Yet those who are falsely associated with jihād turn away 
from the Islamic State, even publicly declaring their enmity 
against it in bizarre competition with the crusaders and the 
apostates” 
5. “declaring enmity and hatred towards the mushrikīn and 
their tawāghīt” 
6. “Then there will remain on the earth the worst of its people” 
7. “Their lands will cast them out, Allah will hate them, and 
the fire will gather them together with the apes and swine” 
8. “And there will remain the worst of the people, having 
intercourse as donkeys do” 
9. “Then there will remain the worst of the people, who have 
the agility of birds (in their haste to commit evil and satisfy 
their lusts” 
10. “announced their enmity and hatred for the cross 
worshippers, the apostates, their crosses, their borders, and 
their ballotboxes” 
11. “any tribe or party or assembly whose involvement and 
collaboration with the crusaders and their apostate agents are 
confirmed, then by He who sent Muhammad with the truth, 
we will target them just as we target the crusaders, and we 
will eradicate and distinguish them”  
12. “there are only two camps: the camp of truth and its 
followers, and the camp of falsehood and its factions” 
13. “what has occurred with some of the traitors in al-Qā’im is 
the best proof for this” 
14. “everyone whose affiliation with the pagan guards, police, 
and army is confirmed, or his collaboration and espionage 
for the crusaders is verified, then his ruling is execution, and 
not only that, his house also will be destroyed and burnt” 
15. “This is in retribution for his treachery towards his religion 
and ummah, and so that he becomes a manifest lesson and a 
deterring example” 
16. “the tribe… acts like a body with some kind of bigoted head 
or like a gang maddened by the mob mentality of tribal 
arrogance” 
17. “They might move like a flock of birds or school of fish, 
albeit less gracefully due to their extreme ignorance” 
18. “They ambushed Islamic State soldiers, and then tortured, 
amputated, and executed prisoners taken from the 
38 
101 
ambushes” 
19. “perpetuators of the crimes against Islam and the Muslims” 
20. “men hateful of the Sharī’ah, drowning in fāhishah, 
alcoholism, and drugs, some of them married to more than 
four wives” 
21. “[Muhammad] ordered their hands and their feet be cut off, 
their eyes be put out with hot iron, and they be thrown out 
on al-Harrah (an area covered with black stones near 
Madīnah), so they would ask for water to drink, but not be 
given any water, until they died” 
22. “These people thieved, killed, disbelieved after their faith, 
and waged war against Allah and His Messenger” 
23. “the severity of the prophetic punishment against the 
treacherous, false claimants of Islam” 
24. “treacherous sahwāt murtaddīn who prostituted themselves 
to America and its regional puppets, stabbing the mujāhidīn 
in the back and subsequently imprisoning and even raping 
many of the muhājirāt” 
25. “Then one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive 
them” 
26. “The religion of Allah will only be supported by someone 
who protects all of its sides” 
27. “the Peshmerga, who fled upon hearing of the Islamic 
State’s approach” 
28. “the devil worshipping Yazīdiyyah” 
29. “As for those who insisted upon their shirk, then they fled 
with the Peshmergan apostates” 
30. “an unkept promise of hijrah to Allah could result in a 
devastating ending for the slave” 
31. “Allah mentions that He punished the hypocrites with 
further hypocrisy as a result of them breaking a previous 
covenant to Him” 
32. “Living amongst the sinful kills the heart, never mind living 
amongst the kuffār” 
33. “They can destroy the person’s fitrah to a point of no return, 
so that his heart’s doubts and desires entrap him fully” 
34. “Muslims who reside amid kuffār and abandon jihād” 
35. “the jihād abandoners” 
36. “zunāh (fornicators/ adulterers), lūtiyyah (sodomites), 
abandoners of jihād, ahlul-bida’ (people of religious 
innovations), alcoholics, are all harmful for the religion of 
Islam” 
37. “Are you pleased to intermingle with those who Shaykhul-
Islām mentioned after the zunāh and lūtiyyah, and before 
ahlul-bida’ and the alcoholics?” 
38. “Wallāhi, they destroy the religion of the person until he 
finds himself in Hellfire!” 
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Ummah 1. “the affairs of the Muslim Ummah” 
2. “the sons of the generous ummah” 
3. “The last part of this ummah believes in what the first part 
of the ummah believed in of the unseen, and believes in 
what the first part of the ummah believed in as 
eyewitnesses” 
4. “retribution for his treachery towards his religion and 
ummah” 
5. “Jihād not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, 
it also grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual” 
5 
Divine 
Sanction 
1. “by Allah’s grace, will end up as ghanīmah for the Islamic 
State” 
2. “And with Allah’s permission, Obama will continue to 
follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Bush” 
3. “all praise is due to Allah, the Lord of all creation” 
4. “may Allah accept him” 
5. “I swear by the One to Whom I will return” 
6. “those who bring victory to Allah and His Messenger” 
7. “Abū Bakr (may Allah support him and keep him firm)” 
8. “nothing like it will ever occur thereafter except in relation 
to it; and Allah knows best” 
9. “what a tremendous favor it is from Allah to guide one to 
the Islamic State and grant him companionship with its 
muhājirīn, those who plunge into the malāhim (the great 
battles prior to the Hour)” 
10. “Allah has praised the believers for their belief in the 
unseen” 
11. “They [the caliphate] will continue to be there clearly upon 
the truth until Allah sends the pleasant breeze” 
12. “Allah will hate them” 
13. “taking the soul of every believer and every Muslim” 
14. “three major military conquests for the Islamic State, which 
only came about by Allah’s grace, power, and might” 
15. “an achievement Allah saved for the Islamic State by His 
grace”  
16. “We ask Allah to accept the shuhadā’ and heal the 
wounded” 
17. “Allah gives His sovereignty to whom He wills” 
18. “relying on Allah alone” 
19. “by Allah’s grace – placed him upon that path” 
19 
Final 
Conflict 
1. “a marvel of history that has only come about to pave the 
way for al-Malhamah al-Kubrā (the grand battle prior to the 
Hour)” 
2. “companionship with its muhājirīn, those who plunge into 
the malāhim (the great battles prior to the Hour)” 
3. “he will be gathered with them on the Day of Resurrection” 
4. “they believed in Allah and the Day of Judgment without 
14 
103 
seeing either of them” 
5. “So it is upon them that the Hour will be established” 
6. “the name of our magazine was taken from the area named 
Dābiq in the northern countryside of Halab, due to the 
significant role it will play during the events of al-Malhamah 
al-Kubrā (The Grand Battle) against the crusaders” 
7. “The Hour will not be established until the Romans land at 
alA’māq or Dābiq”  
8. “Then an army from Madīnah of the best people on the earth 
at that time will leave for them” 
9. “One third of them will be killed; they will be the best 
martyrs with Allah” 
10. “And one third will conquer them; they will never be 
afflicted with fitnah”  
11. “Then they will conquer Constantinople” 
12. “preparing for battle and filing their ranks” 
13. “When the enemy of Allah sees [Jesus Christ], he will melt 
as salt melts in water” 
14. “We ask Allah to place us in the camp of the believers on 
the day of al-Malhamah and keep us firm until he grants us 
either victory or shahādah” 
Table 3: Dabiq Issue 3 
 
Dabiq Issue 9: Sha’ban 1436 
 
Theme Data Frequency 
Jihad 1. “the virtues of jihād” 
2. “steps to make hijrah to the lands of jihād” 
3. “the obligations of hijrah, jihād, and bay’ah” 
4. “perform jihād against both of them” 
5. “Be patient upon jihād” 
6. “jihād to be exerting oneself in obedience to Allah” 
7. “a Muslim who cares for a mujāhid’s family during his 
absence achieves reward for the mujāhid’s jihād” 
8. “ribāt becomes the best jihād” 
9. “nothing is equal in reward to jihād and ribāt” 
10. “ribāt is the root and branch of jihād” 
11. “Jihād is better than it because of its hardship and fatigue” 
12. “jihād – on the personal level – consists of strides on a 
roadmap towards shahādah” 
13. “One first performs hijrah to the lands of jihād… and finally 
achieves shahādah” 
14. “living jihād on a day to day basis” 
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15. “maximize the fruits of his jihād” 
16. “Their evil became most apparent in issues related to jihād” 
17. “If one desired to perform jihād, these leaders would warn 
that jihād now was a conspiracy to kill off the sincere 
Muslim youth and thereby leave the Muslims’ lands to the 
secularists” 
18. “If one wanted to join a jihād jamā’ah, they would warn that 
it was the creation of the kuffār so as to aid in achieving 
kāfir interests” 
19. “If jihād operations – like those of September 11th – were 
carried out against the kuffār, they would claim these 
operations were conspiracies by the kuffār to justify their 
aggression against Muslims” 
20. “Conspiracy theories have thereby become an excuse to 
abandon jihād, to have great awe for the kuffār” 
Sharia 1. “the very crusaders who belittle the Sharī’ah on their news 
and entertainment programs, who arm the secularists and 
Rawāfid in Muslim lands, who imprison and torture Muslim 
men and women, and on top of all who burn the Qur’an and 
mock the Prophet” 
1 
Militancy 1. “The two mujāhidīn came armed and ready to wage war, 
ignited a gun battle with the policemen guarding the center, 
and attained a noble shahādah” 
2. “Many of those who attained shahādah fighting the 
crusaders in their own lands” 
3. “the kuffār will have no peace and no security” 
4. “trains (i’dād) for the purpose of jihād, then patiently spends 
months of rībat, serves countless hours of guard duty 
(hirāsah), then fights (qitāl) in battles and kills (qatl) whom 
he can from amongst the kāfir enemy, and finally achieves 
shahādah” 
4 
Caliphate 1. “two lions of the Khilāfah” 
2. “perform ribāt and fear Allah that you may be successful” 
3. “perform ribāt” (8 instances) 
4. “perform the well-known ribāt for Allah’s cause at the 
frontier posts” 
5. “He is a murābit even if the frontier post he defends is quiet, 
although the reward for defending a dangerous front is 
greater” 
6. “A day of ribāt for Allah’s cause is better than the world and 
everything it contains” 
7. “Ribāt for a day and night is better than fasting and 
performing night-prayer for a month” 
8. “And if he dies during ribāt, he will go on receiving his 
reward for his deeds perpetually” 
9. “A day of ribāt for Allah’s cause is better than a thousand 
days spent elsewhere” 
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10. “A day of ribāt for Allah’s cause is more beloved to me” 
11. “murābitīn defending the frontier posts” 
12. “If the murābitīn abandoned their positions, leaving them 
defenseless, all Muslim cities, towns, and villages would be 
under the threat of being attacked and ransacked” 
13. “when one performs ribāt it is best (not obligatory) that he 
does so for at least forty days or even more before returning 
for rest” 
14. “The deeds of every dead person come to a halt with his 
death except the one who is a murābit for Allah’s cause” 
15. “If he (the murābit) dies during ribāt, he will go on receiving 
his reward for his deeds perpetually, he will receive his 
provision, and he will be saved from the tribulation (of the 
grave) “ 
16. “This death is of the noblest deaths and this reward is 
guaranteed for the murābit who passes away during ribāt 
even if his death is due to disease, elderliness, or some 
accident” 
17. “How much more noble is his death when it is shahādah 
caused by the airstrikes of the crusaders and their apostate 
allies” 
18. “the reward for dying while on ribāt continues to grow 
independent of any other condition, and this is only for the 
murābit” 
19. “This reward is not mentioned for the battleground shahīd 
but for the murābit who might have died during his ribāt due 
to old age and while sleeping for rest” 
20. “how noble of a death is this” 
21. “supplicate for the noblest death – shahādah – while on 
ribāt” 
22. “ribāt becomes the best jihād” 
23. “Ribāt defends the Muslims and their families” 
24. “It is strength for the people of the frontier posts and the 
people of battle” 
25. “ribāt is the root and branch of jihād” 
26. “The best ribāt is the fiercest” 
27. “one performed ribāt in general and returned to it after 
battle, then fighting in battle would be better because of 
what it contains of dangers and hardship” 
28. “fighting in battle to avoid ribāt is improper for the true 
mujāhid to merely consider” 
29. “In general, living on the frontiers, performing ribāt, and 
concerning oneself with ribāt is a great matter” 
30. “Everyone who wanted to dedicate himself to the worship of 
Allah, devote himself to Him, and achieve the best zuhd, 
worship, and awareness, then the scholars would direct him 
towards the frontier posts” 
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31. “The opportunity for good deeds while on ribāt is greater 
than that during battle” 
32. “ribāt will also multiply the blessings in other acts of 
worship he performs while at the frontier posts” 
33. “One first performs hijrah to the lands of jihād (now, dārul-
Islām), then gives bay’ah, pledging what it entails of 
obedience (sam’ and tā’ah) to the amīr (now, the Khalīfah) 
and commitment to the jamā’ah (now, the Khilāfah)” 
34. “be patient on the fearsome battlefield while not enduring 
the hardships of ribāt” 
35. “May Allah (ta’ālā) grant every Muslim the blessing of ribāt 
at the Khilāfah frontier posts and the patience needed to 
keep him firm until he meets Him” 
Hijrah 1. “steps to make hijrah to the lands of jihād” 
2. “they were granted shahādah without facing the difficulties 
of hijrah” 
3. “the obligations of hijrah, jihād, and bay’ah” 
4. “hijrah to be abandoning what Allah dislikes” 
5. “One first performs hijrah to the lands of jihād” 
6. “One first performs hijrah to the lands of jihād (now, dārul-
Islām), then gives bay’ah, pledging what it entails of 
obedience (sam’ and tā’ah) to the amīr (now, the Khalīfah) 
and commitment to the jamā’ah (now, the Khilāfah)” 
6 
Enmity 
against the 
West  
1. “crusaders continue to reveal their intense hatred and 
animosity towards Islam through their relentless bombing 
and drone campaigns on the Islamic State” 
2. “a new breed of crusader continues shedding light on the 
extent of their hatred towards the religion of truth” 
3. “Hatred has already appeared from their mouths, and what 
their breasts conceal is greater” 
4. “This breed of crusader aims to do nothing more than to 
anger the Muslims by mocking and ridiculing the best of 
creation, the Prophet” 
5. “rather than deterring or disheartening the Muslims, serve as 
further incitement, spurring them into confronting the forces 
of kufr with whatever means they have available” 
6. “they choose to wage war on Islam” 
7. “inspiration to those residing in the lands of the crusaders 
who are still hesitant to perform their duty” 
8. “Many of those who attained shahādah fighting the 
crusaders in their own lands” 
9. “the very crusaders who belittle the Sharī’ah on their news 
and entertainment programs, who arm the secularists and 
Rawāfid in Muslim lands, who imprison and torture Muslim 
men and women, and on top of all who burn the Qur’an and 
mock the Prophet” 
10. “the true men will step forward, and the kuffār will have no 
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peace and no security” 
11. “airstrikes of the crusaders” 
12. “all the frontier posts are the priority for the crusaders and 
apostates in their attempts and plans to advance on the lands 
of the Khilāfah” 
13. “the kuffār had the near absolute knowledge, power, and 
ownership to plot and execute any grand conspiracy of their 
desire” 
14. “If one wanted to join a jihād jamā’ah, they would warn that 
it was the creation of the kuffār so as to aid in achieving 
kāfir interests” 
15. “If jihād operations – like those of September 11th – were 
carried out against the kuffār, they would claim these 
operations were conspiracies by the kuffār to justify their 
aggression against Muslims” 
16. “If a mujāhid leader achieved shahādah, they would say that 
the kuffār used him up and needed to dispose of him just in 
case he decided to come out and expose the ‘conspiracy’ of 
which he was supposedly a part” 
17. “If the mujāhidīn liberated territory occupied by the kuffār, 
they would say that the kuffār allowed them to do so 
because kāfir interests necessitated a prolonged war” 
18. “If the mujāhidīn announced an Islamic state, they would 
say that the kuffār facilitated such so as to justify their 
continued interference in Muslim affairs” 
19. “And so, according to these theorists, almost all the events 
of the world were somehow linked back to the kuffār, their 
intelligence agencies, research, technology, and 
coconspirators” 
20. “Conspiracy theories have thereby become an excuse to 
abandon jihād, to have great awe for the kuffār” 
21. “different Sawhah factions openly and publically meeting 
with Qatar, Turkey, Āl Salūl, and the Americans and 
discussing their plans for cooperation against the Islamic 
State, while claiming that the muhājirīn and ansār are allies 
and agents of foreign states” 
22. “As for when the cooperation with the kuffār against 
Muslims is clearly public, it suddenly becomes ‘maslahah’ 
(the greater “good”)” 
23. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to cooperate with the Americans against 
the Islamic State, not a conspiracy of kufr and treachery” 
24. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to cooperate with those factions backed 
by the tawāghīt and crusaders against the Islamic State, not 
deviance nor apostasy”  
25. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to advance under the cover of crusader 
and apostate planes against the Islamic State, not a gate to 
the deepest levels of Hellfire”  
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26. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to use the words ‘civil law,’ ‘civil state,’ 
and ‘self-determination,’ not submission to the demands of 
one’s crusader and apostate backers” 
27. “The extreme belief in conspiracy theories varies between 
minor and major shirk depending on the degree of power, 
knowledge, and ownership attributed by its believer to the 
kuffār” 
28. “the kuffār may appear united whereas their hearts are 
actually full of animosity and enmity for each other” 
29. “animosity and enmity between the followers of the 
different kufrī religions [Christianity and Judaism] is 
manifest in their words” 
30. “the hypocritical allies of the kuffār are too unreliable to 
execute the orders of the kuffār” 
31. “This explains the great partisan hatred the various Jewish 
parties have for each other” 
32. “division and differing of the Jews and Christians and the 
animosity present between the two religions and their sects” 
33. “The Jewish state itself was established for the Jews 
primarily by the British crusaders” 
34. “And it was through Jewish-Crusader relationships and the 
self-degradation of the Arab apostates that the Jews gained 
mastery over the Arab tawāghīt” 
35. “The knowledge, power, and ownership of the kuffār are 
weak and limited” 
36. “The kuffār are divided, hold animosity and enmity towards 
each other, carry out violence against each other, humiliate 
and degrade each other, yet they unite against the Muslims, 
their common enemy” 
37. “the kuffār’s unity is fragile and superficial” 
38. “They often divide after unity and betray each other” 
39. “The kuffār undoubtedly do plot out conspiracies, but these 
plots are weak due to the fragile relationships the kuffār 
have with each other, the unreliability and cowardice of their 
hypocritical allies and agents, the kuffār’s fear of the 
Muslims more than their own fear of Allah, and the kuffār’s 
fear of death and love of the Dunyā” 
40. “The mujāhidīn against the communist Russians were not 
agents of the crusader Americans” 
41. “different apostates waging nationalist wars always had 
open relationships with their kāfir allies” 
42. “The Iraqi Sahwah openly met with Bush, the Iraqi regime, 
and Rāfidī leaders”  
43. “The Americans openly discuss their backing of the Syrian 
Sahwah and the support granted to its ‘Islamic’ factions by 
American allies – Qatar, Turkey, and Āl Salūl” 
44. “And long ago, the agents of the “Arab Revolt” would 
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openly meet in Europe, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Shām, 
and Iraq with different crusader officials from amongst the 
British” 
45. “How many members of the crusader government would 
have to be under permanent watch to prevent news of the 
operation getting out before its execution” 
46. “Does America have control over so many factors” 
47. “The attack was against America itself, and according to the 
conspiracy theorists, it was executed by the Americans” 
48. “the mujāhidīn under the leadership of Shaykh Usāmah 
(rahimahullāh) carried out the blessed attack and thereby 
humiliated America in a manner it never experienced 
before” 
49. “The purpose of conspiracy theories is to exaggerate the 
power of the kuffār and thereby the Muslims become 
paralyzed by analysis of current events and eventually fear 
the kuffār more than they fear Allah” 
50. “May Allah expose the real conspiracies of the kuffār and 
erase the shirkī conspiracy theories from the hearts” 
Non-
Muslims and 
Apostate 
Muslims 
1. “execute the agenda of the tawāghīt in the region” 
2. “when the apostates (the Tawāghīt and the Rāfidah) fight 
each other, it is not permissible for the Muslim to support 
one party of apostates against the other by fighting under the 
leadership of one party or fighting in its defense” 
3. “If he does fight under the leadership of the tāghūt in 
defense of his kufrī regime, he apostatizes from Islam” 
4. “declare his barā’ah from both apostate parties and – if he is 
able – to perform jihād against both of them for Allah’s 
sake” 
5. “it is the addiction of these factions to tāghūt aid” 
6. “they slide down a slippery slope of concessions ending with 
blatant apostasy” 
7. “the jihād claimants of the Jawlānī front wage ‘jihād’ against 
their allies, the shameless slaves of Āl Salūl” 
8. “endless excuses prepared for each blatant statement of 
apostasy made by them” 
9. “May Allah expose the hypocritical and apostate allies of 
“al-Qā’idah” in Shām” 
10. “outlast the kuffār in patience and to perform ribāt against 
the mushrikīn” 
11. “perform ribāt for Allah’s cause against your enemies and 
your religion’s enemies from amongst the people of shirk” 
12. “their apostate allies” 
13. “the apostate tawāghīt’s era, whose era is ended” 
14. “all the frontier posts are the priority for the crusaders and 
apostates in their attempts and plans to advance on the lands 
of the Khilāfah” 
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15. “Sadly, this shirkī attitude (both minor and major) entered 
the hearts and minds of many supposedly ‘Islamic’ leaders, 
scholars, and callers – in imitation of the Arab nationalists 
before them” 
16. “the kuffār had the near absolute knowledge, power, and 
ownership to plot and execute any grand conspiracy of their 
desire” 
17. “Their [apostates] evil became most apparent in issues 
related to jihād” 
18. “If one desired to perform jihād, these leaders would warn 
that jihād now was a conspiracy to kill off the sincere 
Muslim youth and thereby leave the Muslims’ lands to the 
secularists” 
19. “If one wanted to join a jihād jamā’ah, they would warn that 
it was the creation of the kuffār so as to aid in achieving 
kāfir interests” 
20. “If jihād operations – like those of September 11th – were 
carried out against the kuffār, they would claim these 
operations were conspiracies by the kuffār to justify their 
aggression against Muslims” 
21. “If a mujāhid leader achieved shahādah, they would say that 
the kuffār used him up and needed to dispose of him just in 
case he decided to come out and expose the ‘conspiracy’ of 
which he was supposedly a part” 
22. “If the mujāhidīn liberated territory occupied by the kuffār, 
they would say that the kuffār allowed them to do so 
because kāfir interests necessitated a prolonged war” 
23. “If the mujāhidīn announced an Islamic state, they would 
say that the kuffār facilitated such so as to justify their 
continued interference in Muslim affairs” 
24. “And so, according to these theorists, almost all the events 
of the world were somehow linked back to the kuffār, their 
intelligence agencies, research, technology, and 
coconspirators” 
25. “Conspiracy theories have thereby become an excuse to 
abandon jihād, to have great awe for the kuffār” 
26. “these conspiracy claimants are themselves involved in real 
kāfir conspiracies” 
27. “Iraqi Sahwah fighting alongside the Iraqi army – openly 
backed by Iran – while claiming that the mujāhidīn are 
agents of Iran” 
28. “Sahwah factions openly handing over territory to the 
Nusayrī regime, while claiming the mujāhidīn cooperate 
with the Nusayrī regime” 
29. “different Sawhah factions openly and publically meeting 
with Qatar, Turkey, Āl Salūl, and the Americans and 
discussing their plans for cooperation against the Islamic 
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State, while claiming that the muhājirīn and ansār are allies 
and agents of foreign states” 
30. “Syrian National Coalition considering meetings in Geneva 
with the Nusayrī regime, while claiming that the Islamic 
State strives to serve regime interests” 
31. “As for when the cooperation with the kuffār against 
Muslims is clearly public, it suddenly becomes ‘maslahah’ 
(the greater “good”)” 
32. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to cooperate with the Americans against 
the Islamic State, not a conspiracy of kufr and treachery” 
33. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to cooperate with those factions backed 
by the tawāghīt and crusaders against the Islamic State, not 
deviance nor apostasy”  
34. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to advance under the cover of crusader 
and apostate planes against the Islamic State, not a gate to 
the deepest levels of Hellfire”  
35. “It is a ‘maslahah’ to use the words ‘civil law,’ ‘civil state,’ 
and ‘self-determination,’ not submission to the demands of 
one’s crusader and apostate backers” 
36. “The extreme belief in conspiracy theories varies between 
minor and major shirk depending on the degree of power, 
knowledge, and ownership attributed by its believer to the 
kuffār” 
37. “If one were to reinterpret the history of the Muslims in 
accordance to the conspiracy theories of these theorists, he 
would come out with grave deviance” 
38. “the kuffār may appear united whereas their hearts are 
actually full of animosity and enmity for each other” 
39. “animosity and enmity between the followers of the 
different kufrī religions is manifest in their words” 
40. “the hypocritical allies of the kuffār are too unreliable to 
execute the orders of the kuffār” 
41. “that which has been revealed to you from your Lord will 
surely increase many of them [the Jews] in transgression and 
disbelief” 
42. “We have cast among them animosity and hatred until the 
Day of Resurrection”  
43. “This explains the great partisan hatred the various Jewish 
parties have for each other” 
44. “division and differing of the Jews and Christians and the 
animosity present between the two religions and their sects” 
45. “The Jews are humiliated in all the lands” 
46. “They [the Jews] have been put under humiliation wherever 
they are overtaken” 
47. “And they have drawn upon themselves anger from Allah 
and have been put under destitution” 
48. “the accursed Jews are always in humiliation and 
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overpowered” 
49. “And it was through Jewish-Crusader relationships and the 
self-degradation of the Arab apostates that the Jews gained 
mastery over the Arab tawāghīt” 
50. “Whoever believes that has fallen into shirk” 
51. “do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies” 
52. “different apostates waging nationalist wars always had 
open relationships with their kāfir allies” 
53. “The Iraqi Sahwah openly met with Bush, the Iraqi regime, 
and Rāfidī leaders”  
54. The ‘Islamic’ Sahwah factions of Iraq would openly fight 
alongside the tribal Sahwah against the Islamic State and 
would have public political representation under the shade 
of regional tawāghīt” 
55. “The Americans openly discuss their backing of the Syrian 
Sahwah and the support granted to its ‘Islamic’ factions by 
American allies – Qatar, Turkey, and Āl Salūl” 
56. “And long ago, the agents of the “Arab Revolt” would 
openly meet in Europe, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Shām, 
and Iraq with different crusader officials from amongst the 
British” 
57. “rival parties of the kuffār forming real alliances – like the 
Crusader-Safawī- Nusayrī coalition – to wage war against 
the Islamic State and thereby achieve their mutual kāfir 
interests” 
Ummah 1. “achieve the Ummah’s interest” 
2. “this sectarian mission aims at dividing the Ummah” 
3. “defeat the enemies of the Ummah” 
3 
Divine 
Sanction 
1. “vengeance for the honor of our beloved Prophet” 
2. “Their determination to support the cause of Allah and 
punish those who insult the Prophet” 
3. “Allah will surely support those who support Him” 
4. “May Allah expose the hypocritical and apostate allies of 
“al-Qā’idah” in Shām” 
5. “the enemies of Allah” 
6. “for the cause of Allah” 
7. “by which Allah erases your misdeeds and raises your 
ranks” 
8. “stayed up guarding for Allah’s cause” 
9. “Allah’s cause” (3 instances) 
10. “May Allah (ta’ālā) grant every Muslim the blessing of ribāt 
at the Khilāfah frontier posts and the patience needed to 
keep him firm until he meets Him” 
12 
Final 
Conflict 
1. “Day of Resurrection” 1 
Table 4: Dabiq Issue 9 
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Rumiyah Issue 3: Safar 1438 
 
Theme Data Frequency 
Jihad 1. “Since the beginnings of the jihad in Sham”  
2. “the soldiers of the Khilafah” 
3. “This fiery battle, all-encompassing war, and major jihad 
which the Islamic State is engaged in today” 
4. “lengthy history of this Ummah’s jihad against its enemies” 
5. “faith will not be complete in the soul of the Jama’ah of the 
Muslims until the Jama’ah is exposed… jihad against 
mankind” 
6. “Throughout our jihad and struggle against the coalitions of 
kufr” 
7. “lions of jihad” 
8. “waging jihad against your enemy” 
9. “join the jihad” 
10. “resume his jihad” 
11. “supporting the cause of Allah” 
11 
Sharia 1. “prevent the muwahhidin from establishing the religion and 
implementing the Shari’ah” 
2. “supporting the religion of Allah and making His word 
supreme” 
3. “topple anything that can be counted as being from the signs 
of the Shari’ah and its people” (referring to the Al Salul 
government) 
4. “in order to establish Allah’s rule on earth” 
5. “implementation of Allah’s Shari’ah” 
6. “memorizing the Quran” 
6 
Militancy 1. “the Islamic State calls Muslims to fight their enemies as 
much as they are able to” 
2. “this call… answered by dozens of hidden soldiers of Allah, 
sending fear into the east and west using their knives… any 
other weapons” 
3. “you must strike the Turkish taghut” 
4. “Fight them; Allah will punish them” 
5. “Start with the imams… Attack the police…  Attack the 
scholars of the taghut and the supporters of Erdogan’s 
political party (AKP) as 
6. well as other murtadd parties allied to him” 
7. “do not forget to kill the citizens of Crusader nations”  
8. “Therefore, O men of the Arabian Peninsula, O grandsons of 
the Sahabah, attack them, following one attack with 
another” 
9. “Know that today you are the armor and strong fort of 
Islam” 
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10. “He has burdened you with protecting it, defending it, and 
establishing Allah’s rule therein” 
11. “multitude of weapons and techniques” 
12. “harvest a large kill count” 
13. “reaping large numbers of casualties” 
14. “harvesting through his attack” 
15. “smashing their bodies” 
16. “crushing their heads, torsos, and limbs” 
17. “leaving behind a trail of carnage” 
18. “comprehensive methods of attack”  
19. “lethal methods of attack” 
20. “harvesting large numbers of the kuffar” 
21. “granting the level of carnage that is sought”  
22. “causing a blood bath” 
23. “ensuring the destruction” 
24. “giving victims less of a chance to escape” 
25. “Applicable Targets” 
26. “not conditional to target gatherings restricted to 
government or military” 
27. “parades and gatherings are fair game and more devastating” 
28. “I am a soldier of the Islamic State” 
29. “ensure utmost carnage” 
30. “until he is martyred” 
31. “the kill count can be maximized” 
32. “spending both his wealth and life” 
33. “to be allowed to defend the prophet” 
34. “battles… wide scale offensive” 
35. “several major towns were liberated” 
36. “fight for the cause of Allah, to kill and to be killed” 
Caliphate 1. “prevent the muwahhidin from establishing the religion” 
2. “the soldiers of the Khilafah” 
3. “burdened by seeing an example of Islamic rule being 
realized for the people, one that they could see and live” 
4. “a state wherein you can either live with glory or die with 
dignity, without the lowly Rafidah, wicked Nusayriyyah, 
and vile atheists daring to touch your honor” 
5. “Verily you will be victorious [over your enemy], will 
achieve [ghanimah], and will conquer [many lands], so 
whoever witnesses that must fear Allah, command virtue, 
and forbid vice” 
6. “He has burdened you with protecting it, defending it, and 
establishing Allah’s rule therein.” 
7. “To the soldiers of the Khilafah in Khurasan, Bengal, 
Indonesia, Qawqaz, the Philippines… West Africa: Know 
that today, you are the supports of Islam and the pegs of the 
Khilafah in the earth” 
8. “You have enraged the nations of kufr with your coming 
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together and waging jihad, just as they have equally been 
enraged by the rise of the Khilafah” 
9. “soldiers of the Khilafah” 
10. “the cradle of the Khilafah and fortress of Islam in Iraq and 
Sham” 
11. “the Khilafah did not stumble on account of their deaths” 
12. “The Islamic State will remain” 
13. “revival of the Khilafah” 
Hijrah 1. “O you whose path to performing hijrah to Dar al-Islam has 
been blocked by the murtadd” 
2. “O Muslims in the east and the west!” 
3. “if the roads for making hijrah to Iraq and Sham are closed 
or confined, then Allah has made an open path for them to 
make hijrah to one of those other blessed wilayat, where 
they might uphold another solid structure of Islam” 
4. “left for the blessed land of Sham to join the jihad” 
4 
Enmity 
against the 
West  
1. “Modern crusade against the usurped Muslim lands” 
2. “harmonious with the jahili American vision for the world, 
which they named the ‘New World Order’” 
3. “following the path of democracy and accepting secularism” 
(referring to Erdogan’s presidency)  
4. “assisted the Crusaders in hiding their embarrassing defeat” 
5. “hook up with the Crusader nations” 
6. “until its borders met the fate of other Sykes-Picot borders 
that the mujahidin had removed with their own hands” 
7. “the battle intensified between the Islamic State and the 
Crusader coalition” 
8. “did not heed the lesson of their Crusader allies, whom the 
mujahidin attacked and engaged in their own cities… as 
occurred in Paris and Brussels” 
9. “do not forget to kill the citizens of Crusader nations 
wherever you find them. Make examples of them for those 
behind them to be terrorstruck and take revenge by killing 
them for the crimes perpetrated against your brothers.” 
10. “here is the disbelieving world today having mobilized, 
called out, formed coalitions and parties… to wage war 
against Islam and its people and to plot against the believers 
and their religion with all means available and with 
everything it can muster of military equipment” 
“extinguish the light of Allah, in enmity towards His 
religion and methodology on the earth, and due to their fear 
and terror that the people of Islam and Sunnah” 
11. “Indeed, the enemies of Allah – the Jews, Christians, 
atheists, Rafidah, apostates, and all the nations of disbelief – 
dedicated their media, wealth, armies, and vehicles to wage 
war against the Muslims” 
12. “Seeing the Muslims living in honor and security therein 
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deprived them of sleep” 
13. “And this is what they fear most, because it is the path to 
spreading the authority of Islam and expanding its territory” 
14. “O soldiers of the Khilafah, if you stand before America’s 
planes and allies, then stand with steadfastness” 
15. “humiliation and disgrace… Do you not see the Rafidah, 
every day, afflicting you with the worst of torment?” 
16. “They raid your lands under the pretext of waging war 
against the Islamic State, then they don’t depart until they’ve 
either killed your men and taken your women and children 
prisoner” 
17. “Iraq having its cities emptied of Ahlus-Sunnah and filled 
with the most despicable of Allah’s creation and the most 
evil” 
18. “contemplate their deeds when they expel you from your 
land” 
19. “Here are your territories being divided up by the 
disbelieving” 
20. “Here is Halab, facing the most tyrannical and vicious 
Nusayri campaign with kafir, Magian, and Russian support, 
through which they aim to establish an alternative, Nusayri 
entity” 
21. “for the sake of the interests of their masters and backers 
from among the nations of kufr” 
22. “And the plots and schemes of the Romans continue to 
proceed forth… to put the Rafidah in power” 
23. “they took part – through actual military participation – with 
the nations of kufr in waging war against Islam and the 
Sunnah in Iraq and Sham” 
24. “Indeed, they are the head of every tribulation and the 
reason for every calamity” 
25. “Therefore, O men of the Arabian Peninsula, O grandsons of 
the Sahabah, attack them, following one attack with 
another” 
26. “Remember the final will of your prophet  that “there 
cannot exist two religions in the peninsula of the Arabs” 
27. “supported by Crusader coalition warplanes” 
28. “Crusaders in their war against the Khilafah” 
29. “a firm, military arm of the Crusader coalition against Islam 
and its people, an arm the Crusaders could not dispense with 
on the ground” 
30. “They are fighting with obscenity and infidelity in their 
hearts” 
31. “Crusader Europe has not ceased in their ambition to attack 
the cradle of the Khilafah and fortress of Islam in Iraq and 
Sham” 
32. “hardheaded, obstinate kafir nation that wishes to engage in 
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war on the Islamic State” 
33. “harvesting through his attack the slaughter of 86 Crusader 
citizens” 
34. “more devastating to Crusader nations” 
35. “harsh towards the kufar… inspiration for many Muslims 
around the world” 
36. “growing up in the lands of the Crusaders… ills of society 
are glamorized” 
37. “life of humiliation, living under the rule of the kuffar” 
38. “fight against the Crusader coalition forces” 
Non-
Muslims and 
Apostate 
Muslims 
1. “found no better than the Murtadd Brotherhood to be the 
role model” 
2. “realized the corruption of their creed and their allegiance to 
enemies of the religion” (referring to the Muslim 
Brotherhood) 
3. “most disgraceful school of the Murtadd Brotherhood” 
4. “swamp of shirk” 
5. “most loyal of them to the mushrikin”  
6. “the wicked Erdogan” 
7. “given an aura needed to deceive the fools of mankind” 
8. “helped them establish the foundations of the Rafidi 
government in Baghdad” 
9. “Erdogan… strived to drag the various militant factions into 
relationships with him” 
10. “with the backing of Erdogan’s army” 
11. “Erdogan and his vile state attempted to keep their war on 
the Islamic State ‘under wraps,’ hiding behind the murtadd 
factions” 
12. “muwahhidin would turn on turkey, igniting it in a blazing 
war that would not be extinguished”  
13. “the Turkish taghut revealed his prepared role” 
14. “commanding his artillery to pound the villages and cities of 
the Muslims” 
15. “his own evil” 
16. “whoever feels himself safe from vengeance, has only 
himself to blame” (referring to Erdogan’s complacency”) 
17. “did not heed the lesson of other murtadd governments, 
upon whom Allah has sent the soldiers of the Islamic State”  
18. “the mujahidin destroyed their buildings and demolished 
their foundations” 
19. “The Turkish government today, by entering into an open 
war with the Islamic State, is only cutting its own throat 
with its own knife… hanging itself with its own ropes” 
20. “the murtadd, Turkish border patrol forces!” 
21. “strike the Turkish taghut and his murtadd followers” 
22. “Start with the imams of kufr and the pillars of taghut 
therein. Attack the police, judges, and military. Attack the 
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scholars of the taghut and the supporters of Erdogan’s 
political party (AKP) as 
23. well as other murtadd parties allied to him” 
24. “So We thus removed them from gardens, springs, treasures, 
and an honorable station” 
25. “We drowned the others” 
26. “Our punishment cannot be repelled from the people who 
are criminals” 
27. “Turn the disbelievers’ night into day, bring destruction to 
their homes, make their blood flow like rivers” 
28. “You have made the disbelievers taste horrors and have 
rubbed their noses in swamps” 
29. “your rulers in the region have practiced the lowest and most 
despicable form of treachery history has known” 
30. “all in the midst of the treachery of the apostate factions, 
which are busy fighting the Islamic State” 
31. “extensive corruption the government of Al Salul engages in 
to secularize the land, turn all its people into disbelievers, 
spread immorality among them” 
32. “Before you are the enemies of Allah… Before you are their 
cronies and their journalists. Before you are their leaders, 
their ministers, and their media trumpets” 
33. “the secular, apostate state of Turkey had been despicable 
and cowardly” 
34. “only to retract out of fear that the mujahidin would engulf 
its lands with fiery operations and scorching battles” 
35. ”Indeed, their heedlessness will be their destruction” 
36. “Turkey today has become a target for your operations and 
priority for your jihad, so seek Allah’s assistance and attack 
it” 
37. “Turn their security into panic and their prosperity into 
dread, and add it to the scorching zones of your combat” 
38. “the Turkish kafir soldier has come to you while his blood is 
vile like that of a dog” 
39. “Show them your strength, burn them with the fire of your 
wrath, and take revenge for your religion” 
40. “the brothers of Shaytan, role models for the murtaddin, and 
allies of the atheists” 
41. “Indeed, the Murtadd Brotherhood has emerged as a 
poisoned spearhead carried by the Crusaders in their war 
against the Khilafah” 
42. “kufr of this deviant sect did not stop at their committing 
shirk with Allah” 
43. “a firm, military arm of the Crusader coalition against Islam 
and its people” (referring to the Muslim Brotherhood) 
44. “Their brothers increase them in deviance, then they do not 
stop” 
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45. “They are fighting, and they shall end in the Fire” 
46. “Do not be like those nations who passed before you, who 
took a portion and left another, so Allah put enmity and 
hatred between them” 
47. “enemies of Allah” (3 instances) 
48. “stabbed a kafir in the back of the head with a pen for 
insulting the prophet” 
49. “these people were upon falsehood” 
50. “join the fight against the Crusader coalition forces” 
Ummah 1. “lengthy history of this Ummah’s jihad against its enemies” 
2. “Be patient with the bitterness, for it is as if the Ummah’s 
division will be healed soon” 
3. “for the religion and the Ummah” 
3 
Divine 
Sanction 
1. “soldiers of Allah” 
2. “by Allah’s permission” 
3. “Allah will punish them at your hands, He will disgrace 
them, He will support you against them, and He will heal the 
breasts of a believing people”  
4. “as perhaps Allah will restrain them through you” 
5. “And Allah is mightier than them and more severe in 
torment” 
6. “it is the promise of Allah that He has made and His news 
that He has affirmed” 
7. “precursor to the solid victory and a sign of the clear 
conquest that Allah has promised His slaves” 
8. “Allah, His Messenger, and His religion... which belongs to 
Allah and which He makes whom He wills of His slaves 
inherit” 
9. “Allah defends His slaves and the effects of His strength, 
His might, and His power appear” 
10. “Allah intended to establish the truth by His words and to 
eliminate the disbelievers, that He should establish the truth 
and abolish falsehood” 
11. “relying upon Him in whose hand is the domain of the 
heavens and the earth” 
12. “Indeed, my Lord is on a straight path” 
13. “if the sky were to clamp down on the earth, Allah would 
make an opening for the believers” 
14. “go forth with Allah’s blessing, for indeed, this war is your 
war” 
15. “you will find the richest share of reward and means for 
achieving great success, attaining the companionship of 
those upon whom Allah has bestowed favor” 
16. “May Allah reward you with good on behalf of Islam and 
the Muslims” 
17. “You were, and continue to be – after Allah – the best 
source of support, strength, and aid” 
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18. “which strive to remove Allah’s rule from the earth” 
19. “After Allah, you have nothing but the Islamic State to 
protect your religion” 
20. “so seek Allah’s assistance and attack it” 
21. “And verily Allah is with the people of taqwa” 
22. “This is what Allah and His Messenger promised us” 
23. “who strive for Allah’s cause in order to establish Allah’s 
rule on earth” 
24. “May Allah kill them! How deluded they are” 
25. “beware – may Allah have mercy upon you – that Islam and 
Muslims be hurt from your direction, for the sunan of Allah 
are not partial to anyone” 
26. “Allah has employed you and has made you inheritors of the 
earth in order to see how you act” 
27. “practice fear of Allah and obedience to Him to gain His 
support and promise” 
28. “in all conditions, for indeed fearing Allah is the best 
weapon against the enemy and the strongest strategy of war” 
29. “Truly, the Muslims are only supported because of their 
enemy’s disobedience to Allah” 
30. “if we do not defeat them due to our virtue, we will not 
overcome them by our might” 
31. “there are angels from Allah who know what you are doing, 
so have shame before them and do not act in disobedience to 
Allah while you are fighting for his cause” 
32. “Ask Allah for help against yourselves just as you ask Him 
for support against your enemy” 
33. “If you have left a land due to your sins, reclaim it by 
repenting and fearing your Lord, for it is only right that you 
do so” 
34. “Remember that your enemy is fighting for the cause of 
taghut, while you are fighting for Allah’s cause” 
35. “They are fighting, and they shall end in the Fire” 
36. “declaring the tawhid of your Lord, waging jihad against 
your enemy, and striving to make Allah’s word supreme in 
the land” 
37. “When you encounter an enemy, stand firm and remember 
Allah much that you may be successful” 
38. “Allah is with the patient” 
39. “Listen to them as a means to get closer to Allah, and obey 
them as an act of worship for Allah” (referring to ISIS 
leadership) 
40. “Know that if some of your leaders are killed, then Allah 
will replace them with those who are equal or better than 
them” 
41. “Allah will not neglect you, so do not be disheartened” 
42. “Truly, Allah is with us” 
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43. “you can expect from Allah that for which they cannot 
hope” 
44. “We ask that Allah make your liberation at our hands and 
the destruction of your prisons through our weapons” 
45. “Allah is preparing you for a day on which you will support 
your religion and your state” 
46. “for your brothers in the Islamic State, that Allah gives them 
right guidance in their affairs, that He provides them with 
the best of His provision” 
47. “Yet we give you glad tidings, by Allah’s grace and favor, 
that the Khilafah did not stumble on account of their deaths” 
48. “offerings before Allah, seeking His pleasure and requesting 
clear victory and near conquest, by Allah’s permission” 
49. “O Allah, Revealer of the Book, Mover of the Clouds, 
Vanquisher of the Factions! Vanquish them and support us 
against them!” 
50. “O Allah, punish the criminal kuffar, those who avert from 
Your cause, who belie Your messengers, and who fight 
against Your awliya” 
51. “O Allah, eradicate them, kill them while dispersed, and do 
not leave any of them alive!” 
52. “O Allah, scatter their multitudes and divide their unity!” 
53. “O Allah, whoever seeks to harm us, our religion, and our 
jihad, then make his harm come back at him, until he is 
destroyed by his own hands!” 
54. “O Allah, plot for us and not against us!” 
55. “Guide us, facilitate our guidance, and support us against 
those who transgress against us!” 
56. “destruction upon the enemies of Allah”  
57. “terrorizing the enemies of Allah” 
58. “allegiance to the Khalifah… making Allah’s word 
supreme” 
59. “carnage upon the enemies of Allah” 
60. “remembrance of Allah and the sincerity of intending the 
attack solely to please Him” 
61. “repeat du’a for His assistance and acceptance” 
62. “Exalted is Allah, who subdued this for us” 
63. “seeking Allah’s contentment” 
64. “spending both his wealth and his life for the sake of Allah” 
65. “loved Allah… more than anything or anyone else” 
66. “he did not lose hope in Allah’s mercy” 
67. “by Allah’s grace” 
68. “the religion of Allah” 
69. “supporting the cause of Allah” 
70. “fight for the cause of Allah, to kill and to be killed” 
“I did this for You, my Lord” 
71. “Allah had something else destined for him” 
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72. “May Allah elevate his status” 
Final 
Conflict 
1. “clear sign of our enemy’s destruction and eradication being 
near is the day they embark on war and declare it against 
Allah” 
2. “the beginning of our victory” 
3. “Remember the final will of your prophet  that “there 
cannot exist two religions in the peninsula of the Arabs” 
4. “Verily you will be victorious [over your enemy], will 
achieve [ghanimah]” 
4 
Table 5: Rumiyah Issue 3 
 
Rumiyah Issue 9: Sha’ban 1438 
 
Theme Data Frequency 
Jihad 1. “a man would be put into a hole dug into the ground, then a 
saw would be brought to him, put onto his head, and then he 
would be cut into two parts – and that would not avert him 
from his religion”  
2. “His skin would be flayed with metal combs, tearing his 
flesh from his bone and nerves – and that would not avert 
him from his religion” 
3. “jihad will continue as a constant factor on the earth” 
4. “watching the mujahidin’s video releases and following their 
written and recorded news nurtures within the lion cub the 
love of jihad and the mujahidin and hatred towards their 
enemies” 
5. “We ask Allah to grant us righteous offspring and to bring 
forth from us a generation that will wage jihad for His cause 
and bring victory to His religion” 
5 
Sharia 1. “through their blessed deeds – not just their words – revived 
shar’i rulings which the tawaghit and their allies endeavored 
to either wipe out or replace” 
2. “through their membership in the taghut’s army, security 
and intelligence agencies, and police force, which wage war 
against the Muslims and guard the shari’ah of the taghut” 
3. “And in killing them there is the greatest of rewards, by 
Allah’s permission” 
3 
Militancy 1. “So Kill the Mushrikin Wherever You Find Them” 
2. “kill the musrhikin wherever you find them and capture 
them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every 
place of ambush” 
3. “’I was commanded to fight the people until they say ‘La 
ilaha illallah’” 
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4. “As such, they are from the leaders of kufr whom Allah c 
has commanded us to fight” 
5. “they are killed by a weapon that has a wide range of 
damage, as is the case when conducting artillery 
bombardment, or detonating explosive belts or car bombs in 
places where the fighters are present and they are mixed 
together with them” 
6. “the evidence for the permissibility of targeting them with 
such weapons is the action of the Prophet g in setting up a 
catapult against the people of Taif even though there were 
those inside their fortresses who were not to be intentionally 
killed and who were mixed with the fighters in a manner in 
which it wasn’t possible to distinguish between them” 
7. “if they are inside a fortress, it is permissible to set up 
catapults against them, shoot fire at them, and drown them” 
8. “the priests who serve as caretakers over their churches… 
are to be killed and enslaved” 
9. “one should seek closeness to Allah by targeting the priests, 
monks, and others (those who serve as caretakers over the 
churches of the belligerent Christians, including the 
Christians of Misr), harming them and killing them” 
10. “As for the monk who aids the people of his religion with 
his hand and his tongue, such as one who has an opinion 
which they seek when it comes to fighting or incites them, 
he is to be killed by the agreement of the scholars if he is 
subdued… even if he secluded in solitude in his place of 
worship” 
11. “Then, When You Have Inflicted a Massacre, Secure Their 
Bonds” 
12. “‘So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike 
[their] necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon 
them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor 
afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its 
burdens’” 
13. “Muslims in Misr and elsewhere from among the lands of 
kufr can imprison the Christians, after having inflicted a 
massacre on them, their old and their young, and their men 
and their women” 
14. “lands taken by force” (3 instances) 
15. “‘They destroyed their houses by their [own] hands and the 
hands of the believers’” 
16. “targeting these churches with ruin and destruction is a 
matter that is permitted in the Shari’ah, and it is allowed to 
use this as a means of attaining closeness to Allah” 
17. “Christians – including the Christians of Misr – do not have 
any sanctity with regards to their blood and their wealth 
because they are belligerent and do not have dhimmah” 
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18. “If anyone from among them is killed, his blood is waste, 
and likewise their wealth is permissible for the Muslims to 
take” 
19. “And from among the greatest means of causing them 
detriment is to harm and kill their fighters” 
20. “target their churches and monasteries with destruction and 
ruin, until they believe in Allah the Almighty or give the 
jizyah willingly while humbled” 
21. “And sufficient was Allah for the believers in battle, and 
ever is Allah Powerful and Exalted in Might” 
22. “shahadah (martyrdom) according to Allah is of the highest 
ranks for His allies” 
23. “The shuhada are His special people, those brought close 
from amongst His slaves”  
24. “He c loves to take His slaves as shuhada, having their blood 
shed for His love and contentment, while they prefer His 
pleasure and love over their own selves” 
25. “There is no way to achieve this rank except through those 
means that would lead to dominating the enemy” 
26. “Allah says, ‘Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it 
is hateful to you… But perhaps you hate a thing and it is 
good for you’” 
27. “they grow up with their eyes becoming accustomed to 
seeing weapons and equipment, including rifles, tactical 
vests, bullets, grenades, and explosive belts.” 
28. “The first thing that ‘Abdullah Ibn az-Zubayr said when he 
was little was ‘the sword, the sword’” 
Caliphate 1. “Every woman to whom Allah has granted the blessing of 
giving birth in the Islamic State should take advantage of 
this tremendous grace” 
2. “such is the likes of what the generation of the Khilafah 
must be raised upon so that it becomes a firm and course 
generation” 
3. “among the greatest of Allah’s blessings upon the lion cubs 
in the Khilafah – which the mother should recognize and 
take advantage of, and for which she should thank Allah c – 
is that they are raised in the home and under the wing of a 
mujahid father” 
3 
Hijrah None 0 
Enmity 
against the 
West  
1. “Muslims are being killed in the east and in the west – men, 
women, children, and the elderly altogether” 
2. “mushrikin and murtaddin are deploying all manner of 
destructive weaponry against them, raining devastation on 
their villages and towns” 
3. “[apostates are] disavowing themselves of every attack 
carried out against their Crusader allies, claiming that Islam 
does not permit such deeds and accusing those who carry 
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them out of tarnishing the religion’s image” 
4. “the souls of the Christians are precious to [the tawaghit], 
and the Crusader nations behind them would seek them and 
defend them” 
5. “This is what we are certain of in our war with the boastful 
cross-bearing American taghut” 
6. “Even though they have their force and their tyrannical use 
of weapons and equipment, they face psychological 
degradation and a collapse of morale, the likes of which 
would crush mountains” 
7. “beware of comfort and of the clothing of the non-Arabs” 
Non-
Muslims and 
Apostate 
Muslims 
1. “evil scholars, the preachers of misguidance, and the 
tawaghit of the democratic parties are busy weeping over 
every mushrik struck by the hands of the mujahidin” 
2. “[apostates are] disavowing themselves of every attack 
carried out against their Crusader allies, claiming that Islam 
does not permit such deeds and accusing those who carry 
them out of tarnishing the religion’s image” 
3. “Their sinful tongues and filthy pens even go so far as to 
give those harbi (belligerent) kuffar protection with respect 
to their blood and their wealth, and to defame the noble 
muwahhidin” 
4. “through their blessed deeds – not just their words – revived 
shar’i rulings which the tawaghit and their allies endeavored 
to either wipe out or replace” 
5. “From among these blessed deeds were the successive 
attacks which the soldiers of the Islamic State in Misr and 
Sinai carried out against the Christians in those lands, 
targeting them with killings and assassinations, and 
afflicting their churches with burning and explosions” 
6. “they brought upon them tremendous detriment and 
deepened their wounds”  
7. “The last of the blessed attacks against them were the 
simultaneous explosions at two of their largest churches” 
8. “More than 200 of the Christian mushrikin and their 
supporters from among the murtadd soldiers of the taghut 
were killed and wounded, and to Allah belongs all praise” 
9. “the condition of the Christians in Misr, as well as the ruling 
of Islam concerning their blood, their wealth, their honor, 
and their churches, so that those who live may live upon 
evidence and those who perish may perish upon evidence” 
10. “So Kill the Mushrikin Wherever You Find Them” 
11. “default with regards to the blood of mushrikin is that it is 
permissible to shed” 
12. “kill the musrhikin wherever you find them and capture 
them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every 
place of ambush” 
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13. “Committing shirk with Allah is a sin that makes one 
permissible to be killed, and believing in Him gives one 
protection, as the Prophet g said” 
14. “I was commanded to fight the people until they say ‘La 
ilaha illallah’” 
15. The mushrikin cannot render their blood inviolable except 
through a dhimmah contract, or a covenant of security or 
safety” 
16. “The inviolability of their blood in such cases would be an 
exceptional ruling, and whenever that ruling is terminated… 
their blood would go back to the default ruling of it being 
permissible to shed, and there is no disagreement among the 
Muslims in that regard” 
17. “No Protection for Their Blood Except through Faith or a 
Covenant of Security” 
18. “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day 
and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His 
Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the 
religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture – 
[fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are 
humbled” 
19. “The Christians residing in Misr today are belligerent 
kuffar” 
20. “The belligerent (i.e. harbi) kafir is the one The aftermath of 
an attack on the belligerent Christians of Misr 7 who is 
neither a dhimmi nor one who’s been granted security, 
regardless of whether he is a combatant or non-combatant, 
or whether he defames Islam or does not, or whether he 
transgresses against the blood, wealth, and honor of the 
Muslims or does not” 
21. “the Christians of Misr… commit all of these 
transgressions” 
22. “The Christians of Misr possess weapons in preparation to 
fight the Muslims” 
23. “they are engaged in fighting the Muslims through their 
continuous transgressions against any Christian who 
embraces Islam, kidnapping them, killing them, and putting 
them through trial and tribulation in order to make them 
return to shirk”  
24. “through their membership in the taghut’s army, security 
and intelligence agencies, and police force, which wage war 
against the Muslims and guard the shari’ah of the taghut, 
and they are among the most sincere supporters of the taghut 
Sisi in Misr, and among his closest allies and most loyal 
partners in his war against Islam and the Muslims” 
25. “they, their priests, and their monks are among the people 
most active in defaming the religion of Islam, the Noble 
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Quran, and the Messenger g” 
26. “As such, they are from the leaders of kufr whom Allah c 
has commanded us to fight” 
27. “Allah c said, ‘And if they break their oaths after their 
covenant and defame your religion, then fight the leaders of 
kufr, for indeed, they have no covenant; [fight them that] 
they might cease’” 
28. “With the permissibility of shedding the blood of belligerent 
Christians in general, including the Christians of Misr, it is 
the fighters among them who are to be targeted, and they are 
those who are capable of carrying a weapon, even if they 
don’t actually do so, and likewise those of them who support 
the fighters with their opinion and counsel” 
29. “As for those who don’t normally carry weapons, such as 
women, children, the elderly, and the infirm, the default with 
them is that they are to be taken as slaves, not that they are 
to be killed” 
30. “This is despite their blood not being protected since they 
continue to remain upon their shirk, and in that regard, 
children take the ruling of their fathers”  
31. “Furthermore, anyone among them who carries a weapon – 
regardless of whether they are a child or a woman – is to be 
killed, and whoever participates in the fighting by offering 
his opinion and counsel is likewise to be killed, even if he is 
from the elderly and infirm” 
32. “With regards to those of the non-combatant women and 
children from among the belligerent Christians who are 
killed unintentionally, their blood is waste – just like the 
blood of the combatants – because their blood is not 
protected since they neither embraced Islam nor do they 
have a covenant” 
33. “‘Allah’s Messenger g was asked about the children of the 
mushrikin who are raided at night and [as a result], they (i.e. 
the Muslims) strike their women and children [in the raid]’” 
34. “the killing of their women and children occurs as a 
consequence and is not deliberate, such as when they are 
killed in a raid by the mujahidin where it is difficult to 
distinguish between the fighters and the non-fighters” 
35. “they are killed by a weapon that has a wide range of 
damage, as is the case when conducting artillery 
bombardment, or detonating explosive belts or car bombs in 
places where the fighters are present and they are mixed 
together with them” 
36. “the evidence for the permissibility of targeting them with 
such weapons is the action of the Prophet g in setting up a 
catapult against the people of Taif even though there were 
those inside their fortresses who were not to be intentionally 
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killed and who were mixed with the fighters in a manner in 
which it wasn’t possible to distinguish between them” 
37. “in this is evidence for the permissibility of night raids and 
the killing of mushrikin in negligence and inattentiveness – 
even if it leads to their women and children being struck – 
and that the prohibition of killing their women and children 
applies to situations when they can be distinguished and 
separated” 
38. “if they are inside a fortress, it is permissible to set up 
catapults against them, shoot fire at them, and drown them” 
39. [referring to monks] “As for the one who mixes with them, 
or calls to their false religion, or advises and counsels them, 
his ruling does not differ from the ruling on the rest of their 
fighters”  
40. “Rather, he is even more severe in kufr and in waging war 
than they are” 
41. “the fuqaha differentiated between the monks who are 
secluded in the monasteries and the deserts, and the priests 
who serve as caretakers over their churches, for the latter are 
to be killed and enslaved, in contrast with the former, even 
though the blood of these monks has no sanctity due to them 
remaining upon their shirk and kufr of Allah the Almighty” 
42. “one should seek closeness to Allah by targeting the priests, 
monks, and others (those who serve as caretakers over the 
churches of the belligerent Christians, including the 
Christians of Misr), harming them and killing them” 
43. “As for the monk who aids the people of his religion with 
his hand and his tongue, such as one who has an opinion 
which they seek when it comes to fighting or incites them, 
he is to be killed by the agreement of the scholars if he is 
subdued, and he has jizyah taken from him even if he 
secluded in solitude in his place of worship” 
44. “Then, When You Have Inflicted a Massacre, Secure Their 
Bonds” 
45. “If we know that the blood of the Christians is permissible to 
shed, we know that taking them as slaves is also permissible, 
and likewise taking them prisoner and ransoming them for 
our prisoners or for wealth after having inflicted a massacre 
on them, due to the statement of Allah c” 
46. “‘So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike 
[their] necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon 
them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor 
afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its 
burdens’” 
47. “Muslims in Misr and elsewhere from among the lands of 
kufr can imprison the Christians, after having inflicted a 
massacre on them, their old and their young, and their men 
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and their women” 
48. “There is no sanctity for the Christians’ churches in and of 
themselves, as they are places in which shirk and kufr are 
practiced” 
49. “Concerning the churches of the Christians, Imam Ibn 
Taymiyyah r said, ‘They are not the houses of Allah – the 
houses of Allah are only the masajid’” 
50. “they are houses in which the kufr of Allah is practiced, 
even if He is mentioned therein [with reverence]”  
51. “‘Houses take the ruling of their people, and the people of 
these houses are kuffar, so they are houses for the kuffar’s 
worship’” 
52. “‘If a person believes that churches are the houses of Allah, 
or that He is worshiped therein, or that what the Jews and 
Christians do is worship of Allah and obedience towards 
Him and towards His Messenger, or that He loves that or is 
pleased with it, then he is a kafir, because this entails 
believing that their religion is correct, and that is kufr’” 
53. “‘if he helps them in opening it – meaning: the churches – 
and in establishing their religion, and believes this to be a 
means of attaining closeness to Allah or an act of obedience, 
then he is a kafir, because this entails believing that their 
religion is correct’” 
54. “in any land which the Muslims have taken from them by 
force, then the Muslims are allowed to demolish or take the 
churches found there, even if they were to have agreed to 
these churches being present in some previous era of time” 
55. “when they breach their covenant, the sanctity of the 
churches ceases to exist and it is permissible for the 
Muslims to demolish them and remove them, as the sanctity 
is for the covenant, not for the churches”” 
56. “‘The Muslims have taken many churches from them – in 
lands taken by force – after the presence of the churches 
were previously agreed to, during the khilafah of ‘Umar Ibn 
‘Abdil-‘Aziz and others from among the khulafa, and there 
was no one from among the Muslims who condemned that’” 
57. “‘Therefore, it was known that demolishing churches in 
lands taken by force is permissible if it does not lead to harm 
befalling the Muslims’” 
58. “the churches… become like the rest of their wealth, which 
the Muslims are allowed to make use of in that which is 
permitted for them” 
59. “‘it becomes permissible to take the churches of [the lands 
taken through a] treaty, let alone the churches of [the lands 
taken by] force, just as the Prophet g took what belonged to 
[the Jews of the tribes of] Quraydhah, and Nadir when they 
violated their covenant’” 
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60. “The Prophet g and his companions ruined and destroyed the 
wealth and homes of the mushrikin” 
61. “‘They destroyed their houses by their [own] hands and the 
hands of the believers’” 
62. “[Allah] also said, ‘Whatever you have cut down of [their] 
palm trees or left standing on their trunks – it was by 
permission of Allah and so He would disgrace the defiantly 
disobedient’” 
63. “burn or ruin it” 
64. “targeting these churches with ruin and destruction is a 
matter that is permitted in the Shari’ah, and it is allowed to 
use this as a means of attaining closeness to Allah” 
65. “Christians – including the Christians of Misr – do not have 
any sanctity with regards to their blood and their wealth 
because they are belligerent and do not have dhimmah” 
66. “If anyone from among them is killed, his blood is waste, 
and likewise their wealth is permissible for the Muslims to 
take” 
67. “And from among the greatest means of causing them 
detriment is to harm and kill their fighters” 
68. “target their churches and monasteries with destruction and 
ruin, until they believe in Allah the Almighty or give the 
jizyah willingly while humbled” 
69. “He was killed and the mushrikin had mutilated his body” 
70. “the enemy of truth, however arrogant and excessive he may 
be, will taste all sorts of mental anguish before he harms his 
opponent” 
71. “among those things that are hidden from people lacking 
insight is the complete true life promised by Allah to His 
allies and pure worshiper” 
72. “the believers recognized that they had an enemy amongst 
them, an enemy that would not leave them; so they prepared 
for them and took their guard against them” 
73. “Say, ‘I believe in Allah and disbelieve in taghut’” 
74. watching the mujahidin’s video releases and following their 
written and ‘recorded news nurtures within the lion cub the 
love of jihad and the mujahidin and hatred towards their 
enemies’” 
75. “he is a mushrik, as Allah c made clear in His statement, 
‘They have taken their scribes’ meaning their scholars, ‘and 
monks’ meaning their devout worshipers ‘as lords besides 
Allah, and [also] the Messiah, the son of Mary’” 
76. “So let those beware who dissent from his (i.e. the 
Prophet’s) order, lest fitnah strike them” 
77. “but not the ignorant and rough-mannered blind followers, 
as their likes are not from the people of knowledge” 
78. “Whoever turns away from it, then indeed, he will bear on 
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the Day of Resurrection a burden, [abiding] eternally therein 
and evil it is for them on the Day of Resurrection as a load” 
Ummah 1. “There will not cease to be a group from my ummah, 
standing by the command of Allah – not harmed by those 
who betray them or oppose them – until Allah’s command 
comes and they are as such” 
2. “painstakingly endeavor to raise her children in a manner 
that pleases her Lord and brings benefit to her ummah” 
3. “ensure that her children speak the Arabic language and 
ensure that their Arabic is correct and free of linguistic 
errors, and for her to strive to teach them the Arabic 
language if they are not Arabs, so that they can learn the 
affairs of their religion and mix and associate with the 
Jama’ah of the Muslims” 
4. “concern they showed towards the language in which the 
Book of Allah was revealed” 
4 
Divine 
Sanction 
1. “noble muwahhidin, who carried out Allah’s judgment on 
the mushrikin” 
2. “and to Allah belongs all praise [for the attacks]” 
3. “it is Allah who guides to the straight path [of attack]” 
4. “As such, they are from the leaders of kufr whom Allah c 
has commanded us to fight” 
5. “their shirk and kufr of Allah the Almighty” 
6. “And in killing them there is the greatest of rewards, by 
Allah’s permission” 
7. “If we know that the blood of the Christians is permissible to 
shed, we know that taking them as slaves is also permissible, 
and likewise taking them prisoner and ransoming them for 
our prisoners or for wealth after having inflicted a massacre 
on them, due to the statement of Allah c” 
8. “target their churches and monasteries with destruction and 
ruin, until they believe in Allah the Almighty or give the 
jizyah willingly while humbled” 
9. “These were those who found pleasure in joining him, as if 
they were joyful in offering their souls as ransoms for their 
religion” 
10. “Among the believers are men true to what they promised 
Allah” 
11. “And sufficient was Allah for the believers in battle, and 
ever is Allah Powerful and Exalted in Might” 
12. “And if you are patient and fear Allah, their plot will not 
harm you at all” 
13. “‘There will not cease to be a group from my ummah, 
standing by the command of Allah – not harmed by those 
who betray them or oppose them – until Allah’s command 
comes and they are as such’” 
14. “Victory and the fate of this religion is in the hand of Allah 
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c. He has vouched for it and has promised it” 
15. “If He wills, He will support it and make it dominant, and if 
He wills, He will delay that from happening” 
16. “So if He causes a delay, then it is due to a decreed wisdom 
for the welfare of iman and its people – and no one is more 
ardent in their support for the truth and its people than 
Allah” 
17. “He gives victory to whom He wills” 
18. “Allah does not fail in His promise, but most of the people 
do not know” 
19. “For indeed Allah c – magnificent is His ability, mighty is 
His grandeur – grants victory to the believers sometimes, 
and sometimes He tests them, restricting them of this 
blessing so that they taste tribulations” 
20. “for indeed after Allah gave victory to the Muslims over 
their enemies” 
21. “Allah’s  wisdom came to bring about a test for His slaves” 
22. “if Allah c always supported the believers and gave them 
victory over their enemy in every battle, giving them 
consolidation over their enemies in every case, their souls 
would transgress and become arrogant and proud” 
23. “Allah manages the affairs of His slaves according to His 
wisdom – and He is Aware of them and Watchful over 
them” 
24. “the servitude of His allies and His party is brought out 
during good times and bad times, during that which they 
love and that which they hate, in the state of their victory 
and that of their enemies” 
25. “if they remain steadfast upon worshipful obedience in what 
they love and hate, they are truly His slaves, unlike one who 
worships Allah only during good, blessed, and healthy 
times” 
26. “He tests them with defeat and being conquered, they are 
humiliated, divided, and subdued, until they seek His might 
and support” 
27. “if He c wants to bolster, support, and mend His slave, He 
breaks him first” 
28. “His mending him, bolstering him, and support for him, is 
all in accordance with how much he faced of humiliation 
and division” 
29. “Of them is that Allah c prepared for His believing slaves 
homes in the abode of His generosity – their deeds will not 
reach them, but they will only come to them through trial 
and tribulation” 
30. “He will send to them the means by which they will reach 
these homes by ordaining tests and trials for them” 
31. “He grants them success in accomplishing righteous deeds” 
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32. “He decreed for them to be tested and tried as a treatment to 
that impairing sickness” 
33. “trials and tribulations are like the physician who gives his 
patient some unpleasant medicine in order to remove his 
ailments” 
34. “shahadah (martyrdom) according to Allah is of the highest 
ranks for His allies” 
35. “The shuhada are His special people, those brought close 
from amongst His slaves”  
36. “He c loves to take His slaves as shuhada, having their blood 
shed for His love and contentment, while they prefer His 
pleasure and love over their own selves” 
37. “There is no way to achieve this rank except through those 
means that would lead to dominating the enemy” 
38. “Allah knows, while you know not” 
39. “Allah knows what the slave does not know” 
40. “there is nothing more beneficial for him than complying 
with the command, even if that is difficult for him at first” 
41. “he does not choose anything over his Lord’s decision, but 
only asks Him to choose what is best for him and asks that 
He makes him content with what He chooses for him – as 
there is nothing more beneficial for him than that” 
42. “he entrusts his affair entirely to Allah and is content with 
whatever He chooses for him, asking Him to give him the 
strength, resolve, and patience to see it through” 
43. “which Allah c has not granted to many other women” 
44. “painstakingly endeavor to raise her children in a manner 
that pleases her Lord and brings benefit to her ummah” 
45. “Allah c is with His slave”  
46. “he learns to fear Allah , internally venerates the affair of 
his Creator, and perceives that He is watching him in secret 
and in public” 
47. “We ask Allah to grant us righteous offspring and to bring 
forth from us a generation that will wage jihad for His cause 
and bring victory to His religion” 
48. “obedience to Allah in accordance with that which He has 
ordered upon the tongues of His messengers” 
Final 
Conflict 
1. “Whoever turns away from it, then indeed, he will bear on 
the Day of Resurrection a burden, [abiding] eternally therein 
and evil it is for them on the Day of Resurrection as a load” 
1 
Table 6: Rumiyah Issue 9 
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